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I. INTRODUCTION
Child sexual abuse is often exceedingly difficult to prove. Molesta-
tion occurs in secret, and the child is usually the only eyewitness.1
While many children are capable witnesses, some cannot take the
1. In re Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112, 117, 518 N.E.2d 914, 915 (1987).
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stand.2 Most children find the courtroom a foreboding place, and
when a child is asked to testify against a familiar person, even a par-
ent, the experience can be overwhelming. Consequently, children's
testimony is sometimes ineffective. The problems engendered by inef-
fective testimony and lack of eyewitnesses are compounded by the
paucity of physical evidence in many child sexual abuse cases. 3 Faced
with a vacuum of evidence, attorneys increasingly turn to physicians,
psychiatrists, social workers, and psychologists to provide expert testi-
mony regarding child sexual abuse.4
Allegations of child sexual abuse arise in eight types of legal pro-
ceedings: criminal prosecutions; juvenile delinquency litigation; juve-
nile court proceedings to protect abused children; child custody and
visitation litigation incident to divorce; proceedings to terminate pa-
rental rights; civil suits brought by victims against perpetrators for
monetary damages; civil litigation against child protective service
agencies and professionals for failing to protect children from sexual
abuse; and administrative proceedings to suspend or revoke profes-
sional or facility licenses. While the form of expert testimony may
vary slightly with the type of proceeding involved, expert testimony
on child sexual abuse plays an important role in each forum.
Beginning in approximately 1980, a substantial body of case law
emerged on expert testimony in child sexual abuse litigation. An ex-
plosion of decisions occurred in the years following 1985. The ink is
barely dry on one opinion before the next is added. It is difficult to
keep abreast of the burgeoning decisional law in this area.
When complex new subjects are introduced in the law of evidence,
it takes a number of years for courts to achieve consensus regarding
2. For discussion of children as witnesses, see generally J. MYERS, CHILD WITNESS:
LAW AND PRACTICE (1987) [hereinafter J. MYERS].
3. For discussion of medical evidence of child sexual abuse, see infra section IV (A).
4. The authors are aware of the debate regarding the limits of expertise of mental
health professionals. Some commentators argue for significant limitations on the
use of mental health professionals as expert witnesses. In the present Article,
the authors have decided not to address the ongoing debate. As things currently
stand, courts permit properly qualified mental health professionals to testify as
experts. The present Article can be most helpful to bench and bar by accepting
the fact that mental health professionals will continue to testify as experts, and
by focusing our discussion on the uses and limits of such experts. We express no
opinion regarding the proper outcome of the larger debate.
For commentary discussing the limits of mental health expertise, see J. ZIS-
KIN & D. FAUST, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
(1988); Faust & Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241
SCIENCE 31 (1988); Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of
Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978) [hereinafter Morse, Crazy Be-
havior]; Morse, Failed Expectations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and
the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971 (1982); Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health
Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66
VA. L. REV. 427 (1980).
[Vol. 68:1
EXPERT TESTIMONY
basic principles and applications. This is certainly true regarding ex-
pert testimony on child sexual abuse. The law in this area is in a form-
ative stage of development, and a coherent theoretical framework for
decisionmaking has yet to emerge. The purpose of this Article is to
contribute to the ongoing effort to articulate the proper scope and lim-
its of expert testimony in child sexual abuse litigation.
This Article is divided into five sections. Following this introduc-
tory material, section II provides background information on the ad-
missibility of expert testimony. Section III analyzes special rules
pertaining to evidence based on novel scientific principles. Section IV
describes nine categories of expert testimony. Each category of expert
testimony is divided into two subsections. Subsection 1 provides
clinical and scientific information regarding the type of expert testi-
mony discussed in the category.5 With the clinical and scientific infor-
mation as a base, subsection 2 shifts the focus of discussion to theories
of admissibility and applicable case law.
In addition to analyzing categories of expert testimony, this Article
has a second and equally important purpose. The phenomenon of
child sexual abuse is exceedingly complex. Expert testimony regard-
ing such abuse is equally complicated. In order to comprehend the
dynamics of sexual abuse, and to appreciate the utility of expert testi-
mony, judges and attorneys must be familiar with current psychologi-
cal and medical literature on the subject. Yet, few members of the
bench and bar are in a position to read and digest the rapidly ex-
panding nonlegal literature on child sexual abuse. The second goal of
this Article is to provide the judiciary and the legal profession with
up-to-date clinical and scientific information that is relevant to child
sexual abuse. This goal could not be achieved through the pen of a
lawyer. An interdisciplinary group of authors is required. The au-
thors of this Article are a social worker, two psychologists, a pediatri-
cian, a child psychiatrist, and an attorney.
5. In the field of child sexual abuse, expertise is based on a combination of clinical
training and experience, and knowledge of the relevant professional literature. A
portion of the literature consists of articles by clinicians, in which practitioners
describe their clinical experience with sexually abused children. Purely clinical
writing is not based on scientifically controlled studies. A growing portion of the
literature consists of articles reporting the results of scientifically controlled
studies.
The authors are aware that scientifically controlled studies often yield results
which are more readily verifiable than conclusions based solely on clinical experi-
ence. With this in mind, we could have structured this Article so that scientific
data would be presented in one subsection and clinical data in another. We de-
cided against this organizational approach because in the real world of expertise
on child sexual abuse, there is no bright line separating clinical from scientific
information. Practitioners rely on the best of both worlds.
1989]
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II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Rules of evidence governing expert testimony vary slightly from
state to state. In the main, however, the uses and limits of expert tes-
timony are similar across the country. What is more, similarity is
growing under the influence of the Federal Rules of Evidence, now in
force in many jurisdictions. 6 Because of the pervasive influence of the
Federal Rules, the following discussion is based on these Rules.
A. General Rule of Admissibility
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence establishes the basic
principle governing admission of expert testimony. The rule states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
The trial judge determines whether proffered testimony meets the
requirements of Rule 702.7 In doing so, the judge is guided by the pol-
icy of the Federal Rules favoring admission of expert testimony.8 In
evaluating admissibility, the most important question is whether the
testimony will assist the jury.9 As Dean Wigmore put it, "On this sub-
ject can a jury receive from this person appreciable help?"10 When
does expert testimony assist the jury? There are no easy answers to
6. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES
OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES passim (1987)[here-
inafter WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE].
7. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339-40 (8th Cir. 1986)("The decision whether
to permit expert testimony ordinarily lies within the discretion of the trial court
and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Moran, 151 Ariz.
378, 381, 728 P.2d 248, 251 (1986)("Deciding whether expert testimony will aid the
jury and balancing the usefulness of expert testimony against the danger of un-
fair prejudice are generally fact-bound inquires uniquely within the competence
of the trial court."); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 473, 720 P.2d 73, 74 (1986)(con-
cerning the admissibility of expert testimony describing behavior patterns of in-
cest victims, the court stated: "The trial judge has discretion to allow such expert
testimony where it may assist the jury in deciding a contested issue, including
issues pertaining to accuracy or credibility of a witness' recollection or testimony.
The trial judge may exercise this discretion where there is a reasonable basis to
believe that the jury will benefit from the assistance of expert testimony that
explains recognized principles of social or behavioral science which the jury may
apply to determine issues in the case. Testimony of this type is not to be permit-
ted in every case, but only in those where the facts needed to make the ultimate
judgment may not be within the common knowledge of the ordinary ju-
ror.")(citations omitted).
8. See McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility,
67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 888 (1982).
9. See State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 473, 720 P.2d 73, 74 (1986); State v. Middleton,
294 Or. 427, 435, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219 (1983).
10. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1923, at 29 (Chadbourn
rev. 1974)(original emphasis removed) [hereinafter J. WIGMORE]. For the reader
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this question. Testimony that assists in one circumstance is unil-
luminating in another. Assistance to the jury must be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis.11 The Advisory Committee note on Rule 702 al-
ludes to the case-by-case approach:
Whether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be
determined on the basis of assisting the trier. There is no more certain test for
determining when experts may be used than the common-sense inquiry
whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently
and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment
from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the
dispute. When opinions are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and
therefore superfluous and a waste of time .... 12
Prior to widespread adoption of the Federal Rules, a number of
courts held that expert testimony was proper only when the subject of
the testimony was completely beyond the ken of the average juror.
This standard continues to find occasional judicial expression. Cer-
tainly, expert testimony is appropriate to explain highly technical or
scientific information which is beyond the understanding of jurors,
but the jury can also benefit from expert testimony on subjects with
which it has a degree of familiarity. Under the Federal Rules, it is
clear that the subject on which expert testimony is offered need not be
completely beyond the understanding of the jury. In some cases, the
expert can add insight and depth to the jury's understanding of famil-
iar subjects. In others, expert testimony may disabuse jurors of com-
monly held misconceptions about relatively common events. In sum,
Rule 702's requirement of assistance to the jury envisions admissibility
of expert testimony on a broad spectrum of subjects, ranging from the
arcane to the mundane. The question is not whether the subject is
beyond common understanding, but whether the expert can assist the
jury "to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue .... " 13
B. Permissible Bases for Expert Testimony
Rule 703 of the Federal Rules articulates the permissible bases for
expert testimony. The Rule states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
with a bent for history, Wigmore provides a characteristically fascinating picture
of the development of expert testimony at § 1917. Id.
11. See id. § 1923, at 19, 32, where Wigmore writes:
But the only true criterion is: On this subject can a jury receive from this
person appreciable help? In other words, the test is a relative one, de-
pending on the particular subject and the particular witness with refer-
ence to that subject .... No more specific test can be supplied, defining
the kind of subject which certainly or usually will need no aid at all
from any witness.
Id. (emphasis in original).
12. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (citation omitted).
13. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert
at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.
The facts on which experts on child sexual abuse base opinions
come from a wide variety of sources. In many cases the expert has
firsthand knowledge of the child because the expert is personally in-
volved in interviewing or treating the child. For example, a child's
therapist might opine that the child probably experienced age-inap-
propriate sexual contact. Firsthand knowledge is not always required
for expert testimony about a particular child, however. In an appro-
priate case, an expert who has not met a child may testify about the
child. In such a case, the expert might base the opinion on study of
videotaped interviews of the child and reports prepared by other pro-
fessionals. Some forms of expert testimony do not require any knowl-
edge of a particular child. This is so, for example, when an expert
limits testimony to a description of behaviors commonly observed in
sexually abused children as a class.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert may base an opin-
ion on information that would not be independently admissible in evi-
dence if such information is "of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject."14 Permitting experts on child sexual abuse to formulate
admissible opinions on the basis of inadmissible evidence requires
judges to determine what types of facts and data are "reasonably re-
lied upon" by experts in the field of child sexual abuse.
The potentially inadmissible evidence that is most frequently re-
lied on is written and verbal hearsay. Writings include medical
records, psychological reports, police records, social agency reports,
and the child's written statements. Verbal hearsay statements of the
child are often critical. Indeed, such statements are frequently the
most telling evidence of abuse. A child's assertive nonverbal conduct
amounting to hearsay can also be important. Verbal statements of
other persons, such as parents, also play a role. Even though some of
the documents, verbal statements, and nonverbal conduct just de-
scribed would be excluded by the hearsay rule, the Federal Rules per-
mit experts to rely on such information if reliance is reasonable.1S
Is it reasonable for experts on child sexual abuse to rely on hear-
say? In many cases the answer is yes. American law has long recog-
nized that some forms of hearsay are reliable. Furthermore, the law
expressly acknowledges that physicians and other helping profession-
als constantly and necessarily rely on hearsay to make the most mo-
14. FED. R. EVID. 703.




mentous medical decisions.' 6 Thus, it is clear that experts justifiably
rely on hearsay.
The question remains, however, may an expert rely on any hear-
say, no matter how unreliable? In their influential treatise on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger
grapple with this difficult question.17 They identify two views. Courts
adopting the restrictive view hold that it is unreasonable for experts to
rely on hearsay that is inadmissible in evidence. Courts following the
expansive view permit experts to rely on inadmissible hearsay. Wein-
stein and Berger write:
It is apparent from the reported decisions that the courts are loosely divided
into two camps in interpreting the second sentence of Rule 703 [which permits
reasonable reliance on inadmissible evidence].... Those favoring the admissi-
bility of expert testimony and those taking a far more restrictive view. Those
courts which endorse a restrictive approach do so not only in criminal cases,
... but in civil cases as well. The difference between the restrictive and more
liberal approach to Rule 703 is one of emphasis. Both groups agree that the
trial judge must decide whether the data on which the expert relied is of a
type reasonably relied upon in his field of expertise. But the restrictive camp
imposes a further requirement: it reassesses the underlying material to deter-
mine whether it would have been excluded as hearsay for reasons bearing on
reliability, and if so finds that the expert could not reasonably have relied on
it, even though he shows that this is the type of material on which he relies in
his non-testifying, working life.
The difficulty with [the restrictive approach] lies not in the actual results
but in the court's apparent assumption that trustworthiness of the underlying
data is an independent factor which Rule 703 requires the judge to verify in
order for the expert's testimony to pass the threshold of admissibility. Were
that so, Rule 703 would be redundant since the hearsay rules would be deter-
minative and the second sentence of Rule 703 would be meaningless, except
for saving the proponent of the expert the inconvenience of having to offer the
underlying data into evidence.
The authors have found that the more liberal view works quite well in
practice. In non-jury cases the judge is fully capable of discounting the proba-
tive force of the expert's opinion by considering the source of his data. And, in
jury cases, when the matter is brought to the jurors' attention by a proper
instruction, they show a full sensitivity to the problem-in fact often discount-
ing the expert's opinion too much when it is based on hearsay or secondary
evidence of documents or the like .... 18
The expansive view is in line with what experts on child sexual
abuse do in practice, and with the spirit of the Federal Rules, favoring
admission of evidence. In the run of cases, experts should be permit-
ted to base opinions regarding sexual abuse on hearsay and other evi-
16. The Federal Rules of Evidence contain an exception to the hearsay rule for state-
ments made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment. FE. R. EVID.
803(4). This exception to the hearsay rule plays an important role in child abuse
litigation. See J. MYERS, supra note 2, § 5.36, at 359.
17. 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 703[03], at 703-17 to 19.
18. Id.
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dence that cannot be admitted in evidence. The reliability of
inadmissible evidence normally goes to the weight accorded an ex-
pert's opinion, not its admissibility.
It must be acknowledged, however, that in some cases inadmissible
evidence is so unreliable that a court should exclude testimony based
thereon. Exclusion could rest on a finding that an expert could not
reasonably rely on such evidence. Alternatively, a court might rule
that any probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed
by the potential for unfair prejudice.19
Rather than attack the evidence supporting an expert's opinion in
the hope of excluding the opinion altogether, a party may acquiesce in
the expert's testimony but seek to blunt its sting by convincing the
judge to preclude the expert from divulging one or more of the bases
underlying the opinion. Such an argument proceeds on the theory
that disclosure of the bases of the opinion would cause unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or the misleading of the jury.20 The argu-
ment has merit in some cases.
C. Qualifications of Expert Witnesses
Before a person may testify as an expert, the judge must be con-
vinced that the person possesses sufficient "knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education" to qualify as an expert on the subject at
hand.21 The party offering expert testimony carries the burden of es-
tablishing the witness's qualifications.
The normal procedure is to call the witness to the stand and ask
questions about the person's educational accomplishments, specialized
training, and relevant experience. 22 An expert on child sexual abuse
might be asked questions in the following areas:
1. Educational attainments and degrees.
2. Specialization in a particular area of practice.
3. Specialized training in child sexual abuse.
4. Extent of experience with sexually abused and non-sexually
abused children.
5. Familiarity with relevant professional literature.
6. Membership in professional societies and organizations focused on
child abuse.
7. Publications regarding child sexual abuse.
8. Whether the person has been qualified as an expert on child sex-
ual abuse in prior court proceedings.
19. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
20. Id.
21. See State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 380, 728 P.2d 248, 250 (1986).
22. See Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 272 (Del. 1987)(helpful discussion of qualifica-
tions of experts on child sexual abuse).
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A party opposing expert testimony may voir dire a witness in
an effort to show that the witness is not qualified as an expert.
Unless a witness is clearly unqualified, however, deficiencies in
qualifications normally go to the weight accorded the witness's
testimony rather than its admissibility.23 A witness need not be
the foremost authority on child sexual abuse, nor must the expert
understand every nuance of the subject.
While highly specialized expertise in the field of child sexual
abuse is not always necessary, such expertise is certainly desirable
from the proponent's perspective. The qualifications of an expert
serve two purposes. The first is to surmount the foundational hur-
dle of convincing the judge that the witness is qualified as an ex-
pert. For this purpose, varying degrees of education and
experience are sufficient. The second purpose, however, is to im-
press the jury, and to convince it to accord great weight to the ex-
pert's opinion. On this score the proponent desires an eminently
qualified expert-the more impressive the better.
In the area of child sexual abuse, professionals from several
disciplines lay claim to expertise. 24 In determining who is quali-
fied to testify as an expert on child sexual abuse, it is important to
emphasize that simply because a person holds a particular degree
does not mean the person is qualified to testify as an expert on
child sexual abuse. In the field of child sexual abuse, the critical
factors relating to qualification as an expert are: (1) extensive
firsthand experience with sexually abused and non-sexually
abused children;25 (2) thorough and up-to-date knowledge of the
23. In some cases, a proffered witness is rejected as an expert. See, e.g., State v. Good-
win, 320 N.C. 147. 357 S.E.2d 639 (1987)(clinical social worker was not qualified as
an expert on post-traumatic stress disorder).
24. Experts on child sexual abuse are drawn predominantly from the professions of
psychology, medicine, psychiatry, and social work. See State v. Spigarolo, 210
Conn. 359, 556 A.2d 112 (1989)(social worker with master's degree qualified);
Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269 (Del. 1987)(master's level social worker properly
qualified as expert); State v. Reser, 244 Kan. 206, 767 P.2d 1277 (1989)(social
worker with master's degree qualified); State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154 (Me.
1988)(nurse with bachelor's degree in nursing and master's in child psychology
was qualified); State v. McCoy, 400 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)(master's
level psychologist was qualified); In re Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112, 518 N.E.2d 914
(1987)(master's level social worker properly qualified as expert); Commonwealth
v. Pearsall, 368 Pa. Super. 327, 534 A.2d 106 (1987)(master's level psychologist
properly qualified as expert); State v. Hicks, 148 Vt. 459, 535 A.2d 776
(1987)(master's level social worker qualified); State v. Jensen, 141 Wis. 2d 333,
337, 415 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Ct. App. 1987)(master's level school guidance counselor
properly qualified as expert).
25. See Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 272 (Del. 1987)("In each case the expert must
demonstrate sufficient knowledge of, and contact with, victims of child abuse to
be able to explain the behavioral and psychological characteristics which are ma-
terial to the issues in a particular case.").
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professional literature on child sexual abuse; and (3) objectivity
and neutrality about individual cases.
With the foregoing principles in mind, it is clear that not all
physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers are
qualified in the highly specialized field of child sexual abuse. In
actuality, only a small fraction of professionals in these disciplines
possess sufficient knowledge and experience to qualify as experts.
Courts should insist on a thorough showing of expertise before
ruling that an individual is qualified to testify as an expert on child
sexual abuse. 26
D. Form of Expert Testimony
Once a witness is qualified as an expert, attention turns to the ex-
pert's testimony. Rule 702 states that an expert may testify "in the
form of an opinion or otherwise."27 Expert testimony usually takes
one of three forms; the most common is an opinion. For example, in a
criminal case involving distribution of cocaine, an expert might render
an opinion that a white, powdery substance is indeed cocaine. In a
medical malpractice case, an expert witness might opine that the de-
fendant doctor failed to conform to the standard of care required of
physicians. In child sexual abuse litigation, expert testimony takes a
number of forms. For example, an expert might testify that a child
demonstrates age-inappropriate sexual knowledge or awareness.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert may state an opin-
ion without specifying the bases supporting the opinion.28 As a practi-
cal matter, however, the expert is nearly always asked to provide the
factual data on which the opinion is premised. This information may
precede or follow the opinion itself. Asking the expert to elaborate on
the bases supporting the opinion aids the trier of fact in understanding
the opinion. The explanation also provides the expert an opportunity
to build rapport with the jury and to educate jurors about the subject
at hand. The net effect is to strengthen the impact of the expert's
testimony.
An expert opinion must be premised on a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty.29 The expert cannot speculate or guess.3 0 It is clear, however,
26. See In re E.M., 137 Misc. 2d 197, 520 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Fain. Ct. 1987)(court stressed
importance of making sure experts are qualified and that proper procedures are
followed).
27. FED. R. EVID. 702.
28. FED. R. EVID. 705.
29. For further discussion of the certainty required for expert testimony see infra
text accompanying notes 117-19.
30. See 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1917, at 2. In discussing the origins of the
opinion rule, Wigmore writes that "the witness must speak as a knower, not
merely a guesser . .. ."
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that an expert need not be absolutely certain about a subject before
offering an opinion.3 ' All that is required is reasonable clinical cer-
tainty. Louisell and Mueller write:
The fact that an expert cannot be categorical, and admits of some uncertainty
in his conclusions, does not mean that his testimony should be excluded or
that it fails the helpfulness requirement. Ordinary witnesses routinely testify
to their recollection of events while admitting to uncertainty, and at least as
much latitude should be extended to experts. Thus, assuming that a witness
qualifies as an expert and has an adequate basis upon which to base his opin-
ion, his inability to be definitive should not stand in the way of receiving his
testimony, and in cases where the reasons for his reservations can be made
intelligible to a lay jury it is entirely appropriate to permit the expert to lay
them out, so that the jury may better evaluate his testimony and reach its own
conclusions as to its worth.
3 2
The flexibility inherent in the requirement of reasonable clinical
certainty is important in the context of child sexual abuse, where ab-
solute certainty is rare. As Louisell and Mueller point out, uncertain-
ties in an expert's opinion can be pointed out to the jury, and inquired
into during cross-examination. An expert may refrain from offering
an opinion, and may testify in the form of "a dissertation or exposition
of scientific or other principles relevant to the case, leaving to the trier
of fact to apply them to the facts."3 3 For example, in a child sexual
abuse case, an expert may limit testimony to a description of behaviors
commonly observed in sexually abused children as a class, without
providing an opinion about the alleged victim.
Finally, expert testimony may take the form of an answer to a hy-
pothetical question propounded by counsel. The hypothetical question
was once ubiquitous. In recent years, however, the hypothetical has
declined in popularity. This technique for eliciting expert testimony
often confuses the jury and frustrates the expert.
E. The Ultimate Issue Rule
Through a long and somewhat tortured course of development, the
rule emerged that lay witnesses could not testify in the form of opin-
ion.3 4 What the court needed was facts based on personal knowledge,
not opinion or inference. 3 5 The opinion rule has never been followed
31. See People v. Mendibles, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1277, 1293, 245 Cal. Rptr. 553, 562
(1988) ("diagnosis need not be based on certainty, but may be based on probability;
the lack of absolute scientific certainty does not deprive the opinion of eviden-
tiary value."); People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971).
32. 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 382, at 384 (1988
Supp.)(footnote omitted)[hereinafter LOUISELL & MUELLER].
33. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
34. For the history of the opinion rule see 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1917; 3
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 701[01].
35. McCormick describes "the doctrine that witnesses generally must give the 'facts'
and not their 'inferences, conclusions, or opinions.'" C. McCORMICK, McCoi-
MICK ON EVIDENCE § 11, at 26 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter C. McCoRMICK].
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strictly in practice. Courts realize that lay witnesses are sometimes
able to formulate opinions that assist the jury. Furthermore, it is
often impractical or impossible to avoid opinion or inference. 36 Lay
witnesses have been permitted to resort to opinion to describe the "ap-
pearance of persons or things, identity, the manner of conduct, compe-
tency of a person, feeling, degrees of light or darkness, sound, size,
weight, distance and an endless number of things that cannot be de-
scribed factually in words apart from inferences." 3 7
Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly authorizes lay
witnesses to testify in the form of opinion or inference.38 However,
the Rule limits such testimony to opinions or inferences which are
rationally based on the perception of the witness and which are help-
ful to the jury. McCormick describes the modern approach to lay
opinion testimony as follows: "It is believed that the standard actually
applied by many of the trial judges of today includes the principle es-
poused by Wigmore, namely that opinions of laymen should be re-
jected only when they are superfluous in the sense that they will be of
no value to the jury."39
While restrictions are placed on opinion testimony from lay wit-
nesses, experts have long been permitted to testify in the form of opin-
ion or inference. Rule 702 reflects this tradition, stating that experts
may testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 40
Prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, then, opinion testimony
was permitted from lay witnesses occasionally, and from experts gen-
erally. When opinions were offered, however, pre-Federal Rules law
placed an important limitation on the testimony. Neither type of wit-
ness could express an opinion on "the very issue before the jury".4 1 In
other words, witnesses were not to usurp or invade the function of the
jury by testifying to ultimate facts.42 This limitation on opinion testi-
36. For discussion of reasons why lay opinions are often helpful, see 3 WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 701[02].
37. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 417 (1952).
38. See the advisory committee note to Rule 704, which states: "[t]he basic approach
to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to admit them when helpful to the
trier of fact." FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note. See also 56 F.R.D. 183,
284 (1973).
39. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 35, § 11, at 28 (footnote omitted).
40. FED. R. EVID. 702.
41. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1921, at 21. Modern courts occasionally state that
experts may not offer opinions on the very issue before the court for decision.
See, e.g., State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475, 720 P.2d 73, 75 (1986); State v. Chap-
ple, 135 Ariz. 281, 292, 660 P.2d 1208, 1219 (1983)("Witnesses are permitted to ex-
press opinions on ultimate issues but are not required to testify to an opinion on
the precise questions before the trier of fact.").
42. See Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Springfield & Northwestern R.R. Co., 67 Ill. 142,
145 (1873)("It amounts to nothing more nor less than permitting the witnesses to
usurp the province of the jury."). See also De Groot v. Winter, 261 Mich. 660, 247
N.W. 69 (1933). For a persuasive argument that objections such as "invades the
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mony-known as the ultimate issue rule-was widely followed. The
rule had little to support it, however, and the commentators were
most unkind.43 Wigmore wrote:
Another erroneous test, prevalent in some regions... is that an opinion
can never be received when it touches "the very issue before the jury"....
The fallacy of this doctrine is, of course, that, measured by the principle, it
is both too narrow and too broad. It is too broad because, even when the very
point in issue is to be spoken to, the jury should have help if it is needed. It is
too narrow, because opinion may be inadmissible even when it deals with
something other than the point in issue. Furthermore, the rule if carried out
strictly and invariably would exclude the most necessary testimony. When all
is said, it remains simply one of those impracticable and misconceived utter-
ances which lack any justification in principle .... 44
A phrase, often put forward as explaining why the testimony we are con-
cerned with is excluded, declares that the witness, if allowed to express his
"opinion," would be "usurping the functions of the jury .....
In this aspect the phrase is so misleading, as well as so unsound, that it
should be entirely repudiated. It is a mere bit of empty rhetoric. There is no
such reason for the rule, because the witness, in expressing his opinion, is not
attempting to "usurp" the jury's function; nor could he if he desired. He is not
attempting it, because his error (if it were one) consists merely in offering to
the jury a piece of testimony which ought not to go there; and he could not
usurp it if he would, because the jury may still reject his opinion and accept
some other view .... 45
The ultimate issue rule is rejected in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Rule 704(a) states that "[t]estimony in the form of an opinion
or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it em-
braces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." The Advi-
sory Committee's note to Rule 704 reflects Wigmore's low opinion of
the ultimate issue rule:
The older cases often contained strictures against allowing witnesses to ex-
press opinions upon ultimate issues .... The rule was unduly restrictive, diffi-
cult of application, and generally served only to deprive the trier of fact of
useful information.... The basis usually assigned for the rule, to prevent the
witness from "usurping the province of the jury," is aptly characterized as
"empty rhetoric."4 6
province of the jury" and "usurps the function of the jury" have no place in mod-
ern trials see McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complain-
ants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of Novel
Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 24-25 (1986) [hereinafter
McCord].
43. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 35, § 12; 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 6,
§ 704[01].
44. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1921, at 20-21 (footnotes omitted).
45. Id. § 1920, at 18-19. See State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 435, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219
(1983)("It is the settled law in Oregon that testimony on the ultimate issue is not
inadmissible solely on that basis.... [I]t is impossible to usurp the jury's function.
Even if there is uncontradicted expert testimony, the jury is not bound by it, for
the jury alone must make the ultimate decision.").
46. FED. R. EvID. 704 advisory committee's note (citations omitted), quoting 7 J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 10, § 1921, at 20.
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Thus, it is clear under the Federal Rules that witnesses may offer
opinions on ultimate factual issues.47 The court may limit or exclude
such testimony if the dangers of jury confusion or unfair prejudice
outweigh the helpfulness of the opinion.48 In particular, courts are
careful to ensure that jurors do not abdicate their independent fact-
finding responsibility, and unthinkingly adopt a witness's version of
critical facts.
While opinions are not objectionable because they embrace issues
of ultimate fact, courts generally do not per'mit witnesses-lay or ex-
pert-to offer opinions on questions of law.49 Scholars writing in the
psychological literature agree that experts should not provide opinions
on legal questions. Melton and his colleagues write: "[O]n one point
there is near-unanimity among scholarly commentators .... [M]ental
health professionals should refrain from giving opinions as to ulti-
mate legal issues.50... Ultimate legal issues are issues of social and
moral policy, and they properly lie outside the province of scientific
47. It is difficult to satisfactorily define an "ultimate fact." Black's Law Dictionary
provides the following definitions of an ultimate fact: "Issuable facts; facts essen-
tial to the right of action or matter of defense. Facts necessary and essential for
decision by court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (5th ed. 1979) (citation omit-
ted).
Perhaps examples will give a flavor for ultimate facts. The common-law defi-
nition of larceny is a trespassory taking and asportation of the personal property
of another with the intent to steal. Each element of the definition constitutes an
ultimate fact that must be proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt.
In a sex abuse case in which a defendant is charged with orally copulating a
minor, the act of oral copulation by the defendant on the victim constitutes an
ultimate fact.
48. See FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note, which states in part:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to
admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to
the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which
wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances against the ad-
mission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to
reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers of an earlier day.
49. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 35, § 12, at 31 (footnotes omitted), which states
that "[r]egardless of the rule concerning admissibility of opinion upon ultimate
facts, courts do not permit opinion on a question of law, unless the issue concerns
a question of foreign law. Nor do the Federal Rules of Evidence permit opinion
on law except questions of foreign law." This statement quoted from McCormick
is too sweeping. While courts generally do not permit opinion testimony on ques-
tions of law, in some cases expert testimony on matters of law is admitted. For
helpful discussion, see Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988).
50. G. MELTON, J. PETRILA, N. POYTHRESS & C. SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUA-
TIONS FOR THE COURTS § 1.04, at 14 (1987)(emphasis in original)[hereinafter G.
MELTON]. In a footnote which is omitted from the language quoted in the text,
the authors cite several articles in support of their assertion that scholars agree
experts should not offer opinions on questions of law. Specifically, they cite:
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, STATE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 13-14
(1982); Bazelon, Veils, Values, and Social Responsibility, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST




Closely related to opinions on legal issues are opinions which are
little more than thinly veiled advice on how the jury should decide the
case. McCormick observes that "[u]ndoubtedly there is a kind of state-
ment by the witness which amounts to no more than an expression of
his general belief as to how the case should be decided .... It is be-
lieved all courts would exclude such extreme expressions."52
The line separating ultimate facts from questions of law is illu-
sive.5 3 Adding to the difficulty is the fact that some questions are mix-
tures of law and fact. Perhaps the most helpful way to illustrate the
distinction between permissible and impermissible opinions is with
examples.
To make a will, a person must possess testamentary capacity,
which is generally defined as sufficient decisionmaking capacity to un-
derstand the nature and extent of one's property, and to formulate a
rational plan of distribution. In a will contest, Rule 704 permits the
following question of an expert, "Did [the testator] have sufficient
mental capacity to know the nature and extent of her property and
the natural objects of her bounty and to formulate a rational scheme
of distribution?" The fact that this question touches upon the ulti-
mate factual inquiry before the court does not render it objectionable.
However, the question, "Did [the testator] have the capacity to make a
will?" is improper because it is cast in terms of legal conclusion rather
than ultimate fact.54
In a medical malpractice case, an expert should not express an
opinion on whether the defendant doctor was negligent. This ultimate
legal conclusion is reserved for the jury. The expert may, however,
respond to the question, "Did the defendant doctor adhere to the stan-
dard of care exercised by medical practitioners in the local commu-
nity?" This is a fact question.
In litigation where mental health professionals testify, Melton and
his colleagues observe that "[q]uestions as to criminal responsibility,
commitability, and so forth are legal and moral judgments outside the
expertise of mental health professionals .... ."55 While such ultimate
legal conclusions are not a proper subject for expert testimony, medi-
cal and mental health professionals can provide valuable factual data
at 456; Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom,
38 MD. L. REv. 539, 593-98 (1979).
51. G. MELTON, supra note 50, § 14.05, at 364.
52. C. McCOMMICK, supra note 35, § 12, at 30 (footnote omitted).
53. See State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 450, 349 S.E.2d 684, 686 (1986) (opinion that child
was sexually abused was question of fact, not law).
54. The example offered in the text is taken from the Advisory Committee's note to
Rule 704. The Advisory Committee borrowed the example from McCormick. See
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 35, § 12, at 32.
55. G. MELTON, supra note 50, § 1.04, at 14.
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in the form of clinical and scientific information which the jury can
utilize to reach legal conclusions.
In the context of child sexual abuse litigation, the ultimate facts
are whether abuse occurred, and, if so, who committed the abuse. The
ultimate legal issue in criminal litigation is whether the defendant is
guilty. In juvenile court protective proceedings, the ultimate legal is-
sue is whether the court has jurisdiction over the child. Expert wit-
nesses should not express opinions regarding legal issues such as
criminal responsibility or juvenile court jurisdiction. When experts
possess helpful information on factual matters, however, they may be
permitted to testify despite the fact that their testimony embraces ul-
timate facts.
The conclusion that experts should not testify in the form of legal
conclusions raises an issue in child sexual abuse litigation. In some
cases, an expert may be prepared to testify that a particular child
probably was sexually abused.56 Is such an opinion one of fact or
law?57 An argument can be made that an opinion that a child was
sexually abused is a statement of ultimate fact. The child either was
or was not sexually abused. At the same time, however, an opinion
that a child was sexually abused comes close to the legal issue before
the court for decision. That is, was the child sexually abused as that
term is defined by statute? Testimony cast in the form of a direct
opinion that sexual abuse occurred is similar to an opinion that a testa-
tor had testamentary capacity. For that reason, it may be appropriate,
especially in jury trials, to prohibit experts from offering opinions
which state, in so many words, that a particular child was sexually
abused.
There are a number of alternatives to a direct opinion that a child
was sexually abused. Testimony in an alternative form avoids the con-
cern that the opinion will cross the sometimes elusive line separating
fact from law. An expert might testify that a particular child exper-
ienced age-inappropriate sexual contact. This opinion is cast in terms
of ultimate fact. It is akin to an opinion that the testator possessed
sufficient mental capacity to know the nature and extent of her prop-
erty and the natural objects of her bounty. Alternatively, an expert
56. For discussion of expert testimony on whether a child was sexually abused, see
section IV (C) of this Article. See Johnson v. State, 292 Ark. 632, 639, 732 S.W.2d
817, 821 (1987)("The opinion of an expert that a child has been sexually abused is
not objectionable on the basis that it is an opinion on the 'ultimate issue.' "; how-
ever, experts should not be permitted to offer opinion on whether child was
abused); Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 118, 734 P.2d 705, 708 (1987)("[I]t was
proper for the State's expert to express an opinion on the issue of whether the
child had, in fact, been sexually assaulted or abused. Such an opinion, although
embracing an ultimate issue, represents both the peculiar expertise and consum-
mate purpose of an expert's analysis.").
57. See supra note 53.
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might testify that a child's symptoms and behaviors are consistent
with child sexual abuse. This opinion is cast in factual terms, and is
safely removed from the ultimate legal issues in the case. Finally, an
expert might testify that a child demonstrates age-inappropriate sex-
ual knowledge or awareness. This opinion does not tread close to legal
issues, and is cast in terms that are uniquely within the expertise of
experts on child sexual abuse. The various forms of expert testimony
relating to whether sexual abuse occurred are discussed further in
subsection IV (C).
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY BASED ON NOVEL SCIENTIFIC
PRINCIPLES
One of the most complex issues raised by expert testimony on child
sexual abuse is the application to such testimony of special rules gov-
erning admissibility of novel scientific evidence. This section explores
this important issue.
A. Why Special Admissibility Rules for Novel Scientific Evidence?
For purposes of the present subsection, it is useful to distinguish
medical evidence of sexual abuse from behavioral science evidence.
Medical testimony is provided by physicians. Behavioral science testi-
mony is provided by social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists.5 8
Medical evidence is based on physical examination, medical his-
tory, and laboratory findings. In some instances, medical proof is rela-
tively straightforward. For example, when a child tests positive for
gonorrhea, sexual abuse is usually the only plausible explanation.
Other aspects of medical proof are more controversial. For instance,
the medical profession has not achieved complete consensus regarding
the appearance of normal female genitalia. Thus, it is sometimes diffi-
cult to determine whether a child's anatomy departs from the norm in
a manner indicative of abuse.
As is true with medical evidence, behavioral science evidence of
sexual abuse contains areas of uncertainty and controversy. Profes-
sional consensus exists on some aspects of the subject, but not others.
Fortunately, literature is emerging which supports the utility of be-
havioral science testimony in child sexual abuse litigation. Yet, like
medicine, much remains to be learned.
Medical and behavioral science evidence of sexual abuse share the
fate of all developing technical specialties: myriad unanswered ques-
tions. While medical and behavioral science evidence have much in
common, it is important to point out a significant distinction. Behav-




ioral science evidence carries a handicap that does not apply to medi-
cal evidence. In the minds of some judges, behavioral science evidence
is under a cloud of suspicion that does not darken medical evidence.
Judges are relatively comfortable with medical evidence because it is
based on data that are verifiable by physical examination, laboratory
tests, and other objective techniques. In addition, medical evidence
has long been admissible in a broad range of civil and criminal mat-
ters. Behavioral science evidence, by contrast, has always been contro-
versial.59 Furthermore, the categories of behavioral science testimony
offered in child sexual abuse litigation are of recent development. The
relative novelty of such evidence raises questions about reliability.
Many judges are leery of psychiatric and psychological evidence be-
cause it is based in part on "soft science" and subjective interpretation
of inherently ambiguous behavior.60 The proponent of behavioral sci-
ence testimony must come to grips with the likelihood that some
courts entertain deep-seated doubts regarding such proof.
Bearing in mind the degree of uncertainty and novelty surrounding
some aspects of medical and behavioral science evidence, it is impor-
tant to ensure that expert testimony based on such evidence is suffi-
ciently reliable to assist the jury.61 To ensure reliability, the
proponent of testimony based on novel scientific principles is required
to establish the reliability of the evidence. In other words, the law
imposes a special admissibility test on novel scientific evidence. Why
is this so? Is there something unique about novel scientific evidence
which calls for admissibility requirements that are not applied to
other evidence? It can be argued that standing alone, the novel nature
of a scientific principle is not sufficient reason to require the propo-
nent to shoulder a special burden of proof. The reliability of many
kinds of evidence is open to question. Generally, however, the law
does not subject potentially unreliable evidence to special admissibil-
ity tests. We leave it to cross-examination and the jury's common
sense to ferret out unreliable evidence.
There must be something unusual about novel scientific evidence
to justify a special test, and indeed there is. Novel scientific evidence
is sometimes less accessible to lay analysis than more traditional forms
of evidence. Lacking the scientific or technical knowledge required to
assess the reliability of such evidence, jurors may be over-awed by the
evidence, or may defer too quickly to the expert's opinion. The jury is
59. See authorities collected supra note 4.
60. Not all behavioral science testimony regarding child sexual abuse is based on
"soft science." A growing number of studies that are relevant to child sexual
abuse are scientifically rigorous. Furthermore, researchers are constantly at-
tempting to improve the scientific rigor of studies concerning sexually abused
children.




not alone in its relative inability to evaluate scientific evidence. The
cross-examining attorney (usually a layman) may be impaired in the
ability to cross-examine scientific witnesses. Thus, the jury is further
handicapped. Finally, there is the danger the jury will be confused by
testimony based on scientific principles it does not fully comprehend.
Thus, novel scientific evidence has unique attributes justifying special
admissibility requirements.
Agreeing that a special admissibility test should apply to novel sci-
entific evidence is only the first step. The more difficult questions are
what test to apply and when. As to when to apply an admissibility
test, the question becomes: How does a court know it is faced with
novel scientific evidence? That is, when is evidence scientific, and
when it is novel?
The concept of science has more than one meaning. For present
purposes, science may be defined as the acquisition of knowledge
through systematic application of principles designed to yield accurate
data.62 Are medicine, psychiatry, social work, and psychology scien-
tific disciplines? As this question applies to each discipline, there is
room for discussion and disagreement. Within disciplines, some re-
search is conducted in strict compliance with the scientific method.
Other valuable work is pursued without resort to the scientific
method. In the final analysis, most observers agree that each disci-
pline combines art and science.
In the context of child sexual abuse litigation-where the concern
is reliability of novel forms of evidence-it is appropriate to character-
ize all of the relevant disciplines as scientific. This characterization
has several advantages. First, such a characterization acknowledges
the scientific element of expert medical and behavioral science testi-
mony. Second, characterizing the disciplines as scientific recognizes
that medical and behavioral science testimony based on novel princi-
ples raise the concerns discussed above regarding novel scientific evi-
dence. That is, such evidence may over-awe or confuse the jury and
may be less accessible to lay analysis than more traditional forms of
evidence. Finally, characterizing the disciplines as scientific makes it
possible to avoid a hopeless analytical morass. If some forms of medi-
cal and behavioral science testimony are scientific and 'others are not,
it is necessary to decide which is which. Drawing this distinction is
always difficult, sometimes impossible. The dilemma is avoided by
characterizing all the disciplines as scientific.
Conceding that expert testimony on child sexual abuse can be pre-
mised on scientific principles leads to the conclusion that the special
62. See RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1279 (1966), where
science is defined as "1. a branch of knowledge or study dealing with a body of
facts or truths systematically arranged and showing the operation of general
laws.... 3. systematized knowledge in general."
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admissibility requirement is sometimes applicable to such testimony.
However, this conclusion does not determine when the requirement
applies. The answer to that question depends on whether expert testi-
mony is based on novel principles.
Arguably, the special admissibility test should apply whenever sci-
entific evidence is offered, but this is not done in practice. The test is
only applied when a novel principle underlies expert testimony. Tes-
timony based on a non-novel, or accepted, principle is not subjected to
the test. In such a case, the court takes judicial notice of the reliability
of the principle.63 The key question then becomes: When is a scien-
tific principle novel? There are no easy answers to this question. Nov-
elty is a matter of degree. One principle may remain novel for years,
while another passes from novelty to acceptance very quickly.
Clearly, novelty does not mean longevity. Perhaps the most useful
approach is to link novelty with reliability.64 A scientific principle
should be considered novel when substantial questions exist regarding
its reliability. It may be profitable to dispense with the word novel
altogether. The real issue is reliability. Taking the reliability ap-
proach, the special admissibility test applies when expert testimony is
based on scientific principles of questionable reliability.
An example from physical child abuse illustrates this approach. In
1962, Dr. C. Henry Kempe and his colleagues published their seminal
article describing battered child syndrome.65 Presence of the syn-
drome is strong evidence that a child's injuries are nonaccidental. 66
When prosecutors began using expert testimony on battered child syn-
drome, the reliability of the syndrome was open to question. At that
early stage of development, battered child syndrome was properly
considered a novel application of established scientific principles. The
syndrome quickly gained acceptance as a reliable method of establish-
ing nonaccidental injury, however, and courts uniformly approved ad-
mission of battered child syndrome testimony.67 Today, it is clear that
the syndrome is accepted by medical science.68 The novelty (i.e., ques-
63. See Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1202 (1980).
64. See State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 516-17, 443 A.2d 1020, 1024 (1982).
65. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegmuller & Silver, The Battered-Child Syndrome,
181 J. A.M.A. 17 (1962) (hereinafter Kempe].
66. See generally Myers & Carter, Proof of Physical Child Abuse, 53 Mo. L. REv. 189,
190-93 (1988).
67. Every appellate court to consider the battered child syndrome has approved it.
See State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 543 (Utah 1983)("Our research shows that all
courts which have addressed the question have affirmed the admission of expert
medical testimony regarding the presence of the battered child syndrome.").
68. See State v. Moyer, 151 Ariz. 253, 255, 727 P.2d 31, 33 (Ct. App. 1986); State v.
Dumlao, 3 Conn. App. 607, 610, 491 A.2d 404, 409 (1985)("Battered child syndrome




tionable reliability) of the syndrome faded with experience.
The reliability of scientific evidence may be questioned for a
number of reasons. When a new scientific principle or theory is dis-
covered, its reliability is in doubt until it is subjected to testing and
research sufficient to establish reliability. Reliability is also in doubt
when a new application is made of an accepted principle or theory.
B. Objecting to Novel Scientific Evidence
Someone must direct the court's attention to the fact that prof-
fered expert testimony may be based on novel scientific principles.
This responsibility falls to the party opposing the testimony. In the
case of a court appointed expert, either side may raise the issue. The
court may act on its own to require a showing of reliability. When an
objection is made, the proponent may attempt to persuade the court
that novel principles are not involved. If the court is convinced that
novel principles may be at work, a hearing is conducted to evaluate
the admissibility of the evidence. The question then becomes, what
test should be applied to evaluate reliability? A number of tests are
available.69 This Article focuses on two: the Frye test, and relevance
analysis.
C. The Frye Test
In a 1923 decision, Frye v. United States,7o the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled on the admissibility of a
precursor of the polygraph. In doing so, the court established a test to
determine the admissibility of expert testimony premised on novel sci-
entific principles. In now famous language the court wrote:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the de-
duction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general accep-
tance in the particular field in which it belongs.7 1
The Frye test is commonly known as the general acceptance test.72
The proponent of novel scientific evidence must establish that the evi-
dence has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific commu-
nity. Frye was adopted by numerous federal and state courts.73 In
69. See Giannelli, supra note 63, at 1231-50.
70. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
71. Id. at 1014.
72. For in-depth discussion of the Frye test see Giannelli, supra note 63, and C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 35.
73. See 1 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 32, § 105, at 821 ("The Frye approach has
been widely adopted by both state and federal courts"); C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 35, at 882; Giannelli, supra note 63, at 1205 ("the Frye test has dominated the
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recent years, however, Frye has come under increasing criticism from
courts and commentators alike.74 Nevertheless, Frye is still the law in
a number of jurisdictions.
Frye raises several difficult questions. When is evidence scientific?
What is the "particular field" to which a scientific principle or applica-
tion belongs? What is meant by "general acceptance" within the rele-
vant field? How does one prove general acceptance? Finally, when an
expert's testimony is based on the novel application of a scientific
principle, must the proponent establish the reliability of the underly-
ing principle as well as the application?
The first question-when is evidence scientific-is addressed in
subsection III (A), above. For present purposes, medical and behav-
ioral science testimony are considered scientific.
Selecting the particular field of expertise is slightly complicated.
For Frye purposes, it is useful to distinguish medical evidence from
behavioral science evidence. The field of expertise for medical evi-
dence is relatively straightforward. The field is probably limited to
physicians, although an argument can be made to include other profes-
sionals, such as nurses. It is clear that the relevant field does not em-
brace all, or even a majority, of physicians. A small percentage of
physicians possess expertise on medical evidence of child sexual abuse.
Expert behavioral science testimony is provided by social workers,
psychiatrists, and psychologists. What is the particular field of exper-
admissibility of scientific evidence for more than half a century"); McCord, Syn-
dromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility
of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REv. 19,
82 (1987) [hereinafter McCord. Syndromes].
74. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 35; Giannelli, supra note 63. Professor Mc-
Cord points out that the Frye test is ill-suited to novel forms of psychological
testimony. He writes:
[T]here are four serious drawbacks to the use of the Frye rule with re-
spect to "novel" psychological evidence. First, how to apply the Frye
rule is often not entirely clear. It is not always clear what evidence is
"scientific" and what evidence is not. Further, it is unclear whether Frye
requires general acceptance of the underlying scientific principle, the sci-
entific technique employed, or both. Second, the Frye rule's exclusive
focus on general acceptance diverts attention from other important ques-
tions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. Third, the bedrock
rationale of the Frye rule-to assure that the jury can rationally and in-
telligently weigh the evidence-leads to the conclusion that the rule is
not even appropriate for simple, easily understood types of psychological
expert testimony, which is by its very nature subjective and therefore
not likely to overwhelm the jury. Lastly, requiring general acceptance
may deprive the trier of fact of helpful evidence both because of the lag
time that is inevitably entailed in gaining general acceptance, and be-
cause psychological evidence by virtue of its subjective nature may have
a more difficult time gaining general acceptance than will an objective,
mechanical technique. Indeed, very few concepts are generally accepted
by all behavioral scientists.
McCord, supra note 42, at 29-30 (footnotes omitted).
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tise for behavioral science testimony? Clearly, the field does not con-
sist of all mental health professionals. As in the case of physicians,
only a small fraction of mental health professionals are experts on
child sexual abuse. To further complicate matters, some physicians
possess expertise on the behavioral aspects of child sexual abuse.
The particular field of expertise on child sexual abuse consists of
professionals from a number of medical and mental health disciplines.
Each professional in the field shares the common characteristic of spe-
cialized knowledge about child sexual abuse. For Frye purposes, the
particular field of expertise is not the domain of a single professional
group or specialty, but of a diverse group of professionals sharing com-
mon knowledge and experience. 75
The particular field of expertise called for by Frye should not be
confused with the requirement that individual expert witnesses pos-
sess certain qualifications. The field envisioned by Frye is a relatively
large group of individuals. Frye looks for general acceptance by this
group. The credentials of individual witnesses is a different matter.
Individual expert witnesses are usually members of the field of exper-
tise on child sexual abuse, and a particular witness may be able to tes-
tify about general acceptance in the field, but one witness, no matter
how highly qualified, cannot constitute the field.
The third dilemma under Frye is what constitutes general accep-
tance by the field of experts on child sexual abuse? Frye contemplates
gradual acceptance of novel scientific principles. Over time, "a scien-
tific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages."76 . Once the "demonstrable" stage is
achieved, courts take judicial notice of the reliability of the principle.
However, when is the line crossed? How much acceptance is enough?
What sort of evidence is required to pass the test? Frye offers very
little guidance on these important questions.
It is clear that general acceptance does not mean universal accep-
tance. Unanimity is seldom achieved in science, particularly in the be-
havioral sciences.77 Beyond the fact that unanimity is not required,
however, Frye provides little help. Does acceptance by a majority in
the field suffice?78 If opposing schools of thought exist, does the view
of the larger school constitute general acceptance? The view of either
school? Neither school?
Cases applying Frye do not- answer these questions satisfactorily.
75. See Giannelli, supra note 63, at 1208 ("Many scientific techniques do not fall
within the domain of a single academic discipline or professional field.").
76. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
77. See United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 731 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1110 (1985)("we recognize that unanimity on mental health issues is rare.").
78. See Giannelli, supra note 63, at 1210-11 ("The percentage of those in the field who
must accept the technique has never been clearly delineated.").
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In the end, it is impossible to reduce Frye's requirement of general
acceptance to a precise formula. Perhaps the most satisfactory ap-
proach is to define general acceptance as widespread, though less than
universal, acceptance, premised on convincing documentation in the
relevant professional literature.
A fourth question raised by Frye is whether the proponent of testi-
mony based on a novel application of an underlying scientific principle
must establish general acceptance of the underlying principle as well
as the application. Professor Giannelli dissects the intricacies of this
matter in his article on the admissibility of scientific evidence. He
concludes that "[i]t is unresolved whether the Frye standard requires
general acceptance of the scientific technique or of both the underly-
ing principle and the technique applying it."79 In the context of ex-
pert testimony about child sexual abuse, it seems possible to avoid this
conundrum. The foundational principles underpinning medicine, psy-
chiatry, psychology, and social work are generally accepted.0 Courts
take judicial notice of these principles. Frye should be triggered only
when expert testimony is based on novel applications of these ac-
cepted principles.
The final question raised by Frye concerns proof of general accep-
tance. Once Frye is triggered, how does the proponent establish gen-
eral acceptance?S1 Four sources of evidence are available. The
proponent relies on as many as possible:
1. Informed Testimony. The proponent may call witnesses to testify
regarding general acceptance.8 2 A number of decisions express doubt
that a single witness could suffice for this purpose.8 3 This doubt seems
ill-founded, however. What is important is the quality of testimony,
not the number of speakers.
The proponent should establish that the witness is genuinely in-
formed. The witness should possess significant expertise regarding
the scientific principle at issue. Personal expertise, however, no mat-
ter how impressive, is not sufficient to establish general acceptance.
More important than personal qualifications is the witness's knowl-
edge of the status of the principle among a broad spectrum of other
qualified professionals.
An informed witness possesses in-depth and comprehensive
79. Id. at 1211.
80. Some might disagree with this conclusion. See authorities collected supra note 4.
81. See State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 520-26, 443 A.2d 1020, 1026-29 (1982)(helpful dis-
cussion of methods of proving general acceptance).
82. See Giannelli, supra note 63, at 1215-16.
83. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 37, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
152 (1976)(The court questioned "whether the testimony of a single witness alone
is ever sufficient to represent, or attest to, the views of an entire scientific com-
munity regarding the reliability of a new technique.").
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knowledge of the published literature on the subject. In the rapidly
developing field of child sexual abuse, however, awareness of pub-
lished literature is not sufficient. The results of psychological experi-
ments and other research findings are often presented at conferences
long before they appear in print. It often takes one to two years for
research to be published. Thus, it is vital that witnesses testifying
about general acceptance be aware of conference materials and unpub-
lished data. Material at the cutting edge of science is circulated infor-
mally among researchers and clinicians. The well-informed witness
on general acceptance is privy to such information. In addition to
knowledge of the literature and unpublished research, the ideal wit-
ness is aware of the views of leading authorities.
In the area of child sexual abuse, most physicians and mental
health professionals lack the breadth of knowledge required to testify
about general acceptance. As a consequence, the proponent is well ad-
vised to seek an eminently qualified individual. Perhaps two or more
witnesses should testify, each providing a unique perspective on ac-
ceptance of the scientific principle.
Finally, witnesses testifying about general acceptance should not
be advocates for the principle in issue. The ability of such witnesses to
"fairly and impartially... assess the position of the scientific commu-
nity"84 is open to doubt. Neutral experts are preferred.
2. Relevant Literature. General acceptance may be evidenced in
the professional literature.8 5 The literature pertaining to child sexual
abuse is substantial and growing, ranging from journals on obstetrics
and gynecology to publications on developmental psychology. The
first task is to locate the relevant literature. The proponent may be
fortunate enough to locate recent reviews of the literature. Absent
such good fortune, a literature search must be conducted. Lawyers
are usually ill-equipped to perform such research, and, in most cases,
the witness who testifies regarding general acceptance performs this
task.
3. Guidelines from Professional Organizations. Professional or-
ganizations occasionally promulgate guidelines or protocols for prac-
tice.86 Such documents evidence the consensus of the organization.
Depending on the status of the sponsoring organization, such guide-
lines or protocols may help establish general acceptance.
4. Court Decisions. When evaluating the acceptance of scientific
evidence, courts sometimes rely on decisions in earlier cases.8 7 Even-
tually, the weight of judicial opinion holding that a principle is gener-
ally accepted becomes conclusive. It is impossible to say at what point
84. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,38, 549 P.2d 1240,1249,130 Cal. Rptr. 144,153 (1976).
85. See Giannelli, supra note 63, at 1217-18.
86. See infra notes 305 and 306.
87. See Giannelli, supra note 63, at 1218-19.
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
this threshold is achieved. Prior to the stage of certainty, the propo-
nent is wise to rely on more than judicial decisions.
The Frye test has never been short of critics.88 One of the recur-
ring criticisms is that the test is unworkably vague.8 9 Previous discus-
sion highlights the uncertainty surrounding Frye's elements. When is
evidence scientific?90 What is the appropriate field of expertise? 91
What is general acceptance? 92 Courts and commentators have strug-
gled mightily with these questions with less than satisfying results.
The inherent vagueness of the test leads to inconsistent and unpre-
dictable results. California is a notable example. 93 In California, Frye
applies to rape trauma syndrome,94 but not Munchausen's syndrome
by proxy 95 or expert testimony on the accuracy of eyewitness identifi-
cation.96 One panel of the First District Court of Appeal held that
Frye applies to a psychiatric diagnosis of child sexual abuse,97 while
88. See 1 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 32, § 105; C. McCORMICK supra note 35,
at 885-86. Frye has good points as well. See Giannelli, supra note 63; McCord,
supra note 42. The benefits of the Frye test are: (1) Frye leaves decisions about
the reliability of novel scientific evidence to those most qualified to make such
decisions, scientists in the relevant scientific community; (2) The test may pro-
mote uniformity of decision; (3) once an appellate court holds that the Frye
threshold has been achieved, future courts can take judicial notice of the reliabil-
ity of the evidence; (4) The conservative nature of the test keeps unreliable evi-
dence from the jury; and (5) Frye ensures that a sufficiently large pool of experts
will be available to analyze the reliability of novel evidence.
89. See 1 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 32, § 105, where the authors state that
"[t]he 'general acceptance' standard is highly susceptible to the criticism that it is
both vague and conservative. Its essential vagueness comes to the fore in cases
which emphasize that the admissibility of scientific evidence under Frye is very
much a matter of judicial discretion." Id. at 821 (footnote omitted). See also Sym-
posium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 192 (1983)[hereinaf-
ter Federal Rules Symposium].
90. See Federal Rules Symposium, supra note 89, at 192.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 193.
93. For discussion of California case law dealing with the impact of the Frye test on
expert testimony in child sexual abuse litigation see Carter, Admissibility of Ex-
pert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases in California: Retire Kelly v. Frye
and Return to a Traditional Analysis, 22 LOY. L. REV. 1103 (1989).
94. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 247-51, 681 P.2d 291, 298-301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450,
457-60 (1984).
95. People v. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d 69, 83-88, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703, 711-14 (1981).
96. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 372-74, 690 P.2d 709, 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236,
250-51 (1984).
97. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 686-88, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 625-26
(1987)(court held that when an expert bases an opinion that a child has been
sexually abused on the child's statements and play with anatomically detailed
dolls, the proponent of the evidence must prove that such diagnostic techniques
meet the Frye standard of general acceptance). Accord, In re Sara M., 194 Cal.
App. 3d 585, 239 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1987); In re Christine C., 191 Cal. App. 3d 676, 236
Cal. Rptr. 630 (1987).
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another panel of the same court reached the opposite conclusion.98
When a sophisticated judiciary has difficulty applying Frye consis-
tently, criticism of the test is understandable.
Perhaps the most telling criticism of Frye is that it excludes evi-
dence which could assist the jury.9 9 This exclusion occurs for at least
two reasons. First, Frye is a conservative test which excludes evidence
until it passes from the "experimental" to the "demonstrable"
stage.lO0 However, evidence which has not achieved general accep-
tance may nevertheless be relevant and helpful. Under Frye, the pro-
ponent is precluded from establishing the reliability of evidence in the
"twilight zone" prior to general acceptance. Second, Frye is inade-
quate because it looks to only one aspect of reliability: general accep-
tance.1 0 ' The degree to which a principle is accepted in the scientific
community is important. However, general acceptance is only one of
several factors that indicate reliability. By precluding consideration of
other factors, Frye excludes valuable evidence.
D. Relevance Analysis
The most promising alternative to Frye is a two-step process called
relevance analysis. 0 2 Under relevance analysis, inquiry into reliabil-
98. Seering v. Department of Social Servs., 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422
(1987)(court held that expert testimony based on the child sexual abuse accom-
modation syndrome must meet the Frye test; however, the court also found that
when a psychiatrist bases a clinical opinion of sexual abuse not on the syndrome,
but on the expert's personal clinical experience, the Frye test does not apply, and
the expert may testify that in the expert's opinion, a particular child was sexually
abused.)
99. See 1 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 32, § 105, at 818; Federal Rules Sympo-
sium, supra note 89, at 192 ("One recurring point is that the heavy burden de-
manded by the Frye test deprives courts of relevant evidence.").
100. For discussion of the conservative nature of the Frye test see 1 LOUISELL & MUEL-.
LER, supra note 32, § 105, 821-22, where the authors write:
The essential conservatism of Frye lies in the fact that the "general ac-
ceptance" standard amounts to a harsh prejudged skepticism with re-
spect to any scientific technique which is new, or which originated in an
effort to deal specifically with a particular legal problem. Regardless of
inherent worth or validity, scientific evidence of these sorts cannot hope
to satisfy the "general acceptance" standard if it is literally applied.
Id. at 822.
101. See Federal Rules Symposium, supra note 89, at 192.
102. For discussion of relevance analysis see United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224
(3d Cir. 1985); State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684 (1986)(novel scientific
evidence must be verifiably reliable); State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154 (Me. 1988);
State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404,687 P.2d 751 (1984)(very helpful analysis); C. McCol-
MICK, supra note 35; § 203; 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 703[03]; Gian-
nelli, supra note 63; McCord, supra note 42, at 31-34 (advocating a modified form
of relevance analysis in which the critical factors affecting admissibility of novel




ity is not limited to general acceptance. Rather, the court considers a
broad range of factors to determine the reliability of novel scientific
evidence. Once reliability is assessed, the court balances the reliability
and probative value of evidence against the possibility the evidence
will cause unfair prejudice to the opposing party, or will confuse or
mislead the jury.
Under the relevance approach, the court first evaluates the relia-
bility of the novel technique.'0 3 Courts consider the following factors:
1. Accuracy of the technique.
a. How often the technique yields accurate results or, put an-
other way, the potential error rate.
b. Existence of standards governing use of the technique to en-
sure accurate results. For example, clear diagnostic
criteria.104
c. Degree to which expert testimony is based on a subjective
analysis, as opposed to an objective analysis. An opinion based
on subjective analysis may be less reliable because it is diffi-
cult to evaluate the expert's subjective decisionmaking
process.' 05
d. Degree to which the technique is relied on outside the context
of litigation. For example, is a diagnostic technique relied on
by mental health professionals to make treatment decisions?
2. Whether the scientific principle has been generally accepted by
experts in the field. (The Frye test.)
3. Degree of novelty of the technique. A technique that has yet to
gain general acceptance may be well on the way to acceptance.
The closer a technique is to general acceptance, the greater the
reliability.
4. Whether the technique is related to or analogous to established
and reliable modes of analysis.
5. Whether proffered expert testimony relies entirely, or only par-
tially, on novel principles. The more an expert relies on principles
which are established and reliable, the greater the reliability of
the proffered evidence.
6. Degree to which expert testimony will assist the jury in under-
standing the evidence or in determining a fact in issue.106
103. The factors listed below are gleaned largely from the authorities cited supra note
102. The present authors have added factors which appear to them to be appro-
priate for evaluation of expert testimony on child sexual abuse.
104. See infra notes 305 and 306 and accompanying text.
105. See McCord, supra note 42, at 32.
106. In the final analysis, the ultimate inquiry is whether proffered expert testimony
will assist the jury. Professor McCord makes this factor the centerpiece of his
suggested approach to evaluation of novel scientific evidence. See McCord, supra
note 42, at 31.
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7. Qualifications and stature of the expert.
8. Degree of care with which a technique was used by a qualified
expert.
Once the court evaluates the reliability of proffered evidence, it
proceeds with the second stage of relevance analysis. In this stage, the
judge balances the probative value and reliability of the evidence
against factors militating against admission. The judge considers the
following factors:
1. Availability of other experts to evaluate the technique, and exist-
ence of specialized literature describing the technique.
a. Degree to which a pool of experts is available so the opponent
of proffered testimony can retain an expert to present oppos-
ing views.
b. Degree to which the opponent can conduct research on the
technique.
c. Degree to which the technique's shortcomings can be discov-
ered and exposed to the jury.
2. Degree to which proffered testimony relates directly to disputed
issues.1 07
a. The more directly the testimony relates to a contested issue,
the greater the need for the evidence, but the greater the po-
tential harm if the testimony is unreliable or misused.
b. Importance of the issue on which novel scientific evidence is
offered. If novel scientific evidence is offered on an issue of
central importance to the litigation, confidence in the reliabil-
ity of the evidence should be high.108
3. Degree to which evidence may over-awe the jury.
a. Degree to which jurors may be over-impressed by an aura of
reliability surrounding a technique, causing them to abdicate
their responsibility to critically and independently evaluate
the evidence.
b. Clarity and simplicity with which a technique can be
explained.
c. Ability of jurors to understand the merits and demerits of a
technique.109
d. Extent to which jurors can verify data presented by an expert.
e. Degree to which jurors may be over-impressed with a particu-
107. The fact that evidence is highly probative should not lead to the conclusion that it
may be unfairly prejudicial. See State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 384, 728 P.2d 248,
254 (1986).
108. See McCord, supra note 42, at 33.
109. See id. at 32-33.
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lar expert witness, causing them to abdicate their responsibil-
ity to critically and independently evaluate testimony.
4. Degree to which testimony may confuse or mislead the jury.
5. Degree to which testimony will entail undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
6. Availability to the proponent of the expert testimony of alterna-
tive forms of evidence which may not carry the same degree of
potential prejudice to the party opposing the testimony.
7. Degree to which limiting instructions to the jury may reduce po-
tential prejudice to the party opposing proffered testimony.
8. Degree to which the opponent's actions at trial make expert testi-
mony necessary. For example, in a criminal prosecution against
the father of a six-year-old victim, the defendant's attorney fo-
cuses the jury's attention on the facts that the child delayed disclo-
sure of the abuse and recanted prior to trial. By this tactic the
defendant hopes to convince the jury the abuse did not occur. The
defendant's actions increase the need for expert testimony to help
the jury understand that delay and recantation are common in in-
trafamilial child sexual abuse.
With relevance analysis, the judge considers all factors which re-
late to the ultimate inquiry-reliability. When the balancing process
is complete, the judge has several options. The expert can be permit-
ted to testify in full. The judge can order the expert to limit testimony
to selected topics. Or, the judge can exclude the expert's testimony as
unreliable.
Relevance analysis is particularly well-suited to expert behavioral
science testimony on child sexual abuse. A host of factors must be
considered in determining the reliability and helpfulness of such testi-
mony. By balancing all competing factors, the judge reaches a rea-
soned and fully informed decision.
IV. CATEGORIES OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE
This section describes nine categories of expert testimony. Each
category begins with pertinent clinical and scientific information. The
clinical and scientific information provides a foundation on which to
predicate discussion of various forms of expert testimony. Before
turning to analysis of expert testimony, however, it is important to
recognize the potential for miscommunication and misunderstanding
between lawyers on the one hand and medical and mental health pro-
fessionals on the other. Three illustrations highlight the need for
clear communication.
Lawyers and medical professionals often have a different under-
standing of the term penetration. Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Diction-
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arylO defines penetrate as "to enter or force into the interior."111
Many physicians assume penetration means forcing an object into the
outer vagina, through the hymen, and into the inner vagina. Penetra-
tion of this sort in a child often, although not always, causes injury to
the hymen. The legal definition of penetration is quite different.
Black's Law Dictionary12 defines penetration as "the insertion of the
male part into the female parts to however slight an extent; and by
which insertion the offense is complete without proof of emission."" 3
In law, penetration is complete if the penis enters the labia majora,
the fleshy lips which protect the vagina. Penetration does not require
entry into the vagina or damage to the hymen. The legal definition of
penetration would surprise many physicians.
Lawyers and mental health professionals sometimes have different
perspectives on various forms of child abuse and neglect. Consider the
following example drawn from the writing of James Garbarino:
"Each morning a mother threatens her four-year-old son with aban-
donment: 'Maybe today is the day I go away and leave you alone.
You'd better be good today, boy, or you'll never see me again.' "114
Garbarino concludes that this mother is psychologically maltreating
her child."5 The great majority of mental health professionals would
agree. But does the mother's conduct amount to maltreatment as that
term is defined in law? Would a juvenile court judge be justified in
ruling that the child was neglected? From the psychological perspec-
tive, the danger to the child is apparent."16 From the legal perspec-
tive, however, questions exist as to whether this unfortunate
youngster is "abused."
Another area of potential misunderstanding concerns the degree of
certainty which physicians and mental health professionals require to
make clinical decisions, as contrasted with the level of proof required
in legal proceedings. Physicians and mental health professionals do
not think in terms of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. Rather, these professionals are taught to
gather subjective and objective data, and, on the basis of that data, to
form clinical impressions.117
How does one compare clinical impressions regarding sexual abuse
(which are sufficient for diagnostic and treatment purposes) with the
110. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY (15th ed. 1985).
111. Id. at 1251.
112. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
113. Id. at 1021.




117. L. WEED, MEDICAL RECORDS, MEDICAL EDUCATION, AND PATIENT CARE: THE
PROBLEM-ORIENTED RECORD AS A BASIC TOOL (1969).
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standards of proof at work in child abuse litigation? The solution does
not lie in forcing medical and psychological terminology and decision-
making into legal pigeonholes. The professional should not be asked
whether a clinical impression is certain beyond a reasonable doubt or
by a preponderance of the evidence. 118 Rather, experts should state
opinions in terms of reasonable clinical certainty.119 Reasonable
clinical certainty may be defined as the degree of certainty required to
make diagnostic and treatment decisions. The concept of reasonable
clinical certainty does not have a direct counterpart in legal standards
of proof. Lawyers should accept the methodology and terminology of
medicine and the behavioral sciences. Confusion arises when lawyers
ask experts on child sexual abuse to translate their vocabulary into
the language of the law.
The phenomenon of child sexual abuse is exceedingly complex,
and the possibilities for misunderstanding and miscommunication be-
tween experts and the attorneys who offer their testimony are legion.
The members of each professional group must work to increase their
awareness and understanding of the others.
A. Medical Evidence of Child Sexual Abuse
Expert medical testimony plays an important role in child sexual
abuse litigation. While medical evidence of abuse is present in a rela-
tively small percentage of cases, 120 when such evidence exists, it is
118. See E. DEGOWIN & R. DEGOWIN, BEDSIDE DIAGNOSTIC EXAMINATION (3d ed.
1976), where the authors write:
Unfortunately there is no accepted scale of degrees of certainty
whereby the examiner can express the extent to which he has proved his
diagnosis. The term "the diagnosis" is applied, on the one hand, to a
fracture of the tibia where the fracture line can readily be seen in the x-
ray film with perfect accuracy. On the other hand, the same term is ap-
plied to a diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis, a situation often with much
less certainty ....
Id. at 6.
119. See People v. Mendibles, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1277, 1293, 245 Cal. Rptr. 553, 562
(1988)(a physician's diagnosis of sexual abuse "need not be based on certainty, but
may be based on probability"; the lack of absolute certainty does not deprive the
opinion of evidentiary value); People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr.
919 (1971)(opinion regarding battered child syndrome); State v. Hartman, 145
Wis. 2d 1, 14, 426 N.W.2d 320, 325 (1988)(to be relevant, evidence does not have to
establish a fact conclusively).
120. Most authors report that physical or laboratory evidence of child sexual abuse is
found in only 10 to 50 percent of cases. See Enos, Conrath & Byer, Forensic Eval-
uation of the Sexually Abused Child, 78 PEDIATRICS 385 (1986) [hereinafter Enos]
(of 162 cases evaluated by forensic examiners for child sexual abuse, 26.5 percent
of the girls and 23 percent of boys had positive physical and/or laboratory evi-
dence of abuse); Levitt, Sexual Abuse in Children, 80 POSTGRADUATE MED. 201,
202 (1986) ("if disclosure of the abuse is delayed, which is common, physical find-
ings are present in only 10% to 20% of cases"); Marshall, Puls & Davidson, New
Child Abuse Spectrum in an Era of Increased Awareness, 142 AM. J. DISEASES OF
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generally admissible.121 Furthermore, in some cases where there is no
physical evidence, a physician may nevertheless assist the jury by in-
forming it that lack of medical evidence does not mean a child was not
abused.122
CHILDREN 664 (1988)(of 382 children evaluated for abuse, 71 percent had normal
findings on examination, including 48 percent with a history of sexual penetra-
tion). See also Rimsza & Niggemann, Medical Evaluation of Sexually Abused
Children: A Review of 311 Cases, 69 PEDIATRIcS 8 (1982). In this clinical study,
genital trauma was found in 16 percent of 311 children examined for sexual
abuse. Nongenital trauma was found in 16 percent. Findings suggesting penetra-
tion were recorded in 32 percent. Genital trauma was more common in cases
involving assault by a stranger (25 percent) than in assaults involving a known
assailant (12 percent). The differences were attributed in part to greater delay in
seeking medical examinations for incest victims and victims of known assailants.
The greater the delay prior to medical examination, the less likely it is that the
examination will reveal evidence of trauma. Of children with a history of pene-
tration, 36 percent had genital trauma when examined within 24 hours of the
assault, whereas only 13 percent had such trauma when examined after 24 hours.
The need for prompt medical evaluation is clear.
121. See cases cited infra subsection IV (A)(2). The results of a pilot study indicate
that presence of medical evidence of sexual abuse may actually decrease the like-
lihood of obtaining a conviction. See DeJong & Rose, The Frequency and Signifi-
cance of Physical Evidence in Legally Proven Cases of Child Sexual Abuse, 142
AM. J. DISEASES CHILDHOOD 406 (1988), where the authors write:
Clinicians have long recognized that physical evidence of injury, sex-
ually transmitted diseases, or seminal fluid is often absent in cases of
child sexual abuse. Some legal experts argue that this clinical observa-
tion is based on alleged rather than "proven" cases. To determine the
frequency and significance of physical evidence in legally "proven" fel-
ony cases, a pilot study was done using a retrospective review of court
records of felony child sexual abuse.
Forty-five randomly selected cases were reviewed and abstracted, of
which 39 cases (87%) had resulted in conviction of the perpetrator on
felony charges. This conviction rate was similar to that for all child
abuse cases tried last year (84%). The perpetrators were relatives in 26
and acquaintances in 17 cases. The victims ranged in age from 3.5 to 16
years, and most cases involved female victims (80%). Charges of vaginal
rape were made in 32 cases and oral and/or anal sodomy in 23 cases.
No significant difference in rate of felony conviction was found in
cases with or without physical evidence of injury, sexually transmitted
diseases, or seminal fluid. Thirty (94%) of 32 cases without physical evi-
dence resulted in felony conviction; the remaining two cases resulted in a
misdemeanor conviction and an acquittal. Only nine (69%) of 13 cases
with physical evidence resulted in felony conviction; the remaining four
cases resulted in two misdemeanor convictions and two acquittals. Thus
an interesting trend was found for a higher rate of convictions in cases
without physical evidence. The children's age or sex, the types of sexual
contact, the relationship of the perpetrator to the victim, the number of
victims or perpetrators involved in a single case, the duration of the
abuse, the interval from the time of disclosure to the trial, and the testi-
mony of the examining or an expert physician were not shown to affect
the legal outcome of the cases.
Id. at 406.
122. A lay jury may expect that certain types of sexual abuse always or nearly always
cause physical injury. For example, lay jurors may believe sexual intercourse
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1. Clinical and Scientific Information
Among physicians, child sexual abuse is a recognized medical diag-
nosis. 123 The diagnosis is seldom arrived at easily, but in many cases it
can be made. To reach a diagnosis of sexual abuse, a complete medical
evaluation is required. The evaluation consists of a patient history, a
physical examination, and, when appropriate, laboratory tests.
a. The Medical History
A complete medical history consists of data identifying the patient,
the source of referral to the doctor, the name of the person providing
the medical history, the chief complaint, a history of the present ill-
ness, past medical history, family history, psychosocial history, and a
review of body systems.1 24 In the case of children, much of the histori-
cal information is gathered from adults.125
A complete medical history may reveal important signs and symp-
toms which the child or parents have not considered as relevant to a
diagnosis of sexual abuse. Examples include genital discharge, genital
pain, change in bowel or bladder habits, urinary tract infections, geni-
tal trauma or bleeding, nightmares, symptoms of suicide or depression,
school problems, developmental or behavioral problems, rashes, and a
history of drug or alcohol use. 2 6
The child's medical history is relevant to diagnosis and treatment
in several ways. The history aids the physician in excluding or con-
firming the diagnosis of child sexual abuse. The history helps ascer-
tain if the child is at risk of further abuse. For example, the history
may reveal that the perpetrator is still in the home, or still has access
to the child, or that there are other unknown perpetrators. The his-
tory is vital to the physician's decisions about further testing or refer-
necessarily damages the hymen. This is not always the case, however. If the de-
fense argues or intimates abuse did not occur because there is no injury to the
hymen, expert medical testimony will assist the jury in evaluating the evidence.
123. See INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES (9th ed. 1980) (disease listings
NEC 995.5, V 61.21, 959.9, 959.1).
124. See E. DEGOWIN & R. DEGOWIN, supra note 118, at 15-16.
125. See id. at 12-13, where the authors write:
The medical history is an account of the events in the patient's life that
have relevance to his mental and physical health. Much more than the
patient's unprompted narrative, it is a specialized literary form in which
the physician composes and writes an account based upon facts, supplied
by the patient or other informants, offered spontaneously or secured by
skillful probing. Items are accepted for the record only after rigorous
evaluation by the physician, who employs his knowledge of the natural
history of diseases to secure pertinent details and establish the sequence
of events.
126. In reaching diagnostic impressions, physicians often rely in part on psychological
reactions commonly observed in the sexually abused. Such reactions are dis-
cissed in section IV (B) infra.
[Vol. 68:1
EXPERT TESTIMONY
ral to specialists. The history may reveal the need for x-rays,
ultrasound, or tests for sexually transmitted diseases or pregnancy.
The history may determine the physician's recommendations for med-
ical or psychological therapy. Finally, the history assists in determin-
ing a prognosis.
There is often no physical evidence of child sexual abuse.127 There
are several reasons for lack of physical findings in sexually abused
children. Many abusive acts, such as fondling, kissing, fellatio, cunni-
lingus, or the use of the child in pornography leave no marks.12 8 Even
full penile penetration may not damage the hymen.129 Some sexual
offenders suffer from erectile and/or ejaculatory dysfunction.130 Se-
vere injuries to the genitalia of sexually abused children are rare.131
Healing of injuries in the genital area may be complete and rapid, so
that no physical evidence remains when the child comes to the medi-
cal examination.132
127. See authorities cited supra note 120.
128. A child examined by one of the authors (Bays) reported that her father came in
the bathroom and asked her to spread her legs in the bath so he could make sure
she was clean. He would then gaze at her vaginal area for several minutes. Need-
less to say, the child's physical examination was normal.
129. See Enos, supra note 120, at 395, where the authors write that "[p]enile penetra-
tion resulting in rupture of the hymen is not a requisite indication of inter-
course." In this article there is a picture of an "intact hymen" in a twelve-year-
old girl who had "repeated intercourse with her boyfriend." See also Herman-
Giddens & Frothingham, Prepubertal Female Genitalia: Examination for Evi-
dence of Sexual Abuse, 80 PEDIATRICS 203, 208 (1987) where the authors write
that "it is never accurate to say that, because a hymen appears intact, 'no' sexual
abuse has occurred'; unfortunately, we still see some examiners making state-
ments like this"; Muram, Child Sexual Abuse: Relationship Between Sexual Acts
and Genital Findings, 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 211 (1989). The author re-
ported on 18 cases of sexual abuse in which the offender admitted to vaginal pen-
etration. Specific physical findings (including lacerations of the hymen and
vagina, bite marks, enlarged vaginal opening, and the presence of veneral disease
or sperm) were found in 11 of the 18 female victims. In seven girls the examina-
tion was normal or non-specific for sexual abuse. The author concluded that "all
complaints of sexual abuse must be considered potentially valid and should be
investigated further even if the physical examination fails to detect any abnor-
malities." Muram, supra, at 211.
130. See Groth & Burgess, Sexual Dysfunction During Rape, 297 NEw ENG. J. MED.
764 (1977) (authors report that 34 percent of rapists had erectile or ejaculatory
dysfunction during rape).
131. See Enos, supra note 120, at 392 ("Severe injuries to the external genitalia or anus
of sexually abused children are relatively rare. Edema, contusions, abrasions and
superficial lacerations were most commonly encountered."); Herman-Giddens &
Frothingham, supra note 129, at 207("Force is rarely used in the sexual use of
young children; therefore, bruises, fresh tears, and lacerations are uncommon
findings."). For a case in which a young child suffered severe genital injury re-
quiring surgery, see Owens v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. 1987).
132. See J. McCann, Patterns of Healing in Cases of Sexual Abuse (paper presented at
a symposium entitled Health Science Response to Child Maltreatment, Center for
Child Protection, San Diego, Cal., Jan. 21, 1988). Doctor McCann reported longi-
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When the physical examination of a child discloses no medical evi-
dence of sexual abuse, the child's history becomes extraordinarily im-
portant.133 In this respect, sexual abuse is similar to a number of
diseases which cannot be detected by physical examination. In such
cases the medical history is the only tool available to arrive at a diag-
nosis and to recommend treatment. Angina pectoris is a common ex-
ample of a disease that is not apparent on physical examination. 3 4
The angina patient is likely to have a normal physical examination. It
is the medical history, and in particular, a description of certain symp-
toms, which establish the diagnosis and guide further testing and
treatment. Like the angina victim, sexual abuse victims are likely to
have a normal physical examination. The history is often the most
important evidence available to the physician.
b. The Physical Examination
A complete physical examination should be performed when sex-
ual abuse is suspected. The examination is not limited to the genitalia.
The entire body is examined because signs relevant to sexual abuse
and use of force may be present in areas other than the genitalia.135
tudinal follow-up of children with marked genital and anal injuries from sexual
abuse. He presented photographic documentation that healing progresses so well
that over time physical evidence of abuse may be very minimal, and in less severe
injuries, non-existent.
133. See Herman-Giddens & Frothingham, supra note 129, at 208 ("Normal findings
do not rule out sexual abuse. The interview remains the most critical factor in
establishing whether or not sexual abuse or exploitation has occurred"). See also
Levitt, supra note 120, at 202, where the author writes:
Often the history alone must document that sexual abuse has occurred.
Indeed, if disclosure of the abuse is delayed, physical findings are present
in only 10% to 20% of cases. The physician who limits the evaluation to
physical evidence alone is, then, making decisions regarding whether or
not abuse occurred with 80 to 90% of the data missing .... By discarding
the history, the physician places himself or herself in an untenable posi-
tion. In the courtroom, defense attorneys typically struggle to make sure
medical testimony includes only physical findings and they may try to
prevent the physician from testifying about the history, which is often
damaging to the defendant. The physician should draw on all of his or
her technical abilities to make meaningful decisions on behalf of the
child. The physician should refuse to use physical findings as the sole
basis for an opinion or testimony and explain to the court that in most
medical diagnoses the history outweighs the physical findings in the final
assessment.
134. See MERK MANUAL 489 (14th ed., R. Berkow ed. 1982)("Between attacks and even
during attacks, patients with angina pectoris may not have signs of organic heart
disease.").
135. See Enos, supra note 120, at 387, discussing the examination of the hair, mouth,
and skin prior to conducting the genital examination. The physician looks for
bites, bruises, ligature marks, abrasions, and other indications of abuse and/or
neglect. See also Paul, The Medical Examination in Sexual Offenses Against
Children, 17 MED. SC. & L. 251, 255 (1977) where the author writes:
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As far as the genital examination is concerned, a number of signs may
indicate sexual abuse.
The examination may reveal generalized erythema (redness) or
hyperemia of the skin in the genital area. This is a non-specific find-
ing which may have a variety of causes including diaper rash, use of
bubble bath, and poor hygiene. Localized patterns of redness or irrita-
tion may point to the diagnosis of sexual abuse.136 With intercrural or
"external" intercourse, rubbing on the external genitalia or between
the thighs may produce erythema (acute sign) or chafe marks with
lichenification of the skin (chronic rubbing). Ejaculate or acid phos-
phatase also may be found in these areas after a recent assault.137
Excoriations in the genital area are sometimes found. Such signs
may be due to sexual molestation or to common entities such as pin-
worms, poor hygiene, and infections with Monilia.138
Bruises of the genital area may be due to sexual abuse or to acci-
dental trauma, such as a "straddle injury" caused by falling onto the
horizontal bar of a bicycle or a "picket fence injury" incurred by a fall
onto a pointed object.139
The physician examines the hymenal opening for signs of enlarge-
ment. The size of the normal hymenal opening increases gradually
with age. Data on hymenal opening size in normal girls has been com-
piled.140 Sexual assault may increase the size of the opening with or
[T]he inner surface of the lips must be examined, for it is here that signs
will often be found that are consistent with an attempt to muffle the
scream by the assailant.... Typical grasping injuries may be found on
the arms, thighs, wrists, legs and ankles. However, these injuries are
almost invariably absent in cases where the assailant is the parent of the
child or someone the child knows well.
136. See Emans, Woods, Flagg & Freeman, Genital Findings in Sexually Abused,
Symptomatic and Asymptomatic Girls, 79 PEDIATRICS 778 (1987)(Emans did not
find that erythema distinguished sexually abused girls from those with other gen-
ital complaints); Paul, supra note 135, at 254 ("This [generalized] redness of the
vaginal mucosa is not the same as the more localized redness due to bruising and
abrasion that can result from attempted or accomplished penetration. The latter
... persists as areas of increased redness against the overall background color.");
Rimsza & Niggeman, supra note 120, at 10 ("Vulvar or perianal erythema was the
only physical finding in" 14 percent of 311 patients the authors examined for sex-
ual abuse).
137. Enos, supra note 120, at 396 ("Penetration may or may not have been attempted
but did not occur, the ejaculate was released on the external genitalia, legs, knees,
thighs, buttocks, lower abdomen, clothing, or materials located at the scene.").
Acid phosphatase is a chemical found in ejaculate even in the absence of sperm.
138. Paul, supra note 135, at 254-55.
139. Physicians are sometimes asked to date bruises. Dating bruises is not an exact
science, but the physician can estimate the approximate age of a bruise. See
Schmitt, The Child With Nonaccidental Trauma, in THE BATTERED CHILD 178,
192 (4th ed., R. Helfer & R. Kempe eds. 1987). For discussion of proof of physical
child abuse see Myers & Carter, supra note 66.
140. J. McCann, Anatomical Standardization of Normal Prepubertal Children (pres-
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without damage to the hymen itself.141 It is a common lay misconcep-
tion that the hymen is a rigid, drumhead-like structure which always
"ruptures" and bleeds if penetration occurs. Hymenal tissue is flexi-
ble and somewhat elastic.142 If a sexually abused child is protected
from further abuse, the hymenal orifice may change in size as healing
and scarring occur. 143 It is possible the appearance of the hymen and
entation at a symposium entitled Health Science Response to Child Maltreatment,
Center for Child Protection, San Diego, Cal., Jan. 21, 1988).
Background information concerning the hymen may be helpful. The vagina is
a tube with an outer and inner segment separated by the hymen, a rim of tissue
like the iris in a camera. The hymen may be circular, horseshoe, tube, or crescent
shaped. Normal hymens do not cover the vagina completely; there is a hole to
allow menstruation. The outer vagina is also called the introitus. The hymen lies
one-half inch to one inch inside the introitus, depending on the size of the child.
Penetration can occur inside a child's labia, into the outer vagina, without the
hymen being damaged. If penetration occurs through the hymen into the deeper
vagina, damage to the hymen may or may not occur, depending upon such factors
as the size of the child, the size of the penetrating object, the amount of hymen
tissue, the amount of force, and whether lubrication was used.
The appearance of normal hymen tissue is changed by hormones. The effect
of estrogen produces thicker, redundant hymen tissue on the newborn and the
adolescent. A thorough examination of the hymen and vaginal opening is often
made more difficult by these changes. See Underhill, The Doctor Cannot Always
Tell, LANCET 375, Feb. 18, 1978. The author examined 28 adult women who had
never had intercouse. ("Contrary to popular belief no definite criteria have ever
been established for deciding whether [an adult] woman is a virgin or not.... In
some women the hymen forms a firm ring inside the introitus. The hymenal
opening is so small there can be no doubt that sexual intercourse has not taken
place. However in other women, the hymen is less well developed and the in-
troitus is distensible, and it is extremely difficult for the medical examiner to
state with certainty whether the women is, or is not, a virgin.") More delicate
hymen tissue is characteristic of the child between age three years and early pu-
berty. There are a number of variations in the normal and abnormal hymen de-
scribed in the medical literature. See Pokornoy, Configuration of the Prepubertal
Hymen, 157 AM. J. OBsTET. GYNECOL. 950 (1987). Just below the vagina is a band
of tissue called the posterior fourchette. The valley between the hymen and the
posterior fourchette is called the posterior fossa or fossa navicularis. Between the
vagina and the anus is an area called the perineum. A fusion line called the me-
dian raphe often extends from the vagina in girls to the anal verge. In boys this
line extends from the under surface of the penis, over the middle of the scrotum,
and down to tuck into the anus.
141. See A. HEGER, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: A MEDICAL VIEW 19 (1985) ("Digital ma-
nipulation and stretching as well as penetration may result in an enlarged hy-
menal opening"); Enos, supra note 120, at 396 ("Two of 112 intact hymens were
found dilated and considered indicative of previous intercourse."); Herman-Gid-
dens & Frothingham, supra note 129, at 207 ("Sometimes a hymen may appear
'intact' when, in fact, it has been gradually stretched enough to allow digital or
even penile penetration.").
142. See Pokornoy, supra note 140.
143. Cantwell, Update on Vaginal Inspection as it Relates to Child Sexual Abuse in
Girls Under Thirteen, 11 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 545 (1987). The author re-
examined 20 sexually abused children with enlarged hymenal openings, who
were protected from further sexual abuse. The horizontal hymenal diameter
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genital structures may return to normal if there is a delay of weeks,
months, or years before the child is examined.144
Nonphysicians often question how a small hymenal opening could
accommodate an object as large as a finger or an adult erect penis.
" he average diameter of the adult male penis is 3.5 cm. at the glans
penis."145 The normal size of the vaginal opening at puberty is 0.7 cm
to 1 cm. 146 The vaginal opening and adjacent tissues are not rigid.
Rather, they are flexible, compressible and distensible. 147 During the
vaginal examination, the size of the hymenal opening can be seen to
change, at times markedly, with the degree of relaxation of the
child.148 Thus, penetration may occur without injury to the hymen.
Disruption of the hymen is a significant finding. A variety of hy-
menal changes can be caused by sexual abuse, including: decreased
amount of hymen tissue ("attenuation" of the hymen); absence of the
hymen;149 abrasions and contusions of the hymen; rounding or thick-
ening of the hymen edge; distortion or deformation of the hymen rim;
transection or notching of the hymen; scars on the hymen; loss of sym-
metry; adhesions between the hymen and adjacent structures; the
presence of hymenal remnants (fimbriae or carunculae
myriformes);150 decreased vascularity; and neovascularity.151
shrank from one mm to twelve mm over a period of three days to three years. In
four children who admitted sexual abuse had occurred between the first and sec-
ond examination, the horizontal hymenal diameter enlarged by three mm to nine
Mm.
144. See Berkowitz, Elvik & Logal, A Simulated "Acquired'Imperforate Hymen Fol-
lowing the Genital Trauma of Sexual Abuse, 26 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 307 (1987).
The authors describe a sexually abused child in whom the injured hymen healed
completely over the vaginal orifice, creating a simulated imperforate hymen,
which is a hymen with no aperture. See also J. McCann, supra note 132.
One of the authors (Bays) has followed an infant with a severe injury (a tear
through the hymen, fourchette, and perineum into the rectum) whose examina-
tion is virtually normal one year later.
145. Paul, supra note 135, at 253.
146. See Herman-Giddens & Frothingham, supra note 129, at 207; Levitt, supra note
120, at 213.
147. Pokornoy, supra note 140, at 954.
148. Levitt, supra note 120, at 213.
149. In the absence of congenital deformities of the genitalia, all females are born with
a hymen. There is no evidence in the medical literature of congenital absence of
the hymen. See Jenny, Kuhns & Arakawa, Hymens in Newborn Female Infants,
80 PEDIATRICS 399 (1987); Mor & Merlob, CongenitalAbsence of the Hymen Only
A Rumor?, 82 PFDIATRICs 679 (1988).
In these two studies, a total of 26,199 infant girls were examined; all had
hymens. The highest possible frequency of congenital absence of the hymen
would be less than 0.01 percent. The lowest estimate would be zero.
150. See A. HEGER, supra note 141; Enos, supra note 120; Herman-Giddens & Froth-
ingham, supra note 129; Levitt, supra note 120; Paul, supra note 135.
151. The growth of new blood vessels into an area of scarring is termed neovascu-
larity. See A. HEGER, supra note 141, at 19 ('The development of intrascar ne-
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The most common site of hymenal injury, with "the child examined
in the supine position, is from three to nine o'clock, because the force
of a penetrating object is deflected downward by the small size of the
pelvic outlet and the resistance of the pubic bone. With digital pene-
tration of the vagina, if the finger is thrust upward, injuries may occur
on the upper rim, from nine to three o'clock. A child who is always
abused from one side (e.g., if her bed is against the wall and the perpe-
trator always approaches from the same side) may show correspond-
ing asymmetry of injuries.
Injuries to the posterior fossa and posterior fourchette may be
caused by sexual abuse. Such injuries include: edema, abrasions, con-
tusions, lacerations, scarring, decreased vascularity, and
neovascularity.15 2
In addition to the foregoing signs of possible sexual abuse, the phy-
sician looks for such signs as adhesions or synechiae from labia to
hymen; increased friability of the posterior fourchette as the labia are
spread;153 circumferential superficial tears of the vestibular mu-
cosa;154 and thick labial adhesions,' 55 particularly in the child who is
long out of diapers.
In boys, findings of sexual abuse outside the anal area are rare.
Genital injuries which have been described include bruises of the pe-
nis or perineum156 and tears of the foreskin frenulum.157
Anal signs which may be found after sexual assault include:15 8
ovascularity called neovascularization frequently occurs following genital injury
and is also more easily visualized utilizing a green filter.")
152. See A. HEGER, supra note 141, at 19; Herman-Giddens & Frothingham, supra note
129, at 207; Paul, supra note 135, at 253.
153. See McCann, Voris & Simon, Labial Adhesions and Posterior Fourchette Injuries
in Childhood Sexual Abuse, 142 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDHOOD 659 (1988). The au-
thors examined six sisters with labial adhesions and posterior fourchette injuries,
whose father, grandfather, and uncle confessed to abusing the children. See also
Herman-Giddens & Frothingham, supra note 129, at 207.
154. Paul, supra note 135, at 253.
155 See Berkowitz, Elvik & Logan, Labial Fusion in Prepubescent Girls: A Marker
for Sexual Abuse?, 156 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 16, 19 (1987)("in young infants,
fecal soiling and diaper dermatitis may promote the condition [labial fusion]. In
older girls, trauma such as that associated with sexual abuse may predispose to
labial fusion.").
156. See Spencer & Dunklee, Sexual Abuse of Boys, 78 PEDIATRICS 133 (1986).
157. Hobbs & Wynne, Management of Sexual Abuse, 62 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN
CHILDHOOD 1182, 1185 (1987).
158. For a description of anal signs of abuse see A. HEGER, supra note 141, at 19-20;
Herman-Giddens & Frothingham, supra note 129, at 206; Hobbs & Wynne, Bug-
gery in Childhood-A Common Syndrome of Child Abuse, LANCET 792 (Oct. 4,
1986); Hobbs & Wynn, Sexual Abuse of English Boys and Girls: The Importance
of the Anal Examination, in 13 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 195 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Hobbs & Wynn, Sexual Abuse]; Paul, supra note 135, at 256-57.
Information concerning the anus may be helpful. When the buttocks are
spread, the folds of skin around the anal verge can be seen. The verge is the anal
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1. Perianal Erythema (Redness). Erythema is a non-specific sign
which may have a variety of causes including poor hygiene, diaper der-
matitis, and yeast infection, as well as sexual abuse.
2. Edema of the Perianal Tissues. This sign is called the "tyre sign"
in England, and represents swelling of tissues after acute trauma.
Aside from molestation, only an unusual accident causing damage di-
rectly to the anus could cause this finding.
3. Increased (with acute injury) or Decreased (with chronic penetra-
tion) Anal Sphincter Tone. With acute penetration of the anus by a
large object, the circular sphincter muscle at first relaxes, but after a
few hours, the muscle may go into spasm. Repeated, chronic episodes
of penetration may cause the anal sphincter to lose tone and become
lax. 5 9
4. Abnormal Reflex Anal Dilation. Normally, the anal sphincter re-
laxes slightly and then tightens reflexively (the "anal wink") 6 0 if the
examiner gently separates the buttocks. After repeated anal sodomy,
the internal and external anal sphincter muscles relax and dilate
widely when the examiner separates the child's buttocks. The exam-
iner is able to see the inside of the anal canal and the lower rectum.
To be significant, wide gaping should be seen with no stool in the am-
pulla, and should be reproducible in several positions or on several
attempts. 161
margin where a transition occurs between the hairy skin and the smooth perianal
area. The anal canal begins just inside the anal verge. It is about one and one-
half inches long in an adult and contains the external and internal anal sphinc-
ters, the circular muscles which open and shut to allow passage of flatus and
stool. If penetration into the anus occurs, damage to tissues or muscles may or
may not occur, depending upon the size of the child, the size of the penetrating
object, and use of force or lubrication. An object the size of a finger or a penis can
be passed into the anus without damage, as stools of at least this diameter or
larger are commonly passed out. See Levitt, supra note 120, at 204 ("Young chil-
dren, naive about sexual practices, will usually not know that something can pen-
etrate deep into the vagina (or rectum). Their own definition of "inside" as
evidenced by their answers or as demonstrated on an anatomically correct doll,
may not in fact, turn out to actually mean deep, or even any, penetration. Precise
definition of the child's idea of penetration can be arrived at by having her com-
pare the sensations occurring at the time of examination with those felt at the
time of abuse.").
159. See Paul, supra note 135, at 256, where the author writes that "[dligital penetra-
tion may result in no injury of any kind, even in an infant of less than one year of
age.... The signs of penile penetration will vary depending upon the use of a
lubricant, the force used, and the number of times that such an act has taken
place."
160. Sanfilippo & Schikler, Identifying the Sexually Molested Preadolescent Girl, 15
PEDIATRIC ANNALS 621, 622 (1986).
161. See Herman-Giddens & Frothingham, supra note 129, at 206, where the authors
write that "[w]e have seen gaping [of the anus] of 1.0 to 1.5 cm in children known
to have been subjected to repeated anal intercourse. Gaping of a smaller diame-
ter may or may not be normal...." See also Bamford & Kiff, Letter to the Editor,
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5. Shortening or Eversion of the Anal Canal. This sign has been de-
scribed in children under three years of age following repeated anal
intercourse. The anorectal junction, which is usually found one-half
to one inch inside the anal verge, prolapses down to the anal
opening.162
6. Fissures. Anal sodomy may produce fissures or tears at the anal
verge. A sudden change in bowel habits may be observed. Because of
pain subsequent to anal sodomy, the child may withhold bowel move-
ments which then become dry and large, initiating a cycle of pain with
defecation, cracking of healing fissures, stool holding, and further con-
stipation. Severe constipation in nonabused children occasionally
causes superficial anal fissures, but children commonly pass very large
bowel movements with no injury to the anus at all.
7. Venous Congestion. Venous congestion is swelling of the veins
around the anal opening. Such congestion has been described in forty
percent of normal children if they are kept in the knee chest position
for an extended period of time.
8. Changes of the Perianal Skin. Changes in the perianal skin can
include hyperpigmentation and thickening of perianal skin, and "iron-
ing out" or decrease in prominence of the anal skin folds.163
9. Scars at the Anal Verge. Such scars may be linear or triangular. 64
10. Skin Tags and Hemorrhoids. A hemorrhoid is a dilated, protrud-
ing anal vein. Skin tags are small outgrowths of skin at the anal verge.
Skin tags may form after healing of hemorrhoids or hematomas.
These two signs are also found in nonabused children. 6 5
11. Bruising or Hematomas. Bruises and hematomas are caused by
trauma to the blood vessels around the anal opening. Forceful spank-
ing produces bruises on the outside of the buttocks only.
12. Anal Warts. Both condyloma acuminata (venereal warts) and
condyloma lata (syphilitic warts) can be transmitted through sexual
abuse.
13. Loss of Perianal Fat. With repeated impact and injury to the per-
ianal tissues, there may be loss of perianal fat and an appearance vari-
ously described as coving, cupping, funnelling, or saucering of the
LANCET 1396 (Dec. 12, 1987); Priestly, Letter to the Editor, LANCET 1396 (Dec. 12,
1987).
162. Hobbs & Wynne, Sexual Abuse, supra note 158, at 203.
163. A. HEGER, supra note 141, at 19-20; Paul, supra note 135, at 257.
164. See Hobbs & Wynne, Sexual Abuse, supra note 158, at 205.
165. See Paul, supra note 135, at 256, where the author writes:
The shearing force required to insert a penis into the virginal anus of a
very young child, particularly if no lubricant has been used, tends to rup-
ture the delicate and poorly supported blood vessels at the anal verge.
This rupture can produce the overall swelling previously described or it
can produce a local collection of blood in the form of an anal verge hema-
toma. Such a hematoma will take up to 10 days to resolve, and may leave
a small tag of loose skin for a further 2-3 weeks to mark its site.
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tissues around the anus.166
A variety of conditions are considered by physicians evaluating
children for possible sexual abuse. These include surgery or instru-
mentation of the genital openings; lichen sclerosis et atrophicus;1 67
varicella; 68 severe constipation or megacolon;169 Crohn's disease;170
hemolytic uremic syndrome;171 and a variety of skin conditions such as
lichen planus, seborrheic dermatitis, atopic dermatitis, contact derma-
titis, and neurodermatitis. 172 Use of tampons does not cause injury to
the hymen. 73
Various types of accidental injury must be considered, including
seat belt injury.174 "Straddle injuries" and other accidental injuries
are usually easily distinguished from injuries caused by sexual abuse.
It would be extremely rare for accidental injuries or masturbation to
cause injury to the hymen.175
A number of laboratory tests are helpful in diagnosing or clarify-
ing child sexual abuse. The occurrence of sexual contact can be con-
firmed by the presence of spermatozoa, acid phosphatase (a chemical
166. See A. HEGER, supra note 141, at 20.
167. See Handfield-Jones, Hinde & Kennedy, Lichen Sclerosis et Atrophicus in Chil-
dren Misdiagnosed as Sexual Abuse, 294 BRITISH MED. J. 1404 (1987).
168. See Boyd & Jordan, Unusual Presentation of Varicella Suggestive of Sexual
Abuse, 141 AM. J. OF DISEASES OF CHILDREN 940 (1987).
169. See Clayden, Reflex Anal Dilatation Associated With Severe Chronic Constipa-
tion in Children, 63 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 832 (1988); Wales &
Taitz, Letter to the Editor, LANCET 1396, 1397 (Dec. 12, 1987)(authors collected
data on anal sphincter tone in 74 children referred for constipation. They found
that "a minority of children with chronic constipation may show a 'positive' anal
dilation test.").
170. See Hey, Buchan, Littlewood & Hall, Differential Diagnosis in Child Sexual
Abuse, LANCET 283 (Jan. 31, 1987).
171. See Vickers, Morris, Coulthard & Eastham, Anal Signs in Haemolytic Uraemic
Syndrome, LANCET 998 (April 30, 1988).
172. See Williams, Callen & Owen, Vulvar Disorders in the Pubertal Female, 15 PEDI-
ATRIC ANNALS 588 (1986).
173. Cowell, The Gynecological Examination of Infants, Children, and Young Adoles-
cents, 28 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 247 (1981). The author writes that "The
first myth to be dispelled is that tampons alter hymenal integrity. Distensibility
is increased due to slight stretching... ." Id. at 260.
174. Baker, Seat Belt Injury Masquerading as Sexual Abuse, 77 PEDIATRICS 435 (1986).
175. Hobbs & Wynne, Child Sexual Abuse-An Increasing Rate of Diagnosis, LANCET
837, 840 (Oct. 10, 1987)("Straddle injuries, sometimes difficult to differentiate
from abuse, will tend to lead to anterior injury other than to the vaginal in-
troitus."); Muram, Genital Tract Injuries in the Prepubertal Child, 15 PEDIATRIC
ANNALS 616, 620 (1986)("Severe self-inflicted injuries [to the genitalia] are ex-
tremely rare, but vulvar contusions can be seen in mentally handicapped girls,
particularly those who masturbate regularly."); Woodling & Kossoris, Sexual
Misuse: Rape, Molestation and Incest, 28 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 481, 492
(1981)("Autostimulation will not produce abrasions, lacerations, or contusions,
nor does tampon insertion.").
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found in ejaculate), or a foreign blood group substance if ejaculation
occurred. The absence of laboratory evidence of ejaculation does not
disprove sexual abuse. If the time interval between sexual abuse and
examination is longer than forty-eight hours (as is most often the case
in child sexual abuse), evidence of sperm or acid phosphatase is un-
likely to be present. Sperm persist longer in vaginal fluid than dried
on skin surfaces. In child sexual abuse, however, ejaculation is likely
to occur outside the vagina.176
Toluidine blue and Lugol's solution are dyes which may be applied
to the posterior fourchette and perineum to penetrate into small fis-
sures or acute lacerations such as those caused by sexual abuse.177
Acetic acid can be applied to the genitalia to reveal venereal warts.1 78
Among sexually transmitted diseases, some are more likely to be
sexually transmitted than others. Infection with syphilis, gonorrhea,
condyloma lata, Trichomonas, herpes type 2, and Chlamydia are con-
sidered virtual proof of sexual contact in a child, provided perinatal
transmission has been excluded. Condyloma acuminata and Gardner-
ella vaginalis are also sexually transmitted diseases. Controversy ex-
ists, however, regarding whether or how often these diseases may be
acquired by non-sexual means.
A laboratory technique that promises to find increasing use in sex-
ual abuse litigation involves so-called "genetic fingerprint" evidence.
This technique is employed to identify the perpetrator. Genetic fin-
gerprinting involves a laboratory comparison of DNA coding material
found at the scene of a crime with a sample of DNA taken from the
defendant. For example, DNA contained in sperm found on a sexu-
ally abused child could be compared with DNA found in a sample of
defendant's blood. The test is highly probative of identity.
In the recent case of Andrews v. State,179 the Florida Court of Ap-
176. See Dahlke, Cooke, Cunnane, Chawla & Lau, Identification of Semen in 500 Pa-
tients Seen Because of Rape, 68 AM. J. OF CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 740 (1977).
177. McCauley, Gorman & Guzinski, Toluidine Blue in the Detection of Perineal Lac-
erations in Pediatric and Adolescent Sexual Abuse Victims, 78 PEDIATRICS 1039
(1986).
178. Krebs & Schneider, Human Papillomavirus-Associated Lesions of the Penis:
Colposcopy, Cytology, and Histology, 70 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 299
(1987)("Routine application of 3% or 5% acetic acid yielded white or grayish epi-
thelial changes in 22% of the cases, which would have been missed without this
technique."); Rosenberg & Reid, Sexually Transmitted Papillomaviral Infections
in the Male: I. Anatomic Distribution and Clinical Features, 29 UROLOGY 488
(1987).
179. 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). See also State v. Hartman, 145 Wis. 2d 1,
426 N.W.2d 320 (1988); Shines, Blood Grouping and Genetic Marker Evidence:
The Use of Electrophoretic Testing, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 475 (1988); Williams, DNA
Fingerprinting: A Revolutionar-y Technique in Forensic Science and Its Probable
Effects on Criminal Evidentiary Law, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (1987-88); Comment,
DNA Identification Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REV. 903 (1988).
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peal found "genetic fingerprinting" sufficiently reliable to gain admis-
sion in evidence in a criminal proceeding. In Andrews, defendant was
chaiged with sexual battery of an adult. The victim could not identify
her assailant. DNA material contained in sperm found in the victim's
vagina was compared to DNA in defendant's blood. At trial, the
state's expert described the comparison: "[Ihe percentage of the pop-
ulation which would have the DNA bands indicated by the samples
would be 0.0000012%. In other words, the chance that the DNA
strands found in appellant's blood would be duplicated in some other
person's cells was 1 in 839,914,540."180 The expert "concluded that to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty, appellant's DNA was present
in the vaginal smear taken from the victim."8s
A colposcope is a medical instrument which allows a physician to
inspect the genitalia with a strong light source and magnification of
five to thirty times actual size. The colposcope is binocular, allowing
depth perception. A green filter may reveal abnormalities in the
blood vessels.18 2 A camera is often attached to the colposcope so that
physical findings may be photographed for better documentation. The
colposcope has long been used with women patients to study the va-
gina and cervix, as in diagnosis of early cancer or venereal warts. In
1981, Teixeira first reported "the benefits of the use of colposcopy in
the examination of sexual assaults."183 Teixeira examined 500 females
age four to fifty-one years. Twenty percent were under age fourteen.
Ninety-one percent were under age eighteen. In 11.8 percent of cases,
colposcopy provided additional information about physical findings
not seen during the normal examination. The colposcope made it pos-
sible to detect evidence of ongoing healing which, on normal examina-
tion, appeared to be complete. A subsequent article reported on the
value of the colposcope in documenting microtrauma to the genitalia
in adult women after consensual sexual intercourse.18 4 The trauma
was not visible with the unaided eye. In 1986, Woodling and Heger
reported on four year's experience with the colposcope in examining
children for possible sexual abuse. In ten percent of the cases colpos-
copy identified lesions which would have been missed without the aid
of the device.185 The colposcope is an accepted and useful aid to the
physician in conducting a genital examination.
180. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
181. Id. at 849.
182. See A. HEGER, supra note 141, at 19.
183. Teixeira, Hymenal Colopscopic Examination in Sexual Offenses, 2 AM. J. FOREN-
SIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 209 (1981).
184. See Norvell, Benrubi & Thompson, Investigation of Microtrauma After Sexual
Intercourse, 29 J. REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE 269 (1984).
185. Woodling & Heger, The Use of the Coloposcope in the Diagnosis of Sexual Abuse
in the Pediatric Age Group, 10 CHILD'ABUSE & NEGLECT 111, 114 (1986).
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2. Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony Regarding
Sexual Abuse
Expert testimony regarding medical evidence of sexual abuse is
generally admissible. 186 A physician's testimony may take several
forms. First, some courts permit an expert to state that a child was
sexually abused.18 7 Such testimony goes directly to an ultimate fac-
tual inquiry before the court. 88 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
however, the fact that expert testimony embraces an issue of ultimate
fact does not render the testimony inadmissible. 8 9
In an earlier subsection90 the so-called ultimate issue rule was dis-
cussed, and it was concluded that it may be appropriate to prohibit
experts from stating that sexual abuse occurred, and to require in-
stead that expert testimony be limited to statements of fact that are
clearly within the realm of professional expertise. Applying this limi-
tation to physicians, the court might permit a physician to express an
opinion that a child experienced sexual contact, forced sexual contact,
or penetration. The physician should be permitted to fully describe
the type of contact or penetration, and any findings discovered during
physical examination. To the extent the physician's opinion is based
on the child's history or on results of laboratory tests, the physician
should be at liberty to describe the history and the test results, and to
explain how these factors influenced the opinion.
The second form of medical testimony is similar to the first, except
that in the second the physician adds that a child has a "diagnosis" of
sexual abuse or sexual contact. The second type of opinion enhances
the expert's opinion with the aura of scientific certainty connoted to
nonphysicians by the word diagnosis.
Third, an expert may testify that a child's condition is consistent
with sexual abuse. Stating that a child's condition is consistent with
sexual abuse is less certain than the first two forms of opinion, and is
one step removed from the ultimate issue.
Finally, a physician may testify that a child demonstrates no physi-
cal or medical evidence of sexual abuse, but that absence of such evi-
186. See, e.g., People v. Mendibles, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1277, 245 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1988);
State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684 (1986); People v. Land, 178 Ill. App. 3d
251, 533 N.E.2d 57 (1989); Owens v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. 1987); People v.
Vasher, 423 N.W.2d 40 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Baker, 320 N.C. 104, 357
S.E.2d 340 (1987). In very few cases would medical evidence of abuse lack proba-
tive value, and in equally few cases would the probative value of such evidence be
substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice.
187. See State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 448, 349 S.E.2d 684, 685 (1986).
188. Id at 450, 349 S.E.2d at 686 (the doctor's "opinion was one of fact, and was not
inadmissible as a legal conclusion").
189. See FED. R. EvID. 704. See supra section II (E), for discussion of the ultimate issue
rule.
190. See supra subsection I (E).
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dence does not rule out abuse. This type of testimony should not be
permitted in all cases. For example, if the charged offense is fondling,
the jury does not need an expert to tell it the child will not be physi-
cally injured. If, on the other hand, the charge is anal penetration,
jurors may well benefit from expert testimony which informs them
that anal penetration does not always cause physical injury. Such ex-
pert testimony is particularly appropriate if the defense asserts or im-
plies that if abuse had occurred, there would be injury.
Courts permit expert medical witnesses to describe injuries and of-
fer opinions as to their cause.19 1 Courts generally permit physicians to
respond to questions asking whether injuries could have happened in a
particular way.192 Furthermore, experts may be asked whether a
caretaker's explanation for injuries is reasonable.193 Finally, penetra-
tion may be established on the basis of expert testimony.19 4
As discussed earlier, the physician sometimes employs a colposcope
to aid in detecting subtle signs of abuse. In a few cases, defendants
argued that the colposcope is a novel scientific technique, and that
findings gleaned with aid of the colposcope should not be admitted
unless the state proves that the colposcope has gained general accep-
tance in the scientific community. This argument has received a de-
servedly cool reception from the courts. The California Court of
Appeal's decision in People v. Mendibles195 is illustrative. The court
wrote:
In forming an opinion whether the victims had suffered injuries consistent
with sexual abuse, Dr. Heger relied primarily on patterns of scarring, deformi-
ties and other non-normal changes in the hymens of these children. For part
of her examination, she used a colposcope, a binocular device which permits 15
power magnification, thereby allowing microscopic examination of the area.
A camera is attached to the colposcope and will take stereoscopic slides to
preserve the results of the examination. Defendant characterizes all of the
191. See People v. Mendibles, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1277, 1293, 245 Cal. Rptr. 553, 562
(1988)("it is settled by 'a long line of California decisions' that an expert medical
witness is qualified 'to give an opinion of the cause of a particular injury on the
basis of the expert's deduction from the appearance of the injury itself.' "(quoting
People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 249, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 459 (1984))).
192. See Owens v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. 1987).
193. See State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah 1983)(physical abuse case).
194. See State v. Galloway, 304 N.C. 485, 284 S.E.2d 509 (1981), where the court wrote:
A physician who is properly qualified as an expert may offer an opinion
as to whether the victim in a rape prosecution had been penetrated and
whether internal injuries had been caused thereby.... Testimony that
an examination revealed evidence of traumatic and forcible penetration
consistent with an alleged rape is a proper expression for an expert wit-
ness to establish whether the victim had been penetrated by force.
Id. at 489, 284 S.E.2d at 512 (emphasis in original). See also People v. Vasher, 423
N.W.2d 40 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Baker, 320 N.C. 104, 357 S.E.2d 340
(1987).
195. 199 Cal. App. 3d 1277, 245 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1988).
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foregoing as the use of a new scientific technique subject to the stringent re-
quirements of [the Frye test].
It is clear there was no novel device involved. The colposcope is an instru-
ment in general use in the medical community which has value in detecting
sexual abuse or rape .... Even if the colposcope were not in general use, it
does nothing more than provide binocular magnification of 15 power. In this
sense, it is nothing more than a weak microscope-an instrument long ac-
cepted as scientifically reliable.1 9
6
In Mendibles, the defendant did not limit his assertions about novel
scientific evidence to the colposcope. He also argued that the process
of forming medical judgments about sexual abuse on the basis of phys-
ical evidence constitutes a novel scientific technique. The court re-
jected this argument as well, writing:
Neither did Dr. Heger's methodology involve the application of any new
scientific technique. Her opinion was based entirely upon visual examination
and the observations she made therein. She established there is a body of
literature reporting medical studies upon which she could base the conclu-
sions she drew from her observations. Moreover, the diagnosis of sexual abuse
or rape from the observation of certain marks or scarring is nothing new....
The sole "novelty" apparent here is the analysis of injury to a specific portion
of the external genitalia of prepubescent females; that in itself cannot remove
the subject matter from the realm of legitimate scientific expertise. In sum,
the testimony here is no different qualitatively from the analysis of any other
wound or injury. Hence, the People were not required to prove the reliability
and general acceptance of a "new scientific technique" in the relevant medical
community.1 9 7
In the Mendibles case, the physician based her testimony largely on
the results of her physical examination of the children. In some cases,
the physician's opinion is based more heavily on the child's medical
history, with secondary importance attached to the results of the phys-
ical examination. 1 98 In such cases the doctor's inquiry is not limited to
medical evidence disclosed during physical examination. The doctor
considers the results of the physical examination in light of a wide
array of additional information. For example, the child's description
of abuse is vitally important.1 9 9 The doctor also relies on statements
by relevant adults. The fact that some of these out-of-court state-
196. Id. at 1295, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
197. Id.
198. See State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684 (1986), where the court wrote:
Dr. Fleming's opinion that the child had been sexually abused was based
on her physical examination of the child as well as on the history related
to her by the child. This opinion was admissible under the rule that
medical opinions concerning a patient's physical condition are admissible
in evidence even when they are based in part on the physical history
elicited from the patient.
Id. at 449-50, 349 S.E.2d at 685.
199. Under Rule 803(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, certain statements made for
purposes of diagnosis and treatment are excepted from the hearsay rule. See J.
MYERS, supra note 2, § 5.36.
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ments may constitute inadmissible hearsay does not render the physi-
cian's reliance on them unreasonable. 200
In addition to considering verbal descriptions from the child and
others, physicians elicit information about behaviors and emotional re-
actions that are indicative of sexual abuse. For example, the physician
may inquire whether the child demonstrates age-inappropriate sexual
knowledge or preoccupation. The doctor may ask whether the child
demonstrates behavior consistent with stress.
It is apparent that in formulating diagnostic impressions, physi-
cians often consider information that is not strictly medical in nature.
The psychological and social effects of sexual abuse are frequently as
important as the results of laboratory tests and physical examination.
Insofar as physicians consider nonmedical indicators of abuse, they de-
part the realm reserved exclusively for physicians, and enter the
arena of expertise shared by mental health professionals. When a
physician operates in the arena of shared expertise, the numerous con-
siderations discussed in subsequent sections of this Article come into
play. For example, can a diagnosis of child sexual abuse be predicated
in whole or in part on behavioral indicators of abuse? If so, is such a
diagnosis based on novel scientific principles? Do experts possess spe-
cial knowledge that enables them to assess the credibility of children's
allegations of abuse? When a physician has one foot in the medical
camp and the other in the behavioral, the resulting opinion is scruti-
nized from both perspectives.
Medical evidence plays an important role in child sexual abuse liti-
gation. While physical evidence exists in only a minority of abused
children, when such evidence -is present, it may weigh heavily with
jurors.
B. Behavioral Science Testimony Describing Behaviors Commonly
Observed in Sexually Abused Children
Many sexually abused children demonstrate behavioral, cognitive,
and emotional reactions to their abuse. Expert testimony describing
such behaviors serves several purposes. In some cases, expert testi-
mony describing behaviors commonly observed in sexually abused
children constitutes substantive evidence of abuse. The use of expert
testimony as substantive evidence of abuse is discussed in the present
subsection. In addition to use as substantive evidence, expert testi-
mony describing behaviors observed in sexually abused children is ad-
missible for nonsubstantive purposes. The most important
nonsubstantive purpose of such testimony is to rehabilitate children's
credibility following certain types of impeachment. Expert testimony
200. See supra discussion of permissible bases of expert testimony, at section I (B).
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designed to rehabilitate credibility is discussed in subsections IV (D)
and (E).
1. Clinical and Scientific Information
It has long been known that sexual abuse might have a negative
psychological impact on children. Case reports in professional litera-
ture have appeared for decades. However, only recently has there
been recognition among mental health professionals that sexual abuse
might be an important correlate for a variety of medical and mental
health conditions. Changes in societal attitudes about sexual assault,
and improved knowledge about the extent and nature of the phenom-
enon, have led to a more complete understanding of the effects of sex-
ual abuse. There now exists a body of knowledge describing the
emotional, behavioral, and cognitive impacts of abuse. Increasingly,
this knowledge base includes scientifically sound data from which con-
clusions can validly be drawn. While there is much yet to learn, a
numbei of well-established findings exist.
It is now clearly established that sexual abuse of children is wide-
spread.2 01 Studies of the general population revealed significant rates
of victimization for women, and somewhat lower rates for men.202
These studies disclose that most child sexual abuse is not reported at
the time. Many cases are never disclosed. Only a small fraction of
cases are known to police. 203
The prevalence of child sexual abuse in adults who are receiving
mental health services is high. Over eighty percent of psychiatric in-
patients have some kind of abuse history.204 The tendency of some
201. See AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT
AND ABUSE REPORTING 1985 (1987); Myers, The Legal Response to Child Abuse: In
the Best Interest of Children?, 24 J. FAM. L. 149, 169-72 (1985-86).
202. D. RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION: RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND WORK-
PLACE HARRASSMENT (1984); D. Finkelhor, G. Hotaling, I. Lewis & C. Smith, Risk
Factors for Sexual Abuse in a National Survey of Adult Men and Women, (un-
published manuscript available from the Family Research Laboratory, University
of New Hampshire, 126 HSSC, Durham, N.H. 03824); Wyatt, The Sexual Abuse of
Afro-American and White-American Women in C7hildhood, 9 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 507 (1985).
203. D. RUSSELL, supra note 202; Kilpatrick, Saunders, Veronen, Best & Von, Crimi-
nal Victimization: Lifetime Prevalence, Reporting to Police and Psychological
Impact, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 479 (1987).
204. Jacobson & Richardson, Assault Experiences of 100 Psychiatric Inpatients: Evi-
dence of the Need for Routine Inquiry, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 908 (1987). It has
been discovered that many mental patients do not volunteer information about
sexual abuse unless they are asked specifically about abuse. In one study the
proportion of female psychiatric outpatients with histories of sexual abuse in-
creased from eight percent to over 70 percent simply by asking about sexual
abuse. J. Briere & L. Zaidi, Sexual Abuse Histories and Sequelae in Psychiatric
Emergency Room Patients (paper presented at Annual Meeting of American
Psychological Association, Atlanta, Ga., Aug., 1988).
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professionals to minimize the consequences of child sexual abuse has
hampered understanding of the psychological impact of abuse. Kin-
sey, who was one of the first researchers to uncover the significant
extent of abuse, took the position that trauma to children came pri-
marily from parents, and did not derive from the abuse experience
itself. 205 Kinsey could see no reason why sexual molestation would
be inherently traumatic. Other commentators have promulgated a
similar view. Early reports in the clinical literature tended to dismiss
negative effects of sexual abuse.2 06 One continues to find occasional
suggestions in the literature that abuse is not harmful. Some papers
discuss a small sample of children who seem relatively unscathed by
sexual abuse, and draw the conclusion that abuse is not necessarily
harmful. 207 Ideology as much as evidence appears to drive some of
those who attack the premise that sexual abuse causes psychological
damage. Constantine notes that many studies find some proportion of
children who show no evidence of harm.208 He goes on to state that
children should have a right to choose to have sex with adults. Simi-
larly, Henderson proposes that psychopathology seen in sex abuse vic-
tims probably preexisted abuse, and that children's disturbances may
cause them to seek out sexual experiences. 209
At the present time, it cannot be denied that child sexual abuse
often has devastating long-term consequences. The terrible damage
caused by sexual abuse has been described most eloquently by the
adult survivors of child sexual abuse.210 Over the last decade there
has been a tremendous accumulation of knowledge about the long-
term effects of abuse. The earliest systematic reports focused on in-
cest victims who were receiving psychotherapy, and found that incest
victims have more severe symptoms than patients who have not been
sexually abused.211 Since then, a number of studies of women in the
general population have confirmed that abuse survivors experience
205. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
HUMAN FEMALE (1953).
206. Bender & Blau, The Reaction of Children to Sexual Relationships with Adults, 7
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 500 (1937).
207. Yorukoglu & Kempe, Children Not Severely Damaged by Incest with a Parent, 5
J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 111 (1961).
208. Constantine, The Effects of Early Sexual Experiences: A Review and Synthesis of
the Research, in CHILDREN AND SEX: NEW FINDINGS, 217, 222-23 (1981).
209. Henderson, Is Incest Harmful?, 28 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 34 (1983).
210. L. ARMSTRONG, KISs DADDY GOODNIGHT (1978); K. BRADY, FATHER'S DAYS
(1970); S. FORWARD & C. BUCK, BETRAYAL OF INNOCENCE: INCEST AND ITS DEv-
ASTATION (1978); S. FRASER, MY FATHER'S HOUSE: A MEMOIR OF INCEST AND
HEALING (1988).
211. J. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST (1982); K. MEISELMAN, INCEST: A PSY-
CHOLOGICAL STUDY OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS WITH TREATMENT RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (1978); Tsai, Feldman-Summers & Edgar, Childhood Molestation:
Variables Related to Differential Impacts of Psychosexual Functioning in Adult
Women, 66 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 407 (1978).
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higher levels of symptomatic distress.212 Adult survivors are more de-
pressed, more anxious, have more dissociative and somatic symptoms,
and have lower self-esteem. Survivors are also at significantly higher
risk of developing depression, various anxiety disorders, including
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance abuse disorders, and
sexual dysfunction.13 High rates of sexual abuse are found in the
histories of patients with conversion reactions,214 suicidality, 215 self-
mutilation,216 multiple personality disorder,217 chronic pelvic pain,2 18
and in women with eating disorders. 219 Childhood sexual abuse is
found in a large percentage of adolescent prostitutes220 and
runaways. 2 2
1
Since the late 1970s, numerous publications have described the
negative effects of sexual abuse on children.222 These publications de-
212. Briere & Runtz, Symtomatology Associated with Childhood Sexual Victimization
in a Non-Clinical Sample, 12 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 51 (1988); Gold, Long
Term Effects of Sexual Victimization in Childhood An Attributional Approach,
54 J. CONSULT. & CLIN. PSYCHOLOGY 471 (1986); Stein, Golding, Seigel, Burnam &
Sorenson, Long Term Psychological Sequelae of Child Sexual Abuse: The Los An-
geles Epidemeological Catchment Area Study, in LASTING EFFECTS OF CHILD SEX-
UAL ABUSE (G.Wyatt & G. Powell eds. 1988)[hereinafter Stein].
213. Bagley & Ramsey, Sexual Abuse in Childhood Psychosocial Outcomes and Im-
plications for Social Work Practice, 4 J. SOC. WORK & HUMAN SEXUALITY 33
(1985); Murphy, Kilpatrick, Amick-McMullan, Veronen, Paduhovich, Best, Ville-
ponteaux & Saunders, Current Psychological Functioning of Child Sexual As-
sault Survivors, 3 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 55 (1988); Stein, supra note 212.
214. Gross, Incestuous Rape: A Cause for Hysterical Seizures in Four Adolescent
Girls, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 704 (1979).
215. Briere & Runtz, Suicidal Thoughts and Behaviors in Former Sexual Abuse Vic-
tims, 18 CAN. J. BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE 413 (1986).
216. Shapiro, Self-Mutiliation and Self-Abuse in Incest Victims, 41 AM. J. PSYCHo-
THERAPY 46 (1987).
217. Putnam, Guroff, Silberman, Barban & Post, The Clinical Phenomenology of Mul-
tiple Personality Disorder: Review of 100 Recent Cases, 47 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIA-
TRY 285 (1986); Saltman & Solomon, Incest and Multiple Personality, 50
PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 1127 (1982).
218. Walker, Katon, Harrop-Griffiths, Holm, Russo & Hickok, Relationship of
Chronic Pelvic Pain to Psychiatric Diagnosis and Childhood Sexual Abuse, 145
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 75 (1988).
219. Root, The Incidence of Victimization in a Bulemic Sample, 3 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 161 (1988).
220. James & Meyerding, Early Sexual Experience and Prostitution, 134 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 1381 (1977).
221. McCormick, Janus & Burgess, Runaway Youths and Sexual Victimization Gen-
der Differences in an Adolescent Runaway Population, - CHILD ABUSE & NE-
GLECT - (in press).
222. A. BURGESS, N. GROTH, L. HOLMSTROM & S. SGROI, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHIL-
DREN AND ADOLESCENTS (1978); S. BUTLER, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: THE
TRAUMA OF INCEST (1978); J. GOODWIN, SEXUAL ABUSE: INCEST VICTIMS AND
THEIR FAMILIES (1982); B. JUSTICE & R. JUSTICE, THE BROKEN TABOO (1979); R.
KEMPE & C. KEMPE, THE COMMON SECRET: SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS (1984); SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES (P.
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scribed certain general patterns of reaction found in clinical samples
of sexually abused children. For the most part, children described in
these studies were victims of incest. Numerous negative effects are
described, including fears and anxieties, feelings of guilt, shame and
anger, self-destructiveness, and inappropriate sexual or aggressive
behavior.
A number of studies systematically describe symptoms among sex-
ually abused children who were receiving mental health treatment.22 3
These studies documented a range of symptoms in such children. One
of the earliest reports on the effects of sexual abuse on a large sample
of children noted that over two-thirds of the children showed evidence
of psychological disturbance.2 24
Based on the foregoing research, a clinical picture of the sexually
abused child began to emerge. A constellation of similar reactions was
observed repeatedly. Eventually, a clinical consensus developed about
the way children who have been sexually abused react emotionally
and behaviorally. 225 Several authors have described behavioral and
emotional reactions commonly observed in sexually abused
children.226
Two recent literature reviews examine existing research on the
impact of child sexual abuse.22 7 The reviews confirm that many sexu-
ally abused children demonstrate reactions to their abuse. The re-
views also point out that there is great variability in the type and
severity of children's reactions. The reviews go on to note that the
Mrazek & C. Kempe eds. 1981); Peters, Children Who are Victims of Sexual As-
sault and the Psychology of Offenders, 30 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 398 (1976).
223. Rogers & Terry, Clinical Intervention With Boy Victims of Sexual Abuse, in Vic-
TIMS OF SEXUAL AGGRESSION (I. Stuart & J. Greer eds. 1984); Adams-Tucker,
Proximate Effects of Sexual Abuse in Childhood. A Report on 28 Children, 139
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1252 (1982); Mian, Wehrspann, Klajner-Diamond, LeBaron &
Winder, Review of 125 Children 6 Years of Age and Under Who Were Sexually
Abused, 10 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 223 (1986) [hereinafter Mian]; Anderson,
Bach & Griffiths, Psychosocial Sequelae in Intrafamilial Victims of Sexual As-
sault and Abuse (paper presented at the Third International Conference on Child
Abuse and Neglect, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1981).
224. V. DEFRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES COMMITTED BY
ADULTS (1969).
225. B. JAMES & M. NASJLETI, TREATING SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN AND THEIR
FAMILIES (1983); Porter, Blick & Sgroi, Treatment of the Sexually Abused Child,
in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL INTERVENTION IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 109 (S. Sgroi
ed. 1982).
226. See, e.g., Sgroi, Porter & Blick, Validation of Child Sexual Abuse, in HANDBOOK
OF CLINICAL INTERVENTION IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 39, 40-41 (S. Sgroi ed. 1982)
[hereinafter Sgroi].
227. J. HAUGAARD & D. REPUCCI, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN (1988); Browne &
Finkelhor, Impact of Child Sexual Abuse: A Review of the Research, 99 PSYCHO-
LOGICAL BULLETIN 66 (1986).
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literature contains few scientifically rigorous studies of the effects of
child sexual abuse.
The literature reviews note a number of weaknesses in methodol-
ogy and design in much of the available literature on effects of sexual
abuse. For example, many of the sexually abused children who were
studied were receiving psychological services. Children in therapy
may not be representative of all sexually abused children.
Another methodological concern is that many of the studies did not
use standardized measures of psychological disturbance, and did not
employ comparison groups. Without comparison data it is not possible
to conclude that observed effects significantly discriminate abused
from nonabused children. This shortcoming reduces the general-
izability of results.
Recent empirical investigations attempt to avoid some of the meth-
odological problems discussed above. Achieving sounder methodology
is accomplished by using control groups, and by employing standard-
ized measures which have established values for normal and clinical
findings. These studies are beginning to provide a more complete pic-
ture of the effects of child sexual abuse.
At this writing, data is available from almost a dozen major investi-
gations. Since some of the studies are ongoing, sample sizes may in-
crease, and additional analyses may be conducted. The investigations
reveal a number of consistent findings which lay the groundwork for
understanding the general parameters of the short-term effects of
child sexual abuse.
The first important study was conducted by a team of researchers
at Tufts New England Medical Center. 228 These researchers collected
extensive data on 122 sexually abused children and their families. A
follow-up study was conducted approximately one and one-half years
later. Conte and Berliner reported on 369 sexually abused children.
A one-year follow-up study was completed.2 29 Cohen and Mannarino
have initial information on sixty abused girls, and are following up on
these cases. 230 Friedrich and colleagues have published several papers
228. Tufts New England Medical Center, Division of Child Psychiatry, Sexually Ex-
ploited Children: Service and Research Project (Final Report for the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice (1984))
[hereinafter Tufts].
229. J. Conte, L. Berliner & J. Schuerman, The Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children:
Final Technical Report (National Institute of Mental Health 1988, U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (Grant No. MH 37133))(also appearing in
HANDBOOK ON SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT Is-
SUES (L. Walker 1988)) [hereinafter J. Conte].
230. An article describing Mannarino and Cohen's study of 60 children has been com-
pleted and submitted for publication. A pilot study involving 24 of the children is
found at Cohen & Mannarino, Psychological Symptoms in Sexually Abused Girls,
12 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 571 (1988). The abstract of this article reads:
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on investigations of behavior problems in sexually abused children.2 3 '
Einbender and Friedrich reported on forty-six sexually abused
girls.2 32 Tong and colleagues evaluated forty-nine girls.233 Saunders
and colleagues have data available on ninety girls who were sexually
abused by father figures. 234 A study led by Runyon was designed to
evaluate the effects of intervention on sexually abused children. The
study provides information on seventy-five children.235 White and
Halpin have compared young sexually abused children with children
who are not sexually abused, and with neglected children.23s Wolfe
and Wolfe are studying seventy sexually abused girls.237
All of these studies gathered data through a checklist completed by
parents. In two studies the checklist was designed specifically for the
study,2 3 8 while in the remainder, standardized instruments were used.
In most of the studies one or more comparison groups were used.
Some of the studies employed both psychiatric outpatient and nonclin-
ical comparison groups. Three investigations used matched compari-
This study examined psychological symptoms exhibited by children
who had recently been sexually abused.
Twenty-four girls aged 6 to 12 years old were evaluated within six
months of being abused using a variety of standardized child psychiatric
instruments. Results showed a marked discrepancy between child and
parent reports of symptoms. The abused children did not exhibit signifi-
cant depressive, anxiety, or low self-esteem symptoms by self-report;
however, their parents rated them as having significantly more behav-
ioral problems than a normative sample but as somewhat less pathologi-
cal than a clinical sample....
231. Friedrich, Beilke & Urguiza, Children from Sexually Abusive Families: A Behav-
ioral Comparison, 2 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 391 (1987) [hereinafter Fried-
rich, Children]; Friedrich, Urquiza & Beilke, Behavior Problems in Young
Sexually Abused Children, 11 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOLOGY 47 (1986) [hereinafter
Friedrich, Behavior].
232. Einbender & Friedrich, The Psychological Functioning and Behavior of Sexually
Abused Girls, J. CLINICAL & CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY (in press).
233. Tong, Oates & McDowell, Personality Development Following Sexual Abuse, 11
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 371 (1987).
234. Saunders, McClure & Murphy, Structure, Function and Symptoms in Father-
Child Sexual Abuse Families: A Multi-level, Multi-Respondent Empirical As-
sessment (Grant from Family Support Program, Department of the
Navy)(Available at Crime Victim Center, Medical University of South Carolina,
171 Ashley Street, Charleston, S.C.).
235. Runyon, Everson, Edelsohn, Hunter & Coulter, Impact of Legal Intervention on
Sexually Abused Chidlren, 113 J. PEDIATRICS 647 (1988).
236. White, Halpin, Strom & Santilli, Behavioral Comparisons of Young Sexually
Abused, Neglected and Nonreferred Children, 17 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY
53 (1988)[hereinafter White].
237. Wolfe, Gentile & Wolfe, The Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A PTSD For-
mulation, BEHAVIOR THERAPY (in press)[hereinafter Wolfe].
238. Conte & Berliner, The Impact of Sexual Abuse on Childrew Empirical Findings,
in HANDBOOK ON SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 72 (L. Walker ed. 1988); White,
supra note 236.
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son groups. In two studies, teachers completed a behavior checklist on
some of the children.
Similar results were found across all of these recent studies. Sexu-
ally abused children are consistently found to be more behaviorally
distressed than nonabused children. However, the levels of behavioral
disturbance in sexually abused children are not as significant as the
levels of disturbance in psychiatric populations of children.
Sexually abused children as a group clearly differ behaviorally
from nonabused children. Within the group of sexually abused chil-
dren, however, there is significant variation. Furthermore, a substan-
tial subgroup of sexually abused children do not exhibit a level of
behavioral distubance which is considered clinically significant.
The studies also employed self-report measures of depression, anx-
iety, and self-esteem to examine emotional and behavioral distur-
bance. On general mental health and behavioral measures, sexually
abused children could not be differentiated from nonabused children.
However, Wolfe and colleagues have preliminary data suggesting that
a device which measures sex-abuse-specific reactions discriminates be-
tween abused and nonabused children.239 When abuse-specific meas-
ures were employed, there were statistically significant differences
between abused and nonabused children. Sexually abused children
had elevations in intrusive thoughts related to the event. They also
demonstrated abuse-specific fears like fear of revictimization.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these investigations.
Sexually abused children as a group differ behaviorally from
nonabused children. Overall, sexually abused children have less pa-
thology than psychiatrically disturbed children. Within the group of
sexually abused children there is a broad range and degree of distur-
bance. Some children do not appear to be behaviorally distressed. In
one study, twenty-one percent of the children were rated asymptom-
atic by therapists. 240 In most studies, however, more than sixty per-
cent of sexually abused children score in the clinically significant
range on some measures. This finding indicates a level of acute dis-
tress requiring immediate clinical intervention.
Investigators have studied factors that appear to be related to the
most serious negative impact of sexual abuse. The closer the relation-
ship between the offender and the child, the more serious the conse-
quences for some children. More intrusive forms of sexual behavior,
such as intercourse, may cause more serious effects. The longer the
duration of abuse, and the more frequent the episodes, the greater the
impact on many children. Use of violence'seems to be related to a
239. Wolfe, supra note 237.




Several studies have found that there is a relationship between the
amount of support available to sexually abused children and post-
abuse functioning. Conte and Schuerman found that a supportive re-
lationship with a nonoffending parent and with a sibling was impor-
tant.242 The support available to a child may be associated with
several factors. One study found that mothers tended to be less sup-
portive when the offender was a stepfather than when he was a biolog-
ical parent.243 Characteristics of family functioning also seems to be
related to outcome. When there are many negative qualities to family
relations, or when families have more conflict and less cohesion,
abused children fare poorly.244
Of the many reactions observed in sexually abused children, sexual
reactions have the closest logical association with sexual abuse. Sex-
ual involvement with adults, or with significantly older children, is
developmentally abnormal. Through the process of learning, or ac-
commodation to sexual abuse, a child may demonstrate unusual or
age-inappropriate sexual behaviors. Some children react in a sexual-
ized way to the experience of abuse.245 The drawings of some sexually
abused children contain sexual detail.246 An empirical investigation of
this phenomenon found that abused children were significantly more
likely to put genitalia on human figure drawings, although only a
small percent of abused children did so. 24 7 Studies indicate that sexu-
ally abused children demonstrate more sexualized play with anatomi-
cally detailed dolls than nonabused children.248
Differences between sexually abused and nonabused children re-
garding sexual behavior have consistently been observed with stan-
dardized behavior measures. 249 A major limitation of this data is that
the information is derived from a few questions about sexual behavior
241. See Browne & Finkelhor, supra note 227.
242. See Conte & Schuerman, Factors Associated with an Increased Impact of Child
Sexual Abuse, 11 CHILD ABusE & NEGLECT 201 (1987).
243. See Tufts, supra note 228.
244. See Conte & Schuerman, supra note 242; Friedrich, Children, supra note 231.
245. Yates, Children Eroticized by Incest, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 482 (1982).
246. See Burgess, McCausland & Wolbert, Children's Drawings as Indicators of Sex-
ual Trauma, 19 PERSP. ON PSYCHIATRIC CARE 50 (1981); Hibbard, Roghmann &
Hoekelman, Genitalia in Children's Drawings: An Association with Sexual
Abuse, 79 PEDIATRICS 129 (1987) [hereinafter Hibbard]; Kelley, The Use of Art
Therapy with Sexually Abused Children, 22 J. PSYCHOSOCIAL NURSING 12 (1984);
Stember, Art Therapy: A New Use in the Diagnosis and Treatment of Sexually
Abused Children, in SEXUAL. ARUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED READINGS (U.S.
Dept. Health & Human Services, Washington D.C., 1980); Yates, Beutler & Crago,
Drawings by Child Victims oJ Incest. 9 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 183 (1985).
247. See Hibbard. supra note 246.
248. For discussion of anatomically detailed dolls see infra note 259.
249. See Fredrich, Children, supra note 231: Gale, Thompson, Moran & Sack, Sexual
Abuse in Young Children: Its Clinical Presentation and Characteristic Patterns,
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contained in lengthy measures. The small number of questions does
not permit an adequate description of the range of possibly affected
behaviors. What is needed is an instrument that focuses on sexual be-
havior. Fredrich has developed such an instrument.250 Preliminary
findings on data comparing five geographically different abuse sam-
ples confirm statistically significant differences in sexual behavior be-
tween sexually abused and nonabused children. The differences
appear to be most pronounced in younger children.
Clinical literature on adolescent victims discloses evidence of sexu-
alized reactions. Abused girls are frequently described as engaging in
sexual acting out.25 1 Prostitution is itself a form of sexual acting out,
and a very large proportion of youth involved in prostitution were sex-
ually abused before they entered prostitution.252
Symptoms of anxiety are commonly reported in sexually abused
children.25 3 Clinical studies describe various anxiety reactions such as
fear, sleep disturbance and nightmares, flashbacks, startle reactions
and hypervigilance, regression, phobic behavior, withdrawal from
usual activities, nervousness, and clingyness. These symptoms are
consistent with symptoms observed in children who have suffered
trauma such as witnessing the death of a parent 254 or being kid-
12 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 163 (1988); Mian, supra note 223; White, supra note
236.
250. See Friedrich, The Child Sexual Behavior Inventory: Reliability and Validity,
Scientific Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry with the Canadian Academy of Child Psychiatry, Vol. IV.,
NR-73, at 59 (1988) [hereinafter Friedrich, Inventory]. Friedrich describes the
research as follows:
The 42-item Child Sexual Behavior Inventory [hereinafter CSBI] was de-
veloped to assess the sexual behaviors seen in young children, and has
particular utility in evaluating children with a history of sexual abuse.
The items assess a broad range of sexual behaviors exhibited in children
ranging from masturbation, gender confusion, sexual aggression, erotic
behavior, and boundary permeability. An initial factor analysis revealed
five factors, i.e., boundary permeability, sexual aggression, self-stimula-
tion, sexual inhibition, and sexual confusion. This paper reports the fre-
quency of these behaviors in a nonabused and normative sample of three
hundred 3-10 year old male and female children. In addition, it contrasts
these children with two separate clinical samples of sexually abused chil-
dren and demonstrates the high degree of discriminating ability of this
measure. Finally, the five factors of the CSBI are correlated with factors
derived from the Child Behavior Checklist [hereinafter CBC], a measure
of general child behavior. Significant correlations are demonstrated
from the CSBI and the CBC, including aggression.
251. See M. DE YOUNG, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF CHILDREN (1982); Rosenfeld,
Browning & Boatman, Incest: Children at Risk, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 69 (1977).
252. See James & Meyerding, supra note 220; Silbert & Pines, Sexual Abuse as an
Antecedent to Prostitution, 5 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 407 (1981).
253. See Browne & Finkelhor, supra note 227.
254. See Pynos & Eth, Children Traumatized by Witnessing Acts of Personal Vio-
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napped.2 55 Children who have experienced disruptive events such as
divorce also have elevations in anxiety symptoms. 25 6
Sexual abuse occurs in the context of a relationship with another
person. Because of the distorted nature of the relationship, some
abused children learn inappropriate relationship skills. Some abused
children are excessively afraid and shy, while others are overly aggres-
sive and intrusive. It has been noted that sexually abused children
have problems respecting interpersonal boundaries.2 57
The foregoing clinical and empirical investigations reveal that the
effects of sexual abuse vary among children. There is no single effect
that has been observed in all children. Whether there is some unique
and specific effect of sexual abuse is unknown. Part of the problem
may be that no instrument has been developed to measure the effects
of sexual trauma. Another issue is that many effects are internal, and
may not be observable or describable even by the children. Consider-
ing that sexual abuse comprises a very broad range of conduct, it is not
likely that all children would be effected similarly. Variables relating
to the child's pre-abuse status, the experience itself, and the aftermath
are thought to interact in some complex fashion to produce the reac-
tions observed in a particular child.
From a mental health perspective, a professional opinion regarding
sexual abuse is supported when there is affirmative psychological evi-
dence of abuse. Certain behaviors are more specifically associated
with sexual abuse than others. When age-inappropriate sexualized re-
sponses are reported or observed in children, sexual abuse must be
considered. When such responses are coupled with a credible descrip-
tion of abuse from the child, sexual abuse should be considered the
most likely, although not the only, explanation.
Children who are suffering symptoms of fear, anxiety, or avoid-
ance are probably suffering the effects of some traumatic experience.
Sexual abuse is only one of many potentially upsetting or disturbing
experiences for children. Given the prevalence of sexual abuse, and
its documented association with anxiety symptoms, however, abuse
should be considered and evaluated through direct inquiry. When
symptoms of fear, anxiety, or avoidance accompany a credible report
of sexual abuse, sexual abuse must be seriously considered.
While no symptom or set of symptoms is conclusive proof of sexual
abuse, when symptoms evidencing abuse are present in conjunction
lence: Homicide, Rape or Suicide Behavior, in POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DIsoR-
DER IN CHILDREN 19 (1985).
255. See Terr, Psychic Trauma in Children and Adolescents, 8 SYMPOSIUM CHILD PSY-
CHIATRY 815 (1985).
256. See Wallerstien & Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the
Child in Later Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 256 (1976).
257. See Friedrich, Inventory, supra note 250.
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with a report that bears indicia of reliability, the clinician is justified
in forming a clinical opinion that a child has been sexually abused.
2. Expert Testimony on Behaviors Commonly Observed in
Sexually Abused Children
The expert testimony discussed in this subsection is offered as sub-
stantive evidence of abuse. Such testimony is offered during the
state's case in chief. Impeachment of the child is not a prerequisite to
such testimony because the testimony is not offered to rehabilitate the
child's credibility. This subsection begins with discussion of the logical
relevance of expert testimony describing behaviors commonly ob-
served in sexually abused children. Attention then shifts to cases dis-
cussing such expert testimony as substantive evidence. The section
concludes with discussion of the child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome.
a. Logical Relevance of Expert Testimony on Behaviors
Commonly Observed in Sexually Abused Children
The clinical and scientific section discloses that many sexually
abused children demonstrate behavioral, emotional, or cognitive reac-
tions following their abuse. While there is no single reaction observed
in all sexually abused children, and while reactions vary considerably,
the presence of commonly observed behaviors provides important data
for clinical decisionmaking on whether abuse occurred, and on the
propriety of treatment. The present subsection draws on information
in the clinical and scientific section to discuss the forensic implications
of behaviors commonly observed in sexually abused children.
Many reactions have been observed in sexually abused children,
including anxiety, regression, sleep disturbance, acting out, depres-
sion, nightmares, and enuresis, to name just a few.258 An examination
of these behaviors quickly reveals that they are also associated with a
wide range of psychological problems that have nothing to do with
sexual abuse. For example, the fact that a child suffers nightmares,
regression, and depression says little about sexual abuse. Myriad
other circumstances cause such behaviors.
While some of the behaviors observed in sexually abused children
are consistent with a number of problems, others are more strongly
associated with personal or vicarious sexual experience. Examples of
behaviors that have greater specificity for sexual abuse include age-
inappropriate knowledge of sexual acts or anatomy, sexualization of
play and behavior in young children, the appearance of genitalia in
young children's drawings, and sexually explicit play with anatomi-
258. See Sgroi, supra note 226, at 40-41.
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cally detailed dolls.25 9
The presence in a young child of behaviors commonly observed in
sexually abused children can be probative of abuse.260 Evidence of the
259. Anatomically detailed dolls are frequently used in investigations of suspected
child sexual abuse, and as an adjunct to therapy. See Boat & Everson, Use of
Anatomical Dolls Among Professionals in Sexual Abuse Evaluations, 12 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 171 (1988), where the researchers discuss the results of a sur-
vey of law enforcement officers, mental health practioners, physicians, and child
protective services workers. Many of the professionals use the dolls during inter-
views. However, relatively few professionals have received training in proper use
of the dolls.
The dolls have three primary uses:
(1) As demonstrative evidence in court to assist child witnesses to testify
more effectively. This use of the dolls is recognized by the courts as proper. See
J. MYERS, supra note 2, § 4.17L (Supp. 1989)(collecting cases). See also MICH.
COMP. LAW ANN. § 600.2163a(3) (West Supp. 1988)("If pertinent, the witness shall
be permitted the use of dolls or mannequins, including, but not limited to, ana-
tomically correct dolls or mannequins, to assist the witness in testifying on direct
and cross-examination").
(2) As an aid during interviews to assist children in describing events they
find difficult to describe in words, and to assist young children who lack the ver-
bal skills required to describe events. Provided the interviewer uses proper inter-
view techniques, this use of anatomical dolls should not be controversial.
(3) As a diagnostic or interperative tool to aid in determining whether sexual
abuse occurred. This use of the dolls is controversial. Recent research indicates
that the dolls can be helpful in evaluating suspected abuse. See White, Strom,
Santilli & Halpin, Interviewing Young Sexual Abuse Victims with Anatomically
Correct Dolls, 10 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 519 (1986). In this study 25 children
who were referred for suspected sexual abuse were compared to 25 nonreferred
children in the way the children interacted with anatomically detailed dolls. The
age range was from two to five years. The children in the referred group dis-
played more sexualized behaviors with the dolls than the nonreferred children.
The differences were statistically significant. Children who were not suspected
of being sexually abused showed no unusual behaviors with the dolls relative to
sexualized play.
See also Jampole & Weber, An Assessment of the Behavior of Sexually Abused
and Nonsexually Abused Children with Anatomically Correct Dolls, 11 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 187 (1987)(thdre were statistically significant differences be-
tween sexually abused and nonsexually abused children in play with the dolls; 90
percent of the sexually abused children demonstrated sexual behaviors with the
dolls; 80 percent of the nonsexually abused children did not demonstrate sexual
behaviors with the dolls); Sivan, Schor, Koepple & Noble, Interaction of Normal
Children with Anatomical Dolls, 12 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 295 (1988)(In this
study of 144 children with no history of sexual abuse, the age range was three to
eight years. The children interacted with anatomically detailed dolls. Little ag-
gression and no explicit sexual activity were observed. In contrast to clinical ob-
servation of abused children, the doll play of nonreferred children is unlikely to
be characterized by aggression or sexual concerns; thus, these behaviors when
observed in interaction with these dolls should be taken seriously); White & San-
tilli, A Review of Clinical Practices and Research Data on Anatomical Dolls, 3 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 430 (1988).
260. See FED. R. EVID. 401, defining relevant evidence as "evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
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behaviors is relevant because it has a tendency to prove that abuse
occurred.261 Children with behaviors associated with sexual abuse-
particularly sexual reactions-are more likely to have been abused
than children without such behaviors. This conclusion does not ignore
the fact that approximately twenty percent of sexually abused chil-
dren demonstrate no observable behavioral reactions. Absence of be-
haviors does not disprove abuse, but presence of behaviors increases
the likelihood of abuse.262 Evidence of behaviors is seldom dispositive,
but evidence need not be dispositive to be logically relevant and
admissible.
The probative value of expert testimony describing behaviors ob-
served in young sexually abused children is highest when there is a
coalescence of three types of behaviors: (1) a central core of sexual
behaviors which are strongly associated with sexual abuse; (2) nonsex-
ual behaviors which are commonly observed in sexually abused chil-
dren; and (3) medical evidence of sexual abuse.
Probative value declines as sexual behaviors and medical evidence
decrease in proportion to nonsexual behaviors. When the only evi-
dence consists of a number of ambiguous, nonsexual behaviors, the ev-
idence may lack any probative value, or probative worth may be
outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice or jury confusion.2 63
When a child demonstrates no sexual behaviors, but does evidence
signs of serious anxiety or post-traumatic stress disorder, expert testi-
mony may still be relevant. In this scenario, however, testimony
serves only to establish that the child may have experienced some
type of traumatic event. Such testimony is not specific to sexual
abuse.
In some cases, testimony describing behaviors observed in sexually
abused children is a combination of expert and lay testimony. The
testimony takes the following form: (1) expert testimony describing
behaviors observed in sexually abused children as a class, coupled with
(2) lay testimony establishing that the child in the case at hand dem-
onstrates such behaviors. The lay testimony is usually provided by in-
dividuals who are familiar with the child's behavior, such as parents.
Expert testimony of this type is limited to a description of sexually
abused children as a class, and does not focus on the child in the case
at hand. Indeed, the expert need have no knowledge of the particular
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."
261. Id.
262. See Corwin, Berliner, Goodman, Goodwin & White, Child Sexual Abuse and Cus-
tody Disputes: No Easy Answers, 2 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 91, 94 (1987)
[hereinafter Corwin].
263. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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child.264 The sole purpose of the expert testimony is to inform the fact
finder of behaviors commonly seen in abused children. The testimony
of lay witnesses is adduced to acquaint the jury with the behavior of
the alleged victim.265 It is up to the jury to put two and two together,
and to conclude that because the alleged victim demonstrates behav-
iors commonly seen in sexually abused children, the victim probably
was abused.
In a proper case, an expert could step beyond a description of sexu-
ally abused children as a class, to describe behaviors observed in a par-
ticular child. Expert testimony that a particular child displays
behaviors similar to those seen in sexually abused children as a class
approaches an opinion that the child was sexually abused. Neverthe-
less, there is a meaningful distinction between expert testimony that a
particular child was sexually abused, and expert testimony that a child
demonstrates behaviors commonly observed in the class of sexually
abused children. In the latter case, the expert does not offer a direct
opinion on the ultimate question of whether abuse occurred.
b. Case Law Regarding Expert Testimony on Behaviors
Commonly Observed in Sexually Abused Children
In a substantial number of cases, courts approve expert testimony
describing behaviors observed in sexually abused children. On first
reading, a number of decisions appear to approve the theory of logical
relevance discussed above in subsection IV(B)(2)(a).266 On closer ex-
amination, however, it seems most courts do not approve such testi-
mony as substantive evidence of abuse.26 7 Rather, the testimony is
permitted to rehabilitate children's credibility. Confusion arises be-
cause some decisions are less than clear on whether testimony is re-
ceived as evidence of abuse, or is limited to rehabilitation.268
Of the few decisions commenting directly on the theory of proof
discussed above, several disapprove it. In State v. Moran,269 for exam-
264. See Anderson v. State, 749 P.2d 369, 371 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988)(expert did not
personally examine children).
265. See id. at 373 (lay testimony provided by victims' mother).
266. For a decision approving expert testimony as described in this subsection see
Ward v. State, 519 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988).
267. See, e.g., State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154 (Me. 1988).
268. Cases from Pennsylvania exemplify the confusion. In Commonwealth v. Bald-
win, 348 Pa. Super. 368, 502 A.2d 253 (1985), the court appeared to approve expert
testimony on behaviors observed in the class of sexually abused children as sub-
stantive evidence of abuse. Such evidence assists the jury in understanding the
evidence. In particular, the evidence helped the jury understand that the gaps
and inconsistencies in the victim's testimony resulted from incest rather than
fabrication. But in Commonwealth v. Pearsall, 368 Pa. Super. 327, 534 A.2d 106
(1987) the court obscures Baldwin. The Pearsall court seemed to imply that ex-
pert testimony is permitted to support credibility, and not as proof on the merits.
269. 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986). See also Hilburn v. State, 765 P.2d 1382 (Alaska
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ple, the Arizona Supreme Court approved expert testimony designed
to rehabilitate a child,270 but held that an expert should not state
whether a child's behavior is consistent or inconsistent with sexual
abuse.271 In State v. Hudnall,272 the South Carolina Supreme Court
disapproved testimony that was designed to prove that abuse occurred.
The court wrote:
Courts that have admitted the type of syndrome evidence at issue here
have typically allowed it only to explain a child victim's post-trauma behavior
as a common reaction to sexual abuse where it would otherwise appear im-
peaching, for instance if there is a retraction of the allegations or a delay re-
porting the abuse....
In this case, the evidence was admitted to bolster the child's testimony that
the crime had in fact occurred and was not offered to explain any seemingly
inconsistent response to the trauma. We find admission of this irrelevant and
prejudicial expert testimony was error .... 273
A few decisions hold that when expert testimony describing behav-
iors commonly observed in sexually abused children is offered to
prove abuse, the proponent must establish that the relevant scientific
community accepts the ability to detect abuse in this fashion.274 When
the clinical and scientific information discussed above in subsection
B(l), is considered along with the clinical and scientific information
discussed in other subsections of this Article, the proponent of expert
testimony describing behaviors observed in sexually abused children
should be in a position to persuade a court that the evidence is suffi-
ciently probative and reliable to gain admission as proof of abuse. This
is so whether the jurisdiction follows the Frye test, relevance analysis,
or some other threshold requirement for scientific evidence.
c. Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
In 1983, Dr. Roland Summit published an article titled "The Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" 275 (CSAAS). Summit de-
scribed five characteristics commonly observed in sexually abused
children: (1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and accommo-
dation, (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure, and (5) re-
Ct. App. 1988); Commonwealth v. Emge, 553 A.2d 74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). For
two decisions which appear to approve the type of expert testimony discussed in
this subsection, see State v. Reser, 244 Kan. 306, 767 P.2d 1277 (1989); Stephens v.
State, - P.2d - (Wyo. 1989).
270. State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
271. See id. at 378, 728 P.2d at 255.
272. 293 S.C. 97, 359 S.E.2d 59 (1987).
273. See id. at 97, 359 S.E.2d at 61-62.
274. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 749 P.2d 369, 373 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); State v.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989).
275. See Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT 177 (1983).
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traction.276 Summit's purpose in describing the accommodation
syndrome was to provide a "common language" for the professionals
working to protect sexually abused children.277
Summit did not intend the accommodation syndrome as a diagnos-
tic device.278 The syndrome does not detect sexual abuse. Rather, it
assumes the presence of abuse, and explains the child's reactions to
it.279 Thus, child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not the
sexual abuse analogue of battered child syndrome, which is diagnostic
of physical abuse. With battered child syndrome, one reasons from
type of injury to cause of injury. Thus, battered child syndrome is pro-
bative of physical abuse. With child sexual abuse accommodation syn-
drome, by contrast, one reasons from presence of sexual abuse to
reactions to sexual abuse. Thus, the accommodation syndrome is not
probative of abuse.
Unfortunately, a number of mental health professionals, lawyers,
and commentators drew unwarranted comparisons between battered
child syndrome and child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.280
This error led to considerable confusion. First, some professionals
misinterpreted Summit's article, believing Summit had discovered a
"syndrome" that could diagnose sexual abuse. This mistake is under-
standable, if not forgivable. Mental health and legal professionals
working in the child abuse area had long been accustomed to thinking
in terms of syndrome evidence to prove physical abuse. Battered child
syndrome was an accepted diagnosis by the time Summit's accommo-
dation syndrome came along in 1983. It was natural for professionals
to transfer their understanding of battered child syndrome to this new
syndrome, and to conclude that the accommodation syndrome, like
battered child syndrome, could be used to detect abuse.
If the first error was erroneously equating child sexual abuse ac-
commodation syndrome with a diagnostic device, the second mistake
was hardly less serious. Some professionals conflated the reactions
described by Summit, which are not probative of abuse, with behaviors
that are probative of abuse. This combination of behaviors was then
denominated a syndrome, the presence of which was supposedly pro-
bative of abuse. The defect of this "syndrome" is that some of its com-
276. Id. at 181.
277. Id. at 191.
278. See People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988); People v.
Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1987)(recognizing that the syn-
drome does not diagnose, and is not a test for sexual abuse).
279. See People v. Sanchez, 208 Cal. App. 3d 721, 256 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1989); People v.
Bowker, 203 Cal. App- 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988); In re Sara M., 194 Cal.
App. 3d. 585, 239 Cal- Rptr. 605 (1987).




ponents are probative of abuse and others are not. Opinions based on
such a "syndrome" are of dubious reliability.
Widespread misunderstanding of child sexual abuse accommoda-
tion syndrome had unfortunate consequences. Expert testimony
based in whole or in part on the syndrome led some courts to believe
the accommodation syndrome was designed to diagnose child sexual
abuse. So viewed, the syndrome is doomed to fail because it simply
does not diagnose. Little wonder courts became suspicious of profes-
sional ability to detect sexual abuse. Unlike battered child syndrome,
which is highly probative of nonaccidental injury, the accommodation
syndrome appeared anything but reliable. Courts were not informed
that the accommodation syndrome was being asked to perform a task
it could not accomplish.
The accommodation syndrome has a place in the courtroom. The
syndrome helps explain why many sexually abused children delay re-
porting their abuse, and why many children recant allegations of
abuse and deny that anything occurred. If use of the syndrome is con-
fined to these rehabilitative functions, the confusion clears, and the
accommodation syndrome serves a useful forensic function.
A number of cases discuss Summit's accommodation syndrome.
The decisions are usefully classified as: (1) cases where testimony was
limited to CSAAS ("pure" CSAAS cases), and (2) cases where
CSAAS was combined with factors that are probative of abuse.
Most courts reject expert testimony limited exclusively to presence
or absence of CSAAS, when such testimony is offered to prove that
abuse occurred.281 In People v. Bowker,28 2 the California Court of Ap-
peal rejected such testimony because there was no showing that
CSAAS was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community
as a means of detecting abuse.28 3 In Lantrip v. Commonwealth,28 4 the
Kentucky Supreme Court expressed similar concern about the scien-
tific acceptance of the syndrome.28 5 The court went on to note that
even if the syndrome gains general acceptance, presence of the syn-
drome "would not suffice, per se, to prove the fact of sexual abuse."28 6
These decisions correctly reject "pure" CSAAS testimony offered to
prove that abuse occurred. CSAAS does not diagnose.
In a few cases, courts approved "pure" CSAAS testimony to ex-
plain such things as delay in reporting and recantation. 287 These cases
281. For a decision which appears to approve of "pure" CSAAS testimony to prove
abuse see Keri v. State, 179 Ga. App. 664, 347 S.E.2d 236 (1986).
282. 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988).
283. Id. at 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
284. 713 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1986).
285. Id. at 817.
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., People v. Luna, 204 Cal. App. 3d 726, 250 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1988); People v.
Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988).
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demonstrate proper use of the syndrome, and are discussed in subsec-
tion IV (D) of this Article.
Finally, a number of decisions grapple with expert testimony that
combines CSAAS and behaviors that are probative of abuse.288 Gener-
ally speaking, such testimony is rejected when offered to prove abuse.
When expert testimony on behaviors observed in abused children
is offered to prove that abuse occurred, it is important to ensure that
the expert's testimony is based on behaviors that are probative of
abuse. The expert should not base the opinion on the accommodation
syndrome because the syndrome is not probative of abuse. Nor should
the expert's testimony describe a combination of behaviors, some of
which are probative of abuse and some of which are not.
d. Conclusion
Presence in a young child of behaviors observed in sexually abused
children is sometimes probative of abuse. Expert testimony explain-
ing such behaviors can assist the jury in understanding the evidence
and determining facts in issue. Such evidence should be admitted un-
less its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for
unfair prejudice or confusion of the jury. Such testimony should
rarely be prejudicial, and the evidence is not so arcane or ambiguous
as to confuse the fact finder.
When considering the theory of expert testimony discussed in this
subsection, it is vitally important to avoid the confusion engendered by
reference to syndromes. When expert testimony describing behaviors
seen in sexually abused children is offered as substantive evidence of
abuse, the expert is not describing a syndrome. The expert is certainly
not describing Summit's child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.
At the present time, experts have not achieved consensus on the exist-
ence of a psychological syndrome that can detect child sexual abuse.
Use of the word syndrome leads only to confusion, and to unwar-
ranted and unworkable comparisons to battered child syndrome. The
best course is to avoid any mention of syndromes.
C. Behavioral Science Testimony on Whether a Child Was Sexually
Abused
This subsection discusses expert behavioral science testimony on
whether a child was sexually abused. Among behavioral scientists,
288. See, e.g., Allison v. State, 256 Ga. 851, 353 S.E.2d 805 (1987)(An expert may de-
scribe behavioral characteristics common in sexually abused children, but may
not opine that a particular child was abused. While the opinion is not entirely
clear, it appears that the expert testimony was offered on rebuttal to prove that
abuse occurred.); Bussey v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1985)(court re-




there is considerable controversy concerning whether professionals
should testify that sexual abuse occurred. An opinion that a child was
sexually abused is controversial for two reasons. Some experts believe
that an opinion that abuse occurred constitutes impermissible testi-
mony on legal issues. This aspect of the question was discussed earlier
in subsection II (E), which analyzed the ultimate issue rule. The issue
is taken up again in this subsection. The second area of disagreement
concerns the ability of professionals to determine whether abuse oc-
curred. Some writers believe professionals cannot reliably make this
determination.2 8 9 Other experts believe it is possible to determine
with reasonable clinical certainty whether sexual abuse occurred.290
Those who believe it possible to determine whether abuse occurred
acknowledge that it is not possible to "know" whether a child was
abused. After all, the expert was not present to observe the abuse.
Rather, expert testimony on whether abuse occurred rests on assess-
ment of a wide range of information leading to a clinical judgment
that sexual abuse is the most likely explanation in particular cases.
Expert testimony which states in so many words that a child was
sexually abused is not the only form of testimony relating to abuse.
Expert testimony relating to sexual abuse occurs along a continuum.
At one end of the continuum is a direct opinion that a child was sexu-
ally abused; that is, that a specific event happened in the past. At the
other end of the continuum is an opinion that a child demonstrates
age-inappropriate sexual knowledge or awareness. It is the direct
opinion that abuse occurred which raises the most concern and disa-
greement among professionals. By contrast, there is considerable con-
sensus that experts on child sexual abuse can determine whether
children demonstrate age-inappropriate sexual knowledge or aware-
ness, and that testimony to that effect is within the ambit of profes-
sional competence. Between the extremes of a direct opinion that
abuse occurred, and testimony relating to age-inappropriate knowl-
edge or awareness, other opinions are possible. For example, behav-
ioral science experts on child sexual abuse are trained and
experienced in diagnosing the symptoms and behaviors that are con-
sistent with sexual abuse, and in ferreting out alternative explanations
for such symptoms and behaviors. An expert could be permitted to
testify that a child demonstrates symptoms and behaviors consistent
with sexual abuse, and that, in the expert's opinion, no explanation
other than sexual abuse seems plausible. Alternatively, an expert
289. See McCord, supra note 42, at 24. See also Melton, Children s Testimony in Cases
of Alleged Sexual Abuse, 8 ADVANCES IN DEV. .& BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 179, 189
(1987)[hereinafter Melton, Children's Testimony]; Melton & Limber, Psycholo-
gists'Involvement in Cases of Child Maltreatment: Limits of Role and Expertise,
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST (in press)[hereinafter Melton & Limber].
290. See infra note 307 and accompanying text.
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might testify that a child probably experienced age-inappropriate sex-
ual contact. The latter opinion approaches a direct opinion that abuse
occurred, however, and to the extent a direct opinion raises concern,
so too might an opinion regarding age-inappropriate sexual contact.
Because testimony cast in the form of a direct opinion that a child was
sexually abused remains controversial, the present subsection focuses
on the form of testimony in which the expert states that a child's
symptoms and behavior are consistent with sexual abuse. This form
of opinion lies near the middle of the continuum, and would win the
endorsement of many experts on child sexual abuse.
While professionals disagree on the form which expert testimony
relating to sexual abuse should take, there is one point on which eve-
ryone agrees. Decisions about child sexual abuse are vitally impor-
tant.2 91 Berliner makes the point as follows:
Determining whether a child has been sexually abused is a matter of great
importance. If this judgment is wrong, a child's physical and emotional health
may be permanently jeopardized, additional children needlessly abused and
their families and communities traumatized. Just as important, an individ-
ual's reputation. access to and custody of children, and even liberty, may be
lost over a false accusation. Children's recovery from the effects of abuse, the
protection of the community and the protection of innocent persons depends
on accurate decision making.
2 9 2
An understanding of behavioral science testimony relating to
whether sexual abuse occurred requires a brief historical sojourn;
therefore, the clinical and scientific subsection begins with historical
material. From there, the subsection provides further detail on the
debate surrounding expert testimony relating to whether abuse
occurred.
1. Clinical and Scientific Information
The contemporary child protection movement traces its origins to
the early 1960s.2 93 As discussed earlier, in 1962, Kempe and his col-
291. See Berliner, Deciding Whether a Child Has Been Sexually Abused, in SEXUAL
ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 48 (B. Nicholson & J.
Bulkley eds. 1988).
292. Id. See also Chadwick, Interdisciplinary Guidelines for the Evaluation of Sus-
pected Child Abuse Cases, 1 THE ADVISOR 7 (Newsletter of the American Profes-
sional Society on the Abuse of Children, Aug., 1988), where Dr. Chadwick
discusses the importance of accurate decisionmaking in all child abuse cases:
Mistakes made in assessment of child abuse cases are costly. Failure to
recognize and document abuse allows it to continue, often with serious,
occasionally with fatal results for the child. Erroneously concluding that
a child has been abused may result in the unnecessary removal of a child
from a family or the unjust conviction of a person for a crime. Making
or missing this diagnosis is comparable, in medicine, to making or miss-
ing a diagnosis of cancer.
293. For historical perspectives of child abuse see Radbill, "Children in a World of
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leagues described the battered child syndrome.294 The syndrome
quickly found its way into court, where it serves as a basis for expert
testimony that a child's injuries were not accidental.295 Beginning in
1963, states rapidly enacted statutes requiring professionals to report
suspected child abuse to designated authorities.296 By the middle of
the decade, every state had a reporting law.297
In the area of physical child abuse, primary responsibility for diag-
nosis lies with physicians. Social workers, nurses, psychologists, and
psychiatrists become involved in treating the emotional sequelae of
abuse, serving families, and preventing maltreatment. Regardless of
professional affiliation, however, most professionals working with
physically abused children employ the medical model as the medium
through which they understand and explain physical abuse. Thus, the
logic and vocabulary of medicine, including the term diagnosis, is
firmly implanted with regard to physical abuse.
It is apparent that a diagnosis of battered child syndrome has im-
portant forensic as well as medical implications. Indeed, when it
comes to physical abuse, physicians often assume forensic responsibili-
ties.298 Detection and interpretation of admissible evidence of physi-
cal abuse is largely the responsibility of the medical profession.
This brief historical examination of the professional response to
physical abuse reveals two factors that have influenced the response
to sexual abuse. First, the dominant role of the medical model, with
its emphasis on diagnosis, found its way into thinking about sexual
abuse. Thus, as in physical abuse, some professionals apply the term
diagnosis to clinical determinations about sexual abuse. Other profes-
sionals disagree with this practice, and assert that the term diagnosis is
misapplied when describing sexual abuse. Adherents of the latter
view suggest that sexual abuse is an event, not a diagnosable disorder.
It may be possible to diagnose the effects of sexual abuse, but not the
cause. One does not diagnose an act of sexual abuse any more than a
physician diagnoses a car accident that results in a broken leg.
It would be a mistake to make too much of disagreement over ap-
Violence: A History of Child Abuse, in THE BATTERED CHILD 2 (R. Helfer & R.
Kempe eds., 4th ed. 1987); Myers, supra note 201, at 151-68.
294. See Kempe, supra note 65.
295. For in-depth discussion of non-accidental injury and battered child syndrome
from a medical perspective see THE BATTERED CHILD (R. Helfer & R. Kempe
eds., 4th ed. 1987); CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A MEDICAL REFERENCE (N. El-
lerstein ed. 1981). For discussion of battered child syndrome as legally admissible
evidence of non-accidental injury see Myers & Carter, supra note 66.
296. See J. MYERS & W. PETERSON, CHILD ABUSE REPORTING LEGISLATION IN THE
1980S (American Humane Association 1987).
297. Id.
298. Professionals working with children are required to report suspected abuse and
neglect to designated child protection authorities. The duty to report implies a
duty to evaluate when the professional suspects maltreatment.
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plication of diagnostic terminology to child sexual abuse. The concept
of diagnosis is sufficiently broad to embrace clinical determinations
regarding sexual abuse. By way of analogy, battered child syndrome is
an accepted medical diagnosis despite the fact that an abusive assault
is an event rather than a disorder. In a jury trial, a judge might decide
against permitting an expert to use the word diagnosis when offering
an opinion regarding abuse. A lay jury might be confused or unduly
impressed by the term.
The second parallel between physical abuse and sexual abuse re-
lates to the combination of therapeutic and forensic responsibilities.
As is true with physical abuse, a therapist treating a sexually abused
child may be asked to document evidence that can be admitted at trial.
The therapist may also be asked to provide expert testimony. To some
professionals, the overlap between clinical and forensic responsibili-"
ties raises concerns about role conflict and confusion.299 For instance,
some believe that a therapist's ability to provide effective therapy may
be jeopardized if the therapist assumes a forensic role.300 Other ex-
perts believe that in many cases, therapeutic and forensic roles can
coexist without harm to the child. The mental health community has
yet to achieve consensus on these issues.
Turning now to the primary inquiry of this subsection: Are profes-
sionals trained in the patterns, effects, and dynamics of child sexual
abuse capable of determining whether a child's behavior and symp-
toms are consistent with sexual abuse? As recently as ten years ago, a
persuasive argument could be made that the answer was no. Today,
however, many experts believe that enough is known about child sex-
ual abuse to permit qualified professionals to formulate reliable
clinical judgments about sexual abuse.
Prior to the 1970s, there was a trickle of research and writing on
child sexual abuse. Since that time the trickle has become a flood.
Clinicians experienced in interviewing and treating sexually abused
children have published books, chapters, and articles discussing tech-
niques that are helpful in determining whether children have been
sexually abused.3 01 A substantial portion of the contemporary clinical
literature supports the conclusion that experts on child sexual abuse
can sometimes determine with reasonable clinical certainty whether a
299. See Garbarino, Report of APA Interdivisional Task Force on Child Abuse Train-
ing, 11 Div. CHILD, YOUTH & FAM. SERviCES NEWSLETTER 7 (Am. Psychological
Assn., Fall 1988).
300. Some commentators point out that most mental health professionals lack specific
forensic training.
301. See, e.g., D. JONES & M. McQUISTON, INTERVIEWING THE SEXUALLY ABUSED
CHILD (Royal College of Psychiatrists 1988); Berliner, supra note 291; Corwin,
Early Diagnosis of Child Sexual Abuse: Diminishing the Lasting Effects, in THE
LASTING EFFECTS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, (G. Wyatt & G. Powell eds. 1988)
[hereinafter Corwin, Early Diagnosis]; Sgroi, supra note 226.
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child's symptoms and behavior are consistent with sexual abuse, and
are probably not the result of other events.30 2
In addition to increased writing on child sexual abuse, profession-
als began meeting on a regular basis to share clinical experience and
research results. Many such meetings occur every year. In 1985, for
example, a national invitational forum was convened to, inter alia, as-
sess the degree of professional consensus on the ability to identify
child sexual abuse.30 3 Present at the forum were nearly 100 experts
on child sexual abuse from the disciplines of medicine, nursing, psy-
chiatry, psychology, social work, investigation, and law. A majority of
participants agreed that enough was known about sexual abuse to
merit creation of materials to inform clinicians about symptoms and
behaviors commonly observed in sexually abused children.
Also in 1985, one of the first statements of professional consensus
regarding clinical evaluation of sexual abuse appeared in the litera-
ture. The Council on Scientific Affairs of the American Medical Asso-
ciation published guidelines on diagnosis and treatment of physical
abuse, sexual abuse, and neglect.3 04
In June of 1988, the Council of the American Academy of Child
and Adolescent Psychiatry approved guidelines for clinical evaluation
of child and adolescent sexual abuse. 305 Published in the September
1988 issue of the Journal of the American Academy of Child and Ado-
lescent Psychiatry, the guidelines state:
The effects of child sexual abuse are diagnosable in the same sense that other
medical conditions are diagnosable--on the basis of history, physical examina-
tion and the judicious use of various tests. Rarely is one finding alone diagnos-
tic of sexual abuse; rather, findings must be interpreted within the total
context of a thorough evaluation.3 0 6
The Academy guidelines support the position that experts can de-
tect symptoms and behaviors that result from sexual abuse. The writ-
302. See, e.g., infra notes 304-15 and accompanying text.
303. The National Summit Conference on Diagnosing Child Sexual Abuse is de-
scribed in Corwin, Early Diagnosis, supra note 301.
304. AMA Diagnostic and Treatment Guidelines Concerning Child Abuse and Neglect,
254 J. A.M.A. 798 (1985). The American Medical Association was careful to note
the limitations of its guidelines. A footnote to the guidelines reads:
Adopted at the Interim Meeting, December 1984, by the House of Dele-
gates of the American Medical Association. These guidelines, submitted
by the AMA's Council on Scientific Affairs, were prepared under the
guidance of its advisory Panel on Child Abuse and Neglect.
This report is not intended to be construed or to serve as a standard
of medical care. Standards of medical care are determined on the basis
of all the facts and circumstances involved in an individual case and are
subject to change as scientific knowledge and technology advance and
patterns of practice evolve.
305. See Guidelines for the Clinical Evaluation of Child and Adolescent Sexual Abuse,
27 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 655 (1988).
306. Id. at 657.
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ing of experts on child sexual abuse echoes the conclusion reflected in
the guidelines. Sgroi, Porter, and Blick write:
[M]ost cases can be validated by investigative interviewing and by assessing
the credibility of the history of sexual abuse elicited from the child. In our
,experience this can be done with children in the age range of five years and
older. A skilled interviewer can sometimes elicit helpful information from an
unusually articulate younger child (age range three to five years). However, a
child who is that young frequently lacks the verbal and conceptual skills re-
quired for investigative interviewing to have validity.
3 0 7
Recent research lends empirical support to the clinical conclusion
that properly qualified professionals can determine whether a child's
symptoms and behavior are consistent with sexual abuse. Conte and
his colleagues conducted a nationwide survey of professionals with ex-
pertise in evaluating suspected child sexual abuse.3 08 The researchers
were interested in determining whether experts agree on factors that
indicate sexual abuse. The survey revealed a high level of agreement
that the following factors are indicative of sexual abuse: age-inappro-
priate sexual knowledge; sexualized play; precocious behavior; exces-
sive masturbation; preoccupation with genitals; indications of pressure
or coercion exerted on the child; the child's story remains consistent
over time; the child's report indicates an escalating progression of sex-
ual abuse over time; the child describes idiosyncratic details of the
abuse; and physical evidence of abuse.3 09
The fact that a broad range of experts agree among themselves
that certain factors are indicative of sexual abuse does not prove that
the clinicians are correct. They could all be mistaken. Such collective
error is unlikely, however, and Conte's survey provides support for
the position that clinicians can make reliable clinical determinations
regarding sexual abuse.
A recent study by Faller provides further support for this conclu-
sion.310 Faller describes three factors that are important in evaluating
suspected abuse. The factors are: "information about the context of
the sexual abuse; the description or demonstration of the sexual vic-
timization; and the victim's emotional state."3 1 1 Faller was interested
307. Sgroi, supra note 226.
308. J. Conte, E. Sorenson, L. Fogarty & J. Rosa, Evaluating Children's Reports of
Sexual Abuse: Results From a Survey of Professionals (unpublished manu-
script)(available from J. Conte, Ph.D., School of Social Service Administration,
University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.).
309. Id.
310. See Faller, Criteria for Judging the Credibility of Children's Statements About
Their Sexual Abuse, 67 CHILD WELFARE 389 (1988).
311. See id. at 391. Faller defines the factors. She defines the context of the abuse as
follows:
The context of the sexual abuse includes when and where it happened;
what the victim and offender were wearing; what clothing was removed
and by whom; where other members of the family were; how the perpe-
trator induced the child to become involved; and whether the offender
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in determining how often these three factors appear in validated cases
of child sexual abuse. She examined 103 cases of child sexual abuse in
which perpetrators confessed or otherwise acknowledged their abuse.
The research produced the following data:
Both a description of the sexual behavior of the sort found in a true allegation,
and an emotional reaction to the sexual abuse or describing it, which is charac-
teristic of a true allegation, were found in over four-fifths of the accounts.
Details of the context of the sexual abuse were found slightly less frequently,
but nevertheless in over three-fourths of the cases. Seventy of the victims'
descriptions (68%) contained all three of these characteristics; 16 (15.5%) con-
tained two; 11 (10.7%) contained one; and six (5.8%) contained none.3 1 2
Based on these findings, Faller concludes that the "clinical criteria
employed by evaluators of sexually abused children are indeed valid
predictors of whether children have been sexually abused and should
continue to be used."313
Faller's study provides empirical evidence that experts can deter-
mine whether a child's symptoms and behavior are consistent with
sexual abuse. Such empirical support is important because purely
clinical decisionmaking is subject to criticism as potentially biased. As
Faller remarks, "clinicians are in the position of asserting that certain
characteristics of the child's statement indicate that it is true 'because
I said so.' "314 Studies like those of Faller and Conte bolster confi-
admonished the victim not to tell, or said anything else in the course of
the abuse. Sometimes the child will relate an idiosyncratic event that
occurred during the course of the abuse that enhances his or her
credibility.
Id. at 391. Faller describes the demonstration or description of the sexual abuse
as follows:
Characteristics of the sexual victimization itself that indicate the allega-
tion is true are the child's ability to describe specific sexual acts, an ac-
count of sexual behavior that is told from a child's viewpoint, and sexual
knowledge in the child's statements or behavior that is beyond that ex-
pected for the child's developmental stage.
Id. at 392. Faller describes the child's emotional state as follows: "The child's
emotional state refers to both the child's state of mind when recounting the sex-
ual abuse and the child's recollection of her or his feelings at the time of the
abuse." Id.
312. Id. at 395 (footnote omitted).
313. Id. at 396-98. Faller cautions that while the "results of this study are promising,"
replication studies should be conducted to ensure the validity of the findings.
314. Id. at 390. See also Corwin, supra note 262, at 93 (reference omitted), where the
authors write:
While clinical experience and anecdotal case reports can provide val-
uable insights to be tested by rigourous, scientific study, there are a
number of known pitfalls in making firm statements based on clinical
impression. For example, confirmation biases can affect clinical inter-
pretation. That is, beliefs about such problems as child sexual abuse are
likely to affect the symptoms and behaviors that clinicians find of
note....
A second pitfall concerns the nature of the clinician's experience. If
the clients seen are not representative of the typical child sexual abuse
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dence in clinical decisionmaking.
When the clinical and empirical data discussed in this subsection
are considered along with information presented elsewhere in this Ar-
ticle, it is possible to argue credibly that in many cases qualified ex-
perts can determine with reasonable clinical certainty whether a
child's symptoms and behaviors are consistent with sexual abuse, and
not with other causes. 315 Before accepting this conclusion, however, it
is important to examine arguments casting doubt on professional com-
petence in this regard.
In a recent law review article, David McCord takes the position
that the "behavioral scientific literature conclusively demonstrates
that there is not general acceptance of the ability of experts in the
field to diagnose a child as having been sexually abused."s16 Based on
his reading of the literature, McCord concludes that courts should re-
ject expert testimony on whether particular children have been
abused.317 As discussed above, there may be reason to exclude expert
testimony in the form of a direct opinion that sexual abuse occurred.
To the extent, however, that Professor McCord's article may be inter-
preted to rule out an opinion that a child's behavior and symptoms are
consistent with sexual abuse, and not with other causes, a reply is in
order.
Professor McCord argues that experts on child sexual abuse know
very little about the behavioral reactions commonly observed in sexu-
ally abused children.3 18 He writes that "researchers have never been
able to pin down typical psychological symptoms of sexually abused
children."1 9 He states further that "there are no typical symptoms"
of child sexual abuse.3 20 It is quite true that sexually abused children
display a wide range of reactions to sexual abuse.321 However, experts
are not as bereft of behavioral guideposts as McCord suggests. In fair-
ness to him, at the time McCord was writing, which was probably 1985
or 1986, the literature provided more support for his position than it
does now. In light of current knowledge, however, McCord's article
paints an unduly bleak picture of expert knowledge.322 Subsection IV
(B)(1) indicates that at the present time, experts know a substantial
amount about the reactions of children to sexual abuse.
Furthermore, contemporary research supports the opinion of
case or range of possible cases, the clinician's conclusions may not
generalize.
315. As clinical and scientific knowledge expands, the argument gains strength.
316. See McCord, supra note 42, at 38. See also McCord, Syndromes, supra note 73.
317. See McCord, supra note 42, at 24.
318. See id. at 18-24.
319. Id. at 20.
320. Id.




many experts that it is possible in some cases to detect the effects of
child sexual abuse.323 Thus, current knowledge casts considerable
doubt on McCord's conclusion that experts cannot diagnose child sex-
ual abuse.
Another influential commentator, Gary Melton, believes that
mental health professionals should not offer expert testimony that a
child has been sexually abused.324 He writes:
A somewhat more difficult but still rather straightforward question is
whether experts should be permitted to give an opinion as to whether a child
has in fact been abused. Most appellate courts that have considered the issue
have held that such testimony is not based on specialized knowledge and in-
vades the province of the fact finder.... Such 'diagnoses' of sexual abuse are
essentially legal conclusions based on common sense inferences. As a matter
of law, they should not be admitted, and as a matter of ethics, they should not
be proffered, because they exceed experts' competence as mental health
professionals.
3 25
Melton's position is troublesome for two reasons. First, he asserts
that an opinion on whether sexual abuse occurred is essentially a legal
conclusion.26 If Melton is correct in this regard, then experts should
not be permitted to offer such testimony because experts are not per-
mitted to testify on questions of law.327 As discussed in subsection II
(E), an opinion that a child was sexually abused can be viewed as a
question of ultimate fact rather than as a question of law. Experts are
permitted to offer opinions on ultimate facts. Thus, if Melton's posi-
tion is that expert testimony on whether abuse occurred should be ex-
cluded because it necessarily constitutes a conclusion of law, it is not
possible to agree with him.
To the extent Professor Melton asserts that experts should not of-
fer testimony cast in the form of a direct opinion that sexual abuse
occurred, he represents one school of thought on the subject. It is
worth noting that his position does not appear to rule out an opinion
that a child's behavior and symptoms are consistent with sexual abuse.
Second, we take issue with Melton's assertion that it is somehow
unethical for qualified professionals to provide expert testimony on
whether abuse occurred. Many competent and ethical professionals
believe such testimony is proper in selected cases. A properly quali-
fied expert does not act unethically in providing such testimony.
323. See text accompanying notes 305-14.
324. See authorities cited supra note 289.
325. Melton, Children's Testimony, supra note 289, at 189. See also Melton & Limbpr.
supra note 289.
326. Id.
327. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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2. Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Whether Sexual Abuse
Occurred
The admissibility of expert testimony relating to whether a partic-
ular child waLs sexually abused is a divisive issue. The subject will be
approached in three subsections. The first subsection describes a line
of New York cases permitting expert testimony validating suspected
sexual abuse. The second component discusses decisions permitting
and rejecting expert testimony on whether abuse occurred. The third
subsection articulates the position that expert testimony on whether
abuse occurred should be admitted in certain proceedings.
a. Validation of Child Sexual Abuse in New York
Every state has a juvenile or family court charged with protecting
abused and neglected children. In New York, protective proceedings
are commenced under the Family Court Act.3 28 In a series of recent
decisions under the Act, New York courts approved testimony by ex-
perts that particular children were sexually abused. The courts refer
to the process by which experts evaluate allegations of abuse as
"validation." 329
Expert validation testimony has been used for two purposes: first,
as corroboration of a child's hearsay statements;330 and second, as sub-
stantive evidence of abuse.33 1 Because of the importance of validation
testimony, New York courts quite properly require experts providing
such testimony to be "highly qualified."332 The civil nature of protec-
tive proceedings, coupled with the overriding need to protect children
from abuse, justifies admission of validation evidence.33 3
328. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 1011-84 (McKinney 1983).
329. See In re Linda K., 132 A.D.2d 149, 158, 521 N.Y.S.2d 705, 711 (1987)(" 'Validation'
has been defined as 'the process by which an expert confirms or fails to confirm
the existence of "intrafamilial child sex abuse syndrome"' ").
330. New York, like many other states, has a hearsay exception for reliable out-of-
court statements of children. If the child declarant is not present to testify at
trial, however, the statements must be corroborated. See In re Nicole V., 71
N.Y.2d 112, 518 N.E.2d 914 (1987); In re Linda K., 132 A.D.2d 149, 521 N.Y.S.2d 705
(1987); In re Donna K., 132 A.D.2d 1004, 1005, 518 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290 (1987)("the
opinion of the expert on 'intrafamilial child abuse syndrome' was admissible on
the issue of whether the child had, in fact, been sexually abused and to corrobo-
rate the child's previous out-of-court statements"); Jane P. v. John P., 135 Misc.
2d 400, 515 N.Y.S.2d 365 (N.Y. Sup- Ct. 1987)(visitation proceeding incident to di-
vorce); In re E.M., 137 Misc. 2d 197, 520 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Farn. Ct. 1987).
331. See In re Donna K., 132 A.D.2d 1004, 518 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1987); In re of Dona D., 141
Misc. 2d 46, 532 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Fain. Ct. 1988); In re E.M., 137 Misc. 2d 197, 520
N.Y.S.2d 327 (Fain. Ct. 1987); In re Melissa M., 136 Misc. 2d 773, 519 N.Y.S.2d 453
(Fai. Ct. 1987).




b. Case Law Regarding Expert Testimony on Whether Abuse
Occurred
A number of appellate decisions reject expert testimony that a par-
ticular child was sexually abused.334 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
is in this camp. 335 In State v. Haseltine,336 the sixteen-year-old incest
victim testified and described repeated sexual intercourse with her fa-
ther. The trial court permitted a psychiatrist to provide two types of
opinion testimony. First, the expert described "the pattern of behav-
ior exhibited by incest victims." 337 Second, the expert was permitted
to opine that there "was no doubt whatsoever" that the minor was an
incest victim.338 The Court of Appeals rejected both types of testi-
mony. Directing most of its attention to the expert's direct opinion
that the daughter was an incest victim, the court held that such testi-
mony amounts to an inadmissible opinion that the minor was "telling
the truth."339
The Court of Appeals was correct in rejecting the expert's asser-
tion that the child was an incest victim. It is respectfully submitted,
however, that the court was right for the wrong reason. The expert's
opinion that there was "no doubt whatsoever" about sexual abuse was
too certain and unequivocal. Such certainty is not warranted by cur-
rent knowledge, and exaggerated confidence in clinical decisionmak-
ing is likely to confuse jurors or cause unfair prejudice to
defendants. 3 40 However, the court did not base its rejection of the ex-
pert's opinion on his unwarranted certainty. Rather, the court con-
cluded that an opinion that a child was abused is the same thing as an
impermissible opinion that the child told the truth when she described
sexual abuse. This conclusion seems wrong. An opinion that a child
was sexually abused is not an opinion that the child was truthful when
describing abuse.341 It is true that professionals rely heavily on the
child's description of abuse. But evaluation of suspected sexual abuse
does not stop with the child's description. The child's statement is an
important factor, but only one factor among many. Thus, an expert
334. See, e.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985).
335. See State v. Lamb, 145 Wis. 2d 454, 427 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Jen-
sen, 141 Wis. 2d 333, 415 N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 432
N.W.2d 913 (1988); State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App.
1984).
336. 120 Wis. 2d 92, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984).
337. Id. at 95, 352 N.W.2d at 675.
338. Id. at 96, 352 N.W.2d at 676.
339. Id. at 97, 352 N.W.2d at 676.
340. Such testimony could be excluded as unduly prejudicial or likely to confuse ju-
rors. FED. R. EvID. 403.
341. See State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212, 365 S.E.2d 651 (1988); State v. Haseltine, 120
Wis. 2d 92, 98, 352 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Ct. App. 1984) (Cane, J., dissenting). But see
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 249 (1986) (a diagnosis can be the equivalent
of testimony on credibility).
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opinion that a child was sexually abused is not the same as an opinion
on the child's truthfulness or credibility. It may be the case that ex-
pert testimony regarding abuse bolsters a child's credibility, but many
permissible forms of expert testimony bolster credibility without be-
coming objectionable.342
In State v. Jensen,343 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals focused more
precisely on expert testimony describing behavioral characteristics
commonly observed in sexual abuse victims. The court held that
when such testimony is offered to prove that abuse occurred, it is
inadmissible:
[Ain expert is precluded from testifying that a complainant's behavior follow-
ing an alleged sexual assault was proof that an assault occurred. The question
of whether the conduct was consistent with that of a sexual assault victim is
but another way of attempting to reach the impermissible conclusion that the
conduct proves the assault.3
4 4
As in Haseltine, the Jensen court ruled that testimony describing
behavioral effects of abuse amounts to improper bolstering of the
child's credibility. It is submitted, however, that Jensen is incorrect
for the same reason Haseltine is incorrect. Expert testimony describ-
ing behaviors commonly observed in sexually abused children is not
the equivalent of testimony that a child is truthful. Perhaps the court
was worried that jurors would depend too heavily on expert opinion
when assessing the child's credibility. Jurors may think, "If the ex-
pert believed the child, why shouldn't we?" This is a legitimate con-
cern, but it does not clarify matters to equate expert testimony on
whether abuse occurred with testimony focused directly on credibility.
In two decisions, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected expert tes-
timony that sexual abuse occurred.345 In Johnson v. State,3 46 a physi-
342. See State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. 1984); Townsend v. State, 103 Nev.
113, 118, 734 P.2d 705, 709 (1987)("expert testimony, by its very nature, often
tends to confirm or refute the truthfulness of another witness"); State v. Middle-
ton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983); Commonwealth v. Pearsall, 368 Pa. Super.
327, 534 A.2d 106 (1987); Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 348 Pa. Super. 368, 502 A.2d
253 (1985).
343. 141 Wis. 2d 333, 415 N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 432 N.W.2d
913 (1988).
344. Id. at 340, 415 N.W.2d at 522.
345. Johnson v. State, 292 Ark. 632, 732 S.W.2d 817 (1987); Russell v. State, 289 Ark.
533, 712 S.W.2d 916 (1986). See also Allison v. State, 256 Ga. 851, 353 S.E.2d 805
(1987). In Allison the trial court permitted an expert to describe characteristics
commonly observed in sexually abused children. The expert went on to give an
opinion that the child had been abused. The Georgia Supreme Court disapproved
of this testimony. The court wrote:
The jury, having the benefit of extensive testimony as to the lineaments
of the child abuse syndrome, as well as testimony that this child exhib-
ited several symptoms that are consistent with the syndrome, was fully
capable of deciding-upon their own- whether the child in fact was
abused, and, if so, whether Allison did it.
Allison v. State, 256 Ga. 851, 853. 353 S.E.2d 805, 808 (emphasis in original).
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cian examined a nine-year-old victim of alleged anal intercourse. The
doctor conducted a physical examination of the child, and obtained the
boy's version of events. The doctor testified that there was no physical
evidence of abuse, but that lack of such evidence did not rule out
abuse. The trial court permitted the doctor to give an opinion on
whether the child had been abused. The doctor testified that in his
opinion "an act had occurred that [was] detrimental to this child's
health."347 The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the ensuing con-
viction, holding that the trial court erred in permitting the expert to
offer an opinion that abuse occurred. The Supreme Court held that
the expert testimony was of no assistance to the jury because "lay ju-
rors were fully competent to determine whether the history given by
the victim was consistent with sexual abuse."348
The court was of the same mind in Russell v. State,349 where a psy-
chologist testified that what the child told-her was consistent with
sexual abuse. The court wrote:
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the witness to
answer whether the child's statements were consistent with sexual abuse be-
cause the subject matter was not beyond the common knowledge of the jury.
The argument is meritorious.
The general test for admissibility of expert testimony is whether the testi-
mony will aid the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining
a fact in issue.... An important consideration in determining whether the
testimony will aid the trier of fact is whether the situation is beyond the trier
of fact's ability to understand and draw its own conclusions .... Here, lay
jurors were fully competent to determine whether the history given by the
victim was consistent with sexual abuse.3 5 0
The Johnson and Russell decisions underestimate the complexity
and the degree of expertise required for evaluation of suspected child
sexual abuse.3 5 1 The evaluator must possess specialized knowledge of
child development, individual and family dynamics, patterns of child
sexual victimization, signs and symptoms of abuse, and the uses and
limits of various psychological tests. The competent evaluator is fa-
miliar with the literature on child abuse, and understands the signifi-
cance of age-inappropriate sexualization and preoccupation. Since
346. 292 Ark. 632, 732 S.W.2d 817 (1987).
347. Id. at 638, 732 S.W.2d at 820.
348. Id. at 640, 732 S.W.2d at 821. See id. at 647, 732 S.W.2d at 829 (Hays, J., dissenting).
349. 289 Ark. 533, 712 S.W.2d 916 (1986).
350. Id. at 534, 712 S.W.2d at 916-17 (citations omitted). While the trial court erred in
admitting the expert testimony, the error was harmless. Id. at 535, 712 S.W.2d at
917.
351. See Commonwealth v. Baldwin. 348 Pa. Super. 368, 377, 502 A.2d 253, 257 (1985).
The Baldwin court recognized the skill required to evaluate suspected child sex-
ual abuse, observing that "the behavioral and psychological characteristics of
child sexual abuse victims are proper subjects for expert testimony." Id. The




sexual behavior is learned, the experienced evaluator is in a position
to observe, understand, and seek explanations for age-inappropriate
sexual knowledge or interest. The evaluator is able to interpret the
results of medical examinations and laboratory tests. The competent
evaluator is trained in t he eomplex art of interviewing children. Elic-
iting accurate and complete information from children who may have
been subjected to traumatic or unusual experiences is a formidable
task, requiring great skill and patience. Equal skill is required to eval-
uate a child's verbal statements and nonverbal behavior. Additionally,
competent evaluators are aware of the specialized literature on de-
tecting coached and fabricated allegations of abuse. Of tremendous
importance is the evaluator's clinical experience with sexually abused
and nonsexually abused children. Depth of clinical experience with
sexually abused children provides the reference point against which
new cases are assessed. The combination of these highly specialized
skills allows evaluators to balance the multitude of factors involved in
assessment of suspected abuse.
The specialized skill and knowledge required for competent evalu-
ation of suspected child abuse is beyond the ken of most physicians
and mental health professionals. It seems clear that lay jurors are in
no position to evaluate suspected abuse.352 Properly qualified experts
can assist jurors in sifting through the mountain of complex and some-
times conflicting and counterintuitive information presented in many
child sexual abuse cases.
Several decisions from the California Court of Appeal have erected
temporary barriers to expert testimony that a particular child was
sexually abused.353 In In re Amber B.,354 the Court of Appeals held
352. See McCord, supra note 42, where the author asks "whether the effects upon
children of sexual abuse is a subject matter where expert testimony would likely
assist the ordinary juror." Answering his own question, McCord cogently ob-
serves that:
Common experience dictates that the answer to this question is yes. To
most people the topic of child sexual abuse is unfamiliar and mysterious.
There is no reason to believe that most people would understand what
effects sexual abuse has on a child and how those effects might be
detected.
Id. at 34.
353. See, e.g., In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1987). See also
State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154 (Me. 1988). In Black. Maine's Supreme Judicial
Court rejected expert testimony to diagnose child sexual abuse. The court stated-
[The expert witness] described the type of play therapy and behavioral
management utilized in the treatment of sexually abused children, as
well as the methods of clinical diagnosis on which professionals such as
herself rely. Moreover, she describes certain "indicators" frequently en-
countered in sexually abused children. These "clinical features of sexual
abuse" are relied on by [her] and other mental health professionals in
the context of their therapy programs. As a result of her treatment of
[the child], [she] expressed her opinion "that a male adult who [the child]
was in trust relationship with, an authority figure, surrogate parent or
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that when an expert bases an opinion that a child was sexually abused
on the child's statements during interviews and the child's play with
anatomically detailed dolls, the proponent of the evidence must prove
that such evaluative techniques have been generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community.3 55
At the present time, sufficient clinical and scientific evidence is
available to mount a persuasive argument that the relevant scientific
community accepts the use of anatomically detailed dolls as a useful
adjunct to interviewing children who may be sexually abused.356 The
dolls are not a test for sexual abuse, and it is not appropriate to base
conclusions on doll play alone. However, it is proper to employ the
dolls, and to consider the child's interaction with them as a small but
relevant piece of the puzzle. Furthermore, the professional literature
supports the view that in selected cases, it is possible to determine
whether sexual abuse occurred. Thus, it should be possible to lower
the barrier raised in Amber B.
A number of courts that have considered expert behavioral science
testimony on whether child sexual abuse occurred have rejected the
testimony.357 The reasoning and conclusions of such decisions are
open to challenge in light of current clinical and scientific knowledge.
Several decisions permit expert testimony on whether abuse oc-
curred. In Townsend v. State,35 8 for example, the Nevada Supreme
Court approved such testimony, writing: "[I]t was proper for the
State's expert to express an opinion on the issue of whether the child
had, in fact, been sexually assaulted or abused. Such an opinion,
although embracing an ultimate issue, represents both the peculiar ex-
such, had sexually abused [him] by having anal intercourse." Neither
[the expert's] qualifications nor her methods as a mental health profes-
sional are in question. The record, however, does not support the admis-
siblity of her testimony identifying [the child] as a victim of past sexual
abuse. The validity of the summary of symptoms encountered in the
populaton of her patients is seriously imparied by selection bias. No
comparison testing was done with children who were not victims of sex-
ual abuse to determine whether they also demonstrated like indicators.
Her testimony demonstrates no scientific basis for determining that a
causal relationship exists between sexual abuse and the "clinical fea-
tures of sexual abuse," nor is there demonstrated even a positive correla-
tion between the two. In the absence of any demonstration of scientific
reliability, we reject the testimony of the mental health expert identify-
ing [the child] as a victim of child sexual abuse.
537 A.2d at 1157. The type of empirical information which the Black court found
wanting is increasingly available. See supra notes 249-50, 308-14 and accompany-
ing text.
354. 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1987).
355. California courts apply the Frye test to evaluate novel scientific evidence. For
discussion of Frye see subsection III (C) supra.
356. See discussion of anatomically detailed dolls supra note 259.
357. See, e.g., Allison v. State, 256 Ga. 851, 353 S.E.2d 805 (1987).
358. 103 Nev. 113, 734 P.2d 705 (1987).
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pertise and consummate purpose of an expert's analysis."3 59 In Seer-
ing v. Department of Social Services,360 the California Court of
Appeal permitted an expert to testify in an administrative proceeding
that, based on his clinical experience, he believed a child had been
sexually abused. And in Glendening v. State, 361 the Florida Supreme
Court wrote that "[a] qualified expert may express an opinion as to
whether a child has been the victim of sexual abuse."3 62
c. Expert Testimony on Whether a Child Was Sexually
Abused Should be Admissible in Appropriate Cases
The material in the clinical and scientific subsection indicates that
expert behavioral science -testimony relating to whether a child was
sexually abused remains a controversial issue. Should such testimony
be admitted in evidence? Based on present knowledge, expert behav-
ioral science testimony on whether sexual abuse occurred raises the
most troubling concerns in criminal jury trials. Because of disagree-
ment among experts on child sexual abuse, and because of the conse-
quences of criminal conviction, it may be appropriate in criminal jury
trials to eschew behavioral science testimony cast in terms of a direct
opinion that sexual abuse occurred. However, it may be proper to per-
mit one or more of the alternative forms of expert testimony discussed
earlier. In particular, it may be appropriate to permit a properly quali-
fied expert to testify that a child demonstrates age-inappropriate sex-
ual knowledge or awareness. Furthermore, it may also be proper to
permit an expert to state that a child's symptoms and behavior are
consistent with sexual abuse.
In civil proceedings, it is appropriate to allow qualified experts on
child sexual abuse to offer direct as well as alternative forms of expert
testimony relating to whether sexual abuse occurred. Such testimony
is particularly suitable and necessary in juvenile court proceedings to
protect children. In this regard, the approach of the New York family
courts has much to commend it. Protective proceedings are civil in
nature, and are not designed to work a permanent disruption of the
parent-child relationship. Quite the contrary, the goal of the court is
to protect the child, support the family, and provide services and treat-
ment designed to eliminate further abuse. It must be recalled that
child sexual abuse is often very difficult to prove, especially when the
victim is young. The juvenile court needs all the evidence that is avail-
able to enable it to protect abused children. In protective proceedings
there is no jury, thus the concern that expert testimony may over-awe
or confuse jurors is eliminated. The judge can evaluate the worth of
359. Id. at 113, 734 P.2d at 708.
360. 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1987).
361. 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988).
362. Id. at 220.
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expert testimony on whether a child was sexually abused. In juvenile
court, the need for the evidence and the compelling interest in pro-
tecting children justify admission of expert behavioral science testi-
mony on whether sexual abuse occurred. Such testimony is also
helpful in child custody and visitation litigation incident to divorce,
and in other civil proceedings.
D. Behavioral Science Testimony to Rehabilitate a Child's Credibility
Following Impeachment in Which the Defendant Asserts that
Behaviors such as Recantation and Delay in Reporting Are
Inconsistent with Allegations of Sexual Abuse
Expert testimony in the preceding three categories is offered to
prove that abuse occurred. In the present category, and the one fol-
lowing, attention shifts from expert testimony designed to prove
abuse, to expert testimony intended to rehabilitate a child's im-
peached credibility.
Witnesses can be impeached in many ways. In child sexual abuse
litigation, two forms of impeachment take on particular significance.
First, the defendant may assert that a child should not be believed
becausd the child did not report alleged abuse for a substantial period
of time, or because the child retracted allegations of abuse. Such im-
peachment is legitimate. However, when the defense concentrates on
delay and recantation, the question arises whether the state may offer
expert rebuttal testimony to inform the jury that many sexually
abused children delay reporting and recant. This type of rebuttal tes-
timony is discussed in the present subsection.
In the second form of impeachment, the defense seeks to under-
mine a child's credibility by arguing that developmental differences
between adults and children render children less credible than adults.
This form of rehabilitation is taken up in the following subsection.
1. Clinical and Scientific Information
A substantial percentage of children are sexually abused at some
point during their minority.3 6 3 Most victims never disclose their
abuse.364 Of those who do, delay in reporting is very common. 36 5
363. Russell, The Incidence and Prevalence of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial Sexual
Abuse of Female Children, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 133 (1983).
364. J. HERMAN, supra note 211; Gagnon, Female Cild Victims of Sex Offenses, 13
Soc. PROBS. 176 (1965); Russell, supra note 363; Summit, supra note 275, at 186.
365. See D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN (1979); K. MEISELMAN, IN-
CEST: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS WITH TREATMENT REC-
OMMENDATIONS (1978); D. RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES
OF GIRLS AND WOMEN (1986); J. Conte, supra note 229; Summit, supra note 275.
For the children who do disclose their victimization, disclosure may have to await
adolescence, when the child is no longer entirely helpless and dependent.
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Jones and McQuiston write that "[p]eople who have been sexually
abused frequently delay reporting what has happened to them. All
the major studies and case series consistently emphasize that delay is a
major clinical feature of [child sexual abuse] cases." 366 The reasons
for delay are not difficult to find. In intrafamilial abuse, where delay
is particularly common, the child is relatively helpless, and must ac-
commodate to ongoing maltreatment.367 The abusing parent is often
in a position to impose and enforce secrecy.3 68
When disclosure occurs, the child may refrain from telling the en-
tire story, and may reveal a little at a time to "test the waters" and see
how adults react.369 For example, a young child who has been pene-
trated many times may begin by saying, "He only did it once." Or, "He
never put it in me, he just touched me with it." Or, "He only did it to
the other kids, not to me." Such disclosures are inaccurate, of course,
but considering the child's uncertainty, and the common belief among
children that adults will perceive them as bad because they were vic-
timized, such behavior is understandable.
When abuse finally comes to light, the victim may disclose to par-
ents, teachers, medical professionals, therapists, or others. Following
disclosure, powerful forces may work to convince the child to change
the facts or to recant altogether.370 Such forces are particularly strong
in intrafamilial abuse cases, where the perpetrator, with or without
the cooperation of the nonabusing parent, seeks to persuade the child
to change or deny prior allegations. There may be ample opportunity
to instill fear, guilt, and ambivalence.
The pressure to recant is described by Summit in his article on the
child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.37 ' Summit's description
366. D. JONES & M. McQUISTON, supra note 301, at 2.
367. See Summit, supra note 275.
368. See id. at 181.
369. See D. JONES & M. McQUISTON, supra note 301, where the authors write that
"[u]sually children disclose a small portion of their total experience initially, ap-
parently in an attempt to test the adult's response before letting them know more
about the assault. If they receive a positive and supportive response, they may
feel safe enough to disclose more about their experience." Id. at 3. See also Bastic
v. State, 772 P.2d 1089 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (approving expert testimony stating
that many sexually abused children reveal details gradually).
370. D. JONES & M. McQuISTON, supra note 301 at 8, where the authors write:
After the disclosure has been made by the victims, the guilt connected
with their participation in the abuse may intensify over the ensuing
months. The feelings of guilt and personal responsibility may become
combined with feelings of loss, and grieving for the emotional warmth
that the abuser provided. At that stage, it is difficult for the victim to
appreciate that the warmth and emotional availability were only pro-
vided at a price. The victims begin to feel that they caused the family's
break-up, and perhaps the incarceration of the abuser. Retraction may
be a frequent accompaniment at this stage.
371. Summit, supra note 275.
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is not accurate in all intrafamilial abuse cases, but it assists in under-
standing the dynamics of recantation. He writes:
Whatever a child says about sexual abuse, she is likely to reverse it. Be-
neath the anger of impulsive disclosure remains the ambivalence of guilt and
the martyred obligation to preserve the family. In the chaotic aftermath of
disclosure, the child discovers that the bedrock fears and threats underlying
the secrecy are true. Her father abandons her and calls her a liar. Her
mother does not believe her or decompensates into hysteria and rage. The
family is fragmented, and all the children are placed in custody. The father is
threatened with disgrace and imprisonment. The girl is blamed for causing
the whole mess, and everyone seems to treat her like a freak. She is interro-
gated about all the tawdry details and encouraged to incriminate her father,
yet the father remains unchallenged, remaining at home in the security of the
family. She is held in custody with no apparent hope of returning home ....
The message from the mother is very clear, often explicit, "Why do you
insist on telling those awful stories about your father? If you send him to
prison, we won't be a family anymore. We'll end up on welfare with no place
to stay. Is that what you want to do to us?"
Once again, the child bears the responsibility of either preserving or de-
stroying the family. The role reversal continues with the "bad" choice being
to tell the truth and the "good" choice being to capitulate and restore a lie for
the sake of the family.
Unless there is special support for the child and immediate intervention to
force responsibility on the father, the girl will follow the "normal" course and
retract her complaint.3 7
2
Children who disclose sexual abuse are sometimes inconsistent in
their descriptions of what happened. Inconsistency occurs for many
reasons, three of which are particularly relevant to the present discus-
sion. First, when a child is repeatedly abused for months or years,
individual molestations blur together. If the child is asked to describe
particular episodes, the child may become confused, and such confu-
sion may lead to inconsistent versions of events. Second, the ambiva-
lence experienced by many victims sometimes causes them to offer
inconsistent accounts of abuse. Such inconsistency is found in chil-
dren of all ages. Third, with young children, inconsistency in describ-
ing past events may be a product of developmental immaturity.
Young children are particularly prone to inconsistency regarding the
peripheral details of events they have experienced. Inconsistency
born of ambivalence is the subject of the present subsection. The type
of inconsistency found in young children is discussed in subsection IV
(E).
The clinical literature discloses that in intrafamilial abuse cases,
many abused children are ambivalent about the abuser, feeling
warmth and anger at the same time. It is not uncommon for abused
children to want to live with and demonstrate affection toward the
abusing parent.
372. Id. at 188 (emphasis in original).
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2. Expert Testimony to Rehabilitate Credibility
In many child sexual abuse cases, the child is the state's most im-
portant witness. If the defendant denies that abuse occurred, or
claims mistaken identity, the child's credibility assumes decisive im-
portance. Even if the child does not testify at trial, the defense may
impugn the child's credibility.
As the clinical and scientific subsection makes clear, many sexually
abused children delay reporting their abuse for weeks, months, or
even years. Once abuse is disclosed, many children recant, denying
that anything happened. Some recant their recantation. Sexually
abused children are sometimes inconsistent in their descriptions of
abuse, and in intrafamilial abuse cases, many victims are ambivalent.
To the untrained eye, such behaviors may appear inconsistent with
allegations of sexual abuse. In an effort to undermine the child's cred-
ibility, the defense may focus the jury's attention on delay in report-
ing, recantation, inconsistency, and loyalty to the alleged perpetrator.
In the face of such impeachment, the state has a need to rehabilitate
the child's credibility. To this end, the state may offer expert rebuttal
testimony designed to inform the jury that such behaviors are com-
mon in sexually abused children. Such expert testimony is needed to
disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual
abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children's
seemingly self-impeaching behavior.3 73
The great majority of courts approve such expert rebuttal testi-
mony.3 7 4 Expert testimony is admitted to explain why sexually
abused children delay reporting their abuse,375 why children recant,3 76
373. See State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986), where the court wrote that
expert testimony describing recantation, delay, and so forth "informs jurors that
commonly held assumptions are not necessarily accurate and allows them to
fairly judge credibility." Id. at 382, 728 P.2d at 252 (citation omitted). See also
People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, -, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886, 892 (1988), where
the court writes that expert testimony of the type now under discussion "is ad-
missible solely for the purpose of showing that the victim's reactions as demon-
strated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested."
374. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 422 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)(court approved ex-
pert testimony to inform jury that running away from home is common in sexu-
ally abused adolescents); State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212, 365 S.E.2d 651
(1988)(expert could state why child would continue to cooperate with abuser);
State v. Robinson, 431 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 1988).
375. See, e.g., Bostic v. State, 772 P.2d 1089 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); People v. Bowker,
203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988)(child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome testimony admitted to explain delay); People v. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d
213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1986); People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (1984); People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1987)(adult rape victim;
rape trauma syndrome admitted to explain delay); Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269
(Del. 1987); People v. Matlock, 153 Mich. App. 171, 395 N.W.2d 274 (1986); State v.
Sandberg, 406 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. 1987); State v. Hall, 406 N.W.2d 503 (Minn.
1987); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984); State v. Davis, 422 N.W.2d 296
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why children's descriptions of abuse are sometimes inconsistent,37 7
why abused children are angry,3 78 and why some children want to live
with a person who abused them.379
While expert testimony is admissible to rehabilitate children's im-
peached credibility, courts circumscribe such testimony to be sure it is
limited to rehabilitation, and is not used as substantive evidence of
abuse.380 For example, expert testimony regarding delay and recanta-
tion goes far toward rehabilitating credibility. It is important to en-
sure, however, that jurors apprehend the limits of such testimony.
Delay itself does not prove abuse, nor does recantation. One commen-
tator remarked about recantation, that "[t]here is something funda-
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 570, 688 P.2d 326 (1984); People v.
Benjamin R., 103 A.D.2d 663, 481 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1984); State v. Garfield, 34 Ohio
App. 3d 300, 518 N.E.2d 568 (1986); State v. Hicks, 148 Vt. 459, 535 A.2d 776 (1987);
State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1984); Griego v. State,
761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 1988); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987). But see
Dunnington v. State, 740 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)(delay in reporting not
beyond ken of lay jurors; therefore, expert testimony not needed).
376. State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986); People v. Luna, 204 Cal. App.
3d 726, 250 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1988)(evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation
was offered during state's case in chief; it is not clear from the opinion why the
evidence was admitted during state's case and not on rebuttal); People v. Bowker,
203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988); Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269 (Del.
1987); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983); Commonwealth v.
Baldwin, 348 Pa. Super. 368, 502 A.2d 253 (1985); State v. Madison, 770 P.2d 662
(Wash. Ct. App. 1989). See also State v. Davis, 422 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988). In Davis, defendant was convicted of child abuse. Following conviction,
the adolescent victim recanted her allegations. Defendant moved for a new trial
on the basis of the recantation. The trial court denied the motion, finding the
recantation untruthful. The court of appeals affirmed.
377. State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472,
720 P.2d 73 (1986); State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359, 556 A.2d 112 (1989); State v.
Black, 537 A.2d 1154 (Me. 1988) (on rebuttal the state may offer expert testimony
as to why a child would be inconsistent; the expert may testify during the state's
case in chief, following impeachment of a child); State v. Pettit, 66 Or. App. 575,
675 P.2d 183 (1984); State v. Rogers, 293 S.C. 505, 362 S.E.2d 7 (1987). But see
Commonwealth v. Gibbons, 556 A.2d 915 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)(error to admit ex-
pert testimony regarding inconsistency even though defendant based his case on
inconsistency).
378. State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986)(defendant argued the child was
angry due to proper parental discipline; the expert supplied an alternative expla-
nation for the child's anger at the defendant.). See also State v. Robinson, 431
N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 1988)(defendant argued that fact that adult sexual assault vic-
tim was calm after the assault indicated that there was no assault; it was proper to
admit expert testimony that sexual assault victims often demonstrate calm affect
following assault).
379. State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986)("The defense repeatedly argued
that it was incomprehensible that the daughter would want to return home if her
father had molested her." Id. at 383, 728 P.2d at 253. It was proper for the expert
to explain "factors that could lead a victim to recant and attempt to return
home." Id. (footnote omitted)).
380. See People v. Matlock, 153 Mich. App. 171, 395 N.W.2d 274 (1986).
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mentally strange about saying that since the child denies that the
event occurred, it must have occurred."3 81 Yet, there is a danger ju-
rors may misconstrue expert testimony on delay and recantation as
substantive evidence of abuse. The approach of the California Court
of Appeal protects against such confusion. In People v. Bowker,382 the
court held that the trial judge should instruct the jury that the expert
testimony "is not intended and should not be used to determine
whether the victim's molestation claim is true."3 8 3
Before expert rehabilitation testimony is admitted, the proponent
should articulate the specific purpose of the testimony.3 8 4 The Bowker
decision is again instructive. In Bowker the state offered expert reha-
bilitation testimony describing Dr. Summit's child sexual abuse ac-
commodation syndrome. The court approved limited use of such
testimony, but went on to write:
[California case law] does not make "general" testimony on CSAAS admis-
sible m every, or for that matter any, child abuse case.... [A]t a minimum the
evidence must be targeted to a specific "myth" or "misconception" suggested
by the evidence.... For instance, where a child delays a significant period of
time before reporting an incident or pattern of abuse, an expert could testify
that such delayed reporting is not inconsistent with the secretive environment
often created by an abuser who occupies a position of trust. Where an alleged
victim recants his story in whole or in part, a psychologist could testify on the
basis of past research that such behavior is not an uncommon response for an
abused child who is seeking to remove himself or herself from the pressure
created by police investigations and subsequent court proceedings. In the typi-
cal criminal case, however, it is the People's burden to identify the myth or
misconception the evidence is designed to rebut. Where there is no danger of
jury confusion, there is simply no need for the expert testimony.3 8 5
Rehabilitation testimony is more readily admitted when it de-
scribes sexually abused children as a class, rather than a specific
child.386 Courts surmise that avoiding discussion of a particular child
is less likely to confuse the jury. Several decisions expressly hold that
an expert may not describe a particular child.38
381. Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical Characteristics of
Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 GEO. L.J. 429, 446 (1985).
382. 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 1.988).
383. Id. at 394, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
384. See Commonwealth v. McNeely, 368 Pa. Super. 517, 534 A.2d 778 (1987).
385. People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 393-94, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886, 891 (citations
omitted). The Bowker court placed another limitation on expert rehabilitation
testimony. When such testimony is designed to explain such things as delay or
recantation, the court observed that there is little need for the expert to mention
a syndrome. The expert's testimony can be limited to the fact that delay and
recantation are common in sexually abused children. The expert need not raise
the spectre of a syndrome, and the possibility of confusion which such a technical,
medical term carries. Id. at 392, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 890 n.8.
386. State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
387. See, e.g., People v. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1986); People v.
Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985).
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In a recent decision, State v. Milbrandt,388 the Oregon Supreme
Court stated that if the state offers evidence of a syndrome to rehabili-
tate a child's credibility, it would be appropriate to subject the syn-
drome to the Frye test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence.
Expert testimony to rehabilitate a child's credibility is usually of-
fered on rebuttal, following impeaching cross-examination of the
child. Until some form of impeachment has occurred, such expert tes-
timony constitutes improper bolstering. It is not always necessary for
the state to await cross-examination, however. In some cases the de-
fense makes plain as early as opening statement that the child should
not be believed. Regardless of the timing or method of the defendant's
attack on credibility, and regardless of whether the attack is aimed
directly or indirectly at the child, expert rehabilitation testimony is
properly admitted as soon as the assault is underway.38 9
Courts are comfortable with expert testimony to rehabilitate a
child's impeached credibility,390 and for good reason. The defense in-
vites such rebuttal testimony by its attack on the child's credibility.
The state has a legitimate need to inform the jury about the dynamics
of child sexual abuse so that jurors can fairly and accurately evaluate
the child's credibility.
E. Behavioral Science Testimony to Rehabilitate a Child's Credibility
Following Impeachment in Which the Defendant Argues that
Developmental Differences Between Adults and Children
Render Children Less Credible Witnesses than Adults
Expert testimony in the present category is designed to rehabilitate
children's credibility in light of impeachment which asserts that chil-
dren are less credible than adults. The thrust of such impeachment is
that children's immaturity renders their testimony suspect. Recent
psychological research indicates that many adults are disposed to re-
gard children as less credible than adults.391 However, other research
indicates that children are not necessarily less reliable witnesses than
388. 305 Or. 621, 756 P.2d 620 (1988).
389. See People v. Sanchez, 208 Cal. App. 3d 721, 256 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1989)(approving
expert testimony to rehabilitate child's credibility during state's case in chief fol-
lowing cross-examination of child).
390. So are the commentators. See McCord, supra note 42, at 67.
391. Goodman, Bottoms, Herscovici & Shaver, Determinants of the Child Victim s
Perceived Credibility, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY 1 (S. Ceci, D.
Ross & M. Toglia eds. 1989) [hereinafter Goodman, Determinants]; Lieppe &
Romanczyk, Children on the Witness Stand. A Communication/Persuasion
Analysis of Juror's Reactions to Child Witnesses, in CHILDREN'S EYEwITNEss
MEMORY 155 (S. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. Ross eds. 1987); Goodman, Golding & Haith,




adults.392 When the defense seeks to capitalize on commonly held
misconceptions about the testimonial competence and credibility of
children, expert rebuttal testimony is sometimes appropriate to set
the record straight.
The present category of expert testimony differs from testimony
discussed in subsection IV(D) above. Subsection IV(D) focused on ex-
pert testimony describing effects of sexual abuse that appear to be in-
consistent with abuse. The expert assists the jury by informing it that
behaviors such as delay in reporting and recantation are common in
sexually abused children. Expert testimony discussed in the present
subsection does not focus on sexually abused children. Rather, the ex-
pert informs the jury. about developmental characteristics shared by
all children. In particular, the instant subsection presents information
relating to children's memory, inconsistency, suggestibility, ability to
differentiate fact from fantasy, and understanding of time.
1. Clinical and Scientific Information
Research on children in the courtroom dates back to the nine-
teenth century.3 93 As is often the case in science, the early research-
ers approached their study laden with the cultural stereotypes of the
day. The notion that children were incompetent, undersized adults
was widely held. This folk wisdom found expression in the research
hypothesis that children were incompetent witnesses. Early studies
documented numerous errors made by children in providing testi-
mony.394 However, such research was flawed because the testimonial
performance of children was not systematically compared with that of
adults.395 More recent research suggests that testimony by adults is
also replete with errors and distortions.396 For example, suggestive
questioning can alter adult testimony, just as it does that of children.
One study found that adults will report seeing objects at the scene of a
simulated crime which were not present, but which had been sug-
gested during questioning by the interviewer. 397 Thus, methodological
392. Goodman, Rudy, Bottoms & Aman, Children's Concerns and Memory: Ecological
Issues in the Study of Children's Eyewitness Testimony, in WHAT YOUNG CHIL
DREN REMEMBER AND WHY (R. Fivush & J. Hudson eds., in press); Melton &
Thompson, Getting Out of a Rut, Detours to Less Traveled Paths in Child Wit-
ness Research, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 209 (S. Ceci, M. Toglia & D.
Ross eds. 1987).
393. Goodman provides an excellent historical review. Goodman, Children's Testi-
mony in Historical Perspective, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 9 (1984).
394. Id.
395. For an example of methodologically flawed early research see Varendock, Les
Termiognages d'Enfants Dans un Proces Retentissant, 11 ARCHIVES DE PSYCHO-
LOGiE 129 (1911).
396. E. LOFrUS, EYEWITNESS TESTiMONY (1979); A. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYE-
WITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
397. Loftus & Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the
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shortcomings render early studies condemning children's testimony of
dubious worth.
A resurgence of research on children's testimony occurred in the
1980s. Current research may be described as a hybrid of developmen-
tal and forensic research. Contemporary researchers strive to control
confounding variables, include appropriate control groups, and en-
hance ecological validity.398 Modern studies focus on children's mem-
ory for real-life events, the effects of stress on children's
performance, suggestibility in children, children's ability to distin-
guish fact from fantasy, and jurors' perceptions of child witnesses.
There is no question that there are significant developmental dif-
ferences between children and adults in numerous areas relevant to
testimony. In addition, children are far from a homogenous group. A
preschooler's rendition of an event will differ markedly from an ado-
lescentis version. Such children are at quite different stages of devel-
opment regarding cognition, memory, social skills, communicative
ability, and emotional maturity. While it is clear that young children
differ from older children, and that children as a group differ from
adults bn some dimensions of testimonial capacity, differences alone
do not undermine children's ability to testify. The real question is
whether these differences render children of certain ages unreliable
witnesses.
Taken as a whole, the research and theory in the field of child de-
velopment suggest that children, like adults, bring both strengths and
weaknesses to the task of testifying. Children can demonstrate adult-
like reliability when testifying about certain kinds of information,
under certain conditions.399 In other situations, regarding other types
of information, children perform less well than adults.400 To further
complicate matters, there are conditions under which children per-
form better than adults. For example, children sometimes remember
Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL
BEHAV. 585 (1974)(broken glass at scene of auto accident).
398. For studies devoted to child testimony research see PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S
TESTIMONY (S. Ceci, D. Ross & M. Toglia eds. 1989); CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS
MEMORY (J. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. Ross eds. 1987).
399. Goodman & Reed, Age Differences in Eyewitness Testimony, 10 L. & Hum.
BEHAV. 317 (1986) [hereinafter Goodman & Reed]; King & Yuille, Suggestibility
and the Child Witness, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY (S. Ceci, M. Toglia &
D. Ross eds. 1987); L. Rudy & G. Goodman, Accuracies and Inaccurcies in Chil-
dren's Testimony (submitted for publication) [hereinafter L. Rudy & G. Good-
man]; K. Saywitz, G. Goodman, E. Nicholas & S. Moan, Children's Memories of
Genital Examinations: Implications for Cases of Child Sexual Assault (paper
presented at Biennial Meeting of the Society for Research on Child Development,
April 30, 1989, Kansas City, Mo.) [hereinafter K. Saywitz].
400. Chance & Goldstein, Face-Recognition Memory: Implications for Children's Eye-
witness Testimony, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 69 (1984). Young children experience more
difficulty than adults in recognizing unfamiliar or disguised faces.
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details that adults overlook.40 ' Thus, it would be quite wrong to sug-
gest that children are uniformly less reliable witnesses than adults.
a. Memory
Do children have a general memory deficit that renders their testi-
mony untrustworthy? Research suggests that children possess the
memory skills required to testify.40 2 Children's memories are particu-
larly good for events that are personally meaningful and salient. Ad-
ditionally, children tend to remember the familiar better than the
unfaniliar.403
One of the most stable findings of memory research is that young
children spontaneously recall less information than older children and
adults.404 This is not to say that young children necessarily remember
less, but that their developing memories are not as proficient at the
complex task of free recall.405 Young children have not mastered the
memory strategies that older children and adults use to trigger recol-
lection.406 Therefore, when young children are asked to "tell what
happened," they often provide less information than older subjects.407
401. Chi, Knowledge Structures and Memory Development, in CHILDREN'S THINKING:
WHAT DEVELOPS? 73 (R. Siegler ed. 1978); Neisser, The Control of Information
Pickup in Selective Looking, in PERCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT. A TRIBUTE TO
ELEANOR GIBSON 210 (A. Pick ed. 1979).
402. See G. MELTON, supra note 50, § 5.06, at 102, where the authors write: "In sum,
the available data suggest that, given simple, supportive questions, even young
children generally have sufficient memory skills to respond to the recall demands
of testimony." See also Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 L. HUM.
BEHAV. 73, 77 (1981).
403. Melton & Thompson, supra note 392: Lindberg, Is Knowledge Base Development
a Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Memory Development?, 30 J. EXPERI-
MENTAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 401 (1980); Renniger & Wozniak, Effects of Interest
Attentional Shift Recognition, and Recall in Young Children, 21 DEVELOPMEN-
TAL PSYCHOLOGY 624 (1985); L. Rudy & G. Goodman, supra note 399.
404. Cole & Loftus, The Memory of Children, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY
179, 181 (S. Ceci, M. Toglia & Ross eds. 1987); Saywitz, Children's Testimony:
Age-Related Patterns of Memory Errors, in CHILDREN'S EYEVITNESS MEMORY 36
(S. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. Ross eds. 1987).
405. A child uses free recall memory when the child remembers an event without the
aid of memory cues or specific questions.
406. Adults and older children employ a number of memory strategies to retrieve in-
formation from memory. The classic example is tying a string around the finger.
Another simple example is rehearsing a phone number until it is memorized.
Young children do not spontaneously employ such memory strategies. Develop-
ment of memory strategies is a gradual process. "A great deal of the development
of the strategic skills necessary for recall occurs between the ages of 5 and 10
years." Zaragoza, Memory, Suggestibility, and Eyewitness Testimony in Chil-
dren and Adults, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 61, 65 (S. Ceci, M. Toglia &
D. Ross eds. 1987).
407. Six-year-olds typically provide less information on free recall than older children
and adults. Three-year-olds provide less than six-year-olds. By about age 12, chil-
dren provide the same amount of information on free recall as adults. See Cole &
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For example, by age three, children are quite adept at narrating auto-
biographical events from memory, such as eating lunch at McDon-
ald's.408 However, a three-year-old's account of the McDonald's
expedition may be little more than a skeletal outline, whereas the de-
scription provided by the preschooler's big sister might be rich in de-
tail, including the fact that sister had a large order of "fries," a "vanilla
shake," and a "cheese burger." The preschooler's description of lunch
provides less detail, but this fact should not be interpreted as under-
mining the accuracy of what the child does remember.409 Research
indicates that young children remember core elements of simple
events with acceptable accuracy.410
Because preschool children commonly provide less information on
free recall than older children, it is often necessary to ask
preschoolers more questions to elicit what they know. And yet, the
children who are most likely to need extensive and directed question-
ing are the very ones who may be most susceptible to misleading sug-
gestion. When this Catch-22 is combined with the fact that many
victims of suspected sexual abuse are subjected to a series of inter-
views, some of which may be conducted by poorly trained people lack-
ing objectivity, concerns arise. This is not to say that young children
who have undergone multiple interviews do not tell the truth. It is
simply a recognition that developmental differences between adults
and young children are sometimes relevant when considering chil-
dren's testimony.
Research indicates that if questioning takes the form of concrete,
understandable, and objective questions, five-year-olds tend to re-
Loftus, supra note 404, at 205; Goodman, Aman & Hirschman, Child Sexual and
Physical Abuse: Children's Testimony, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNEss MEMORY 1, 11
(S. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. Ross eds. 1987); Saywitz, Children's Testimony: Age-Re-
lated Patterns of Memory Errors, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 36 (S. Ceci.
M. Toglia & D. Ross eds. 1987).
408. Nelson, How Children Represent Their World In and Out of Language: A Pre-
liminary Report, in CHILDREN'S THINKING: WHAT DEVELOPS? (R. Seigler ed.
1979); Nelson, Fivush, Hudson & Lucariello, Scripts and the Development of
Memory, in CURRENT TRENDS IN MEMORY DEV. RES. 52 (M. Chi ed. 1983); Nelson
& Gruendel, At Morning Its Lunchtime: A Scriptal View of Children's Dia-
logues, 2 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 73 (1979); Nelson & Gruendel, Generalized Event
Representations: Basic Building Blocks of Cognitive Development, 1 ADVANCES
IN DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 131 (M. Lamb & A. Brown eds. 1981); Todd & Perlmutter,
Reality Recalled by Preschool Children, in CHILDREN'S MEMORY: NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN CHILD DEV. 69 (M. Perlmutter ed. 1980).
409. See Cole & Loftus, supra note 404, at 178, 182, 183, 205. "The information freely
recalled by children tends to be as accurate as adult accounts." Id. at 205; Good-
man, Aman & Hirschman, supra note 407, at 12.
410. Goodman & Reed, supra note 399; Melton & Thompson, supra note 392; L. Rudy




spond as accurately as adults.4 11 Children, like adults, are better at
remembering central details than they are at remembering peripheral
details, such as room decor. There is some evidence children recall
actions better than objects.4 12 Children can generally recall simple,
familiar events in correct chronological order. However, children
have difficulty with the chronological order of complex, unfamiliar
events.
Sometimes children's difficulty remembering peripheral details
and chronological order of complex events makes their descriptions of
events seem inconsistent. For example, when a child describes sexual
abuse to a number of successive interviewers, the child may be incon-
sistent about certain peripheral details. The child may also be mis-
taken or inconsistent about chronological ordering of events. Such
inconsistency is developmentally normal in young children. Thus, it
would be a mistake to question the accuracy of the child's description
of essential elements of sexual abuse simply because of inconsistencies
regarding peripheral details or chronological order.413 What is impor-
tant is consistency regarding personally significant core events, not de-
tails and sequence.
When children make memory errors, they tend to make errors of
omission rather than commission.414 That is, children are more likely
to forget or deny information than to fabricate events that did not
occur.
b. Inconsistency
Do inconsistencies in children's testimony render children unrelia-
ble?415 Consistency is a critical factor in judging witness credibility.
Children's reports tend to appear less consistent than those of adults.
However, when children's inconsistency is properly understood, it
does not necessarily undermine testimony from young witnesses.
Children have difficulty systematically evaluating their communi-
cations for possible errors, omissions, inconsistencies, or contradic-
411. Goodman & Reed, supra note 399; Matin, Holmes, Guth & Kovacs, The Potential
of Children as Eyewitnesses, 3 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 295 (1979).
412. Jones, Swift & Johnson, Nondeliberate Memory for a Novel Event Among
Preschoolers, 24 DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 641 (1988).
413. Goodman & Hegelson, Child Sexual Assault Children's Memory and the Law, in
PAPERS FROM A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFORMS IN CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 41 (J. Bulkley ed. 1986); Saywitz, supra note 407.
414. Goodman & Hegelson, supra note 413; K. Saywitz, G. Goodman, E. Nicholas & S.
Moan, A New Look at Suggestibility (paper presented at a conference of the
American Psychology-Law Society, Miami, Fla., Mar. 1988) [hereinafter K.
Saywitz, New Look].
415. For cases discussing expert testimony to rehabilitate a child whose credibility has
been impeached because of inconsistencies see supra note 377.
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tions.416 Additionally, young children sometimes have difficulty
seeing a situation from another person's perspective.4 17 One conse-
quence of this egocentric perspective is that, unlike adults, children
may be unable to protect themselves against the appearance of incon-
sistency. When adults realize their messages are being misunderstood,
they stop and clarify. By contrast, young children, who have difficulty
assuming another person's perspective, do not perceive that they are
being misunderstood. Thus, they do not realize the need to stop and
clarify. Children's normal developmental limitations in monitoring
communications make it difficult for them to recognize and correct
inconsistencies in their descriptions of events. Such limitations should
not be misinterpreted as indicators of poor memory, or worse.
Apparent contradictions or unbelievable comments often result
from children's immature reasoning skills. For example, at times
preschoolers reason from one thought to the next without logically
connecting ideas. During early stages of causal reasoning, children
generalize in illogical ways as they make up explanations for what
they observe around them. Before such misperceptions are corrected
by parents and teachers, children may baffle adults who know little
about child development. In an oft-cited example, a preschooler in-
sisted that a dog could cause a train to appear.4 18 How? By barking.
The youngster reasoned that the train went by because the dog
barked. The child did not comprehend what seems self-evident to
adults: The dog barked because the train went by. The child was mis-
taken about the causal relationship between train and dog, but observe
that the boy was correct about the essential facts. If the boy was called
as a witness in a case where it was relevant to prove that a train went
by or that a dog barked, the child's mistaken (but developmentally
understandable) reasoning about causation should not serve to dis-
qualify him as a witness. The youngster is capable of describing the
train and the dog. Illogical comments from children utilizing imma-
ture reasoning can be understood with reference to the literature on
child development.
A jury's assessment of a child's credibility can also be influenced by
the phrasing of questions during direct and cross-examination. Chil-
dren are often asked questions about abstract concepts they do not
understand, in language they do not comprehend. Children's re-
sponses are frequently misinterpreted as inconsistencies, or even re-
416. Flavell, Cognitive Monitoring, in CHILDREN'S ORAL COMMUNICATION SKILLS 35
(W. Dickson ed. 1981); Singer & Flavell, Development of Knowledge About Corn-
munication.: Children's Evaluations of Explicitly Ambiguous Messages, 52 CHILD
DEV. 1211 (1981).
417. Selman & Byrne, A Structural Developmental Analysis of Levels of Role Taking
in Middle Childhood, 45 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 803 (1974).
418. D. SINGER & T. REVENSON, HoW A CHILD THINKS (1978).
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cantations, instead of misunderstandings. For example, suppose a
young witness is developmentally capable of understanding simple
sentences six to eight words in length. The child is asked a complex
question thirty words long, containing double negatives and embedded
clauses. The youngster may respond to a part of the question that the
child understood, and ignore other parts that are crucial to adult un-
derstanding of the question and answer. Of course, the problem here
lies with the question, not with the child. Yet, adults probably will not
realize that the question is developmentally inappropriate, and may
conclude, incorrectly, that the child is a poor witness.
Young children often fail to monitor how well they understand
messages from adults.419 This developmentally understandable short-
coming can undermine children's performance on the witness stand.
In one study, children were given instructions that omitted vital infor-
mation. Nevertheless, six-year-olds claimed to understand the in-
structions. Eight-year-olds, on the other hand, were likely to ask for
more information. The older children recognized that they did not
understand.42 0 In another study, children were told that they could
ask clarifying questions. Young children almost never spontaneously
questioned the speaker or requested more information, even when the
information they were receiving was completely uninformative. 421
These studies indicate that children have difficulty assessing what
they do not know.422 This lack of understanding limits children's
ability to request clarification from adults, and may lead children to
attempt to answer questions they do not comprehend. Unfortunately,
young children rarely announce that they do not understand, and, as a
consequence, children often seem less capable on the stand than they
really are.
In one further example, consider how often young children who
have not learned to count are asked how many times something hap-
pened. A child may be capable of saying that something happened a
lot or a little, or once or many times, but may be developmentally inca-
pable of stating that it happened five times or ten. Unfortunately, be-
419. E. OCHS & B. SCHIEFFLIN, DEVELOPMENTAL PRAGMATICS (1979); Flavell, Speer,
Green & August, The Development of Comprehension Monitoring and Knowl-
edge About Communication, 46 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOC'Y FOR RES. ON CHILD
DEV. (Serial No. 192 1981) [hereinafter Flavell].
420. Markman, Realizing That You Don't Understand Elementary School Children's
Awareness of Inconsistencies, 50 CHILD DEV. 543 (1979); Markman, Realizing
That You Don't Understand: A Preliminary Investigation, 48 CHILD DEV. 986
(1977).
421. Cosgrove & Patterson, Plans and the Development of Listening Skills, 13 DEV.
PSYCHOLOGY 557 (1977) [hereinafter Cosgrove & Patterson]; Patterson, Massad &
Cosgrove, Children's Referential Communication: Components of Plans for Ff-
fective Listening, 14 DEv. PSYCHOLOGY 401 (1978).
422. W. DICKSON, CHILDREN'S ORAL COMMUNICATION SKILLS (1981).
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cause the child realizes that he must speak, and that a room full of
adults is waiting for his answer, he may attempt to answer the ques-
tion even though he does not understand it. The youngster may say
"five"-not because that is how many times it happened, but because
he is familiar with the number five, and feels compelled to say some-
thing. His answer could as well have been "five thousand." The
child's misleading and irrelevant response was elicited because of the
pressure to answer, and because young children do not understand
that they can ask for clarification when they do not understand.42 3
This phenomenon can result in inconsistent or contradictory testi-
mony. Adults must take the responsibility to ask questions children
can understand.
c. Suggestibility
Are children so suggestible that their testimony should be re-
jected? There is legitimate concern that children's reports of sexual
abuse become a blend of their initial memory plus information sug-
gested by interviewers, parents, or attorneys. But adults are suggesti-
ble too, and modern research is rapidly exploding the old bromide that
children are always highly suggestible.
Defense counsel sometimes hopes to capitalize on the possibility of
suggestibility by arguing that a person who interviewed a child em-
ployed leading questions that may have misled the child into inaccu-
rate or false allegations of abuse. In some cases the argument has
merit. It is important to point out, however, that the developmental
limitations of young children sometimes necessitates careful use of
leading and specific questions. Put another way, from a developmen-
tal perspective, it is sometimes necessary and proper to use question-
ing techniques with children that might be inappropriate with older
children and adults. Furthermore, research discloses that young chil-
dren are more resistant to suggestive questioning than many adults
believe.424
Psychological studies of suggestibility are often structured as fol-
lows. Subjects are exposed to an original event. An objective record is
made of the event. After some period of time, subjects are inter-
viewed about the original event. During the interview, subjects are
asked misleading and suggestive questions. By contrasting a subject's
performance during the interview with the record of the original
event, researchers can evaluate the influence of suggestive
questioning
423. Flavell, supra note 419; Cosgrove & Patterson, supra note 421.
424. Everson & Boat, False Allegations of Sexual Abuse by Children and Adolescents,
28 J. Am. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 230 (1989); L. Rudy & G.
Goodman, supra note 399.
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Studies in this mold vary greatly in their method of introducing
suggestive and misleading information, retention interval, type of
stimuli, and relevance to real life events such as crimes. Conse-
quently, results are difficult to compare and integrate. Overall, stud-
ies have not converged on a simple relationship between age and
suggestibility.425 When and if a person is suggestible depends on cog-
nitive, social, and situational factors such as the level of interest and
salience of the event, and the emotional state and knowledge base of
the subject, as well as the status of the person suggesting the
information.
Researchers consistently find that children ten to eleven years of
age are no more suggestible than adults.426 Four- to nine-year-olds are
sometimes more suggestible than older children. Young children may
be particularly subject to the influence of suggestion regarding periph-
eral details and unfamiliar events.427 Resistance to suggestion appears
to be highest concerning the core aspects of familiar events.
Research findings regarding suggestibility of four- to nine-year-old
children are not entirely consistent, and methodological limitations of
some studies make findings difficult to interpret. For example, a
number of studies examine children's memories for unfamiliar, innoc-
uous stimuli (words, pictures, stories, or videotapes), following a single
exposure under nonstressful conditions. Questions asked during such
experiments are rarely important to the child's life. Nor do the ques-
tions relate to physical acts perpetrated upon the children. Goodman
and Hegelson caution against generalizing from such studies to chil-
dren's suggestibility regarding real life events such as sexual abuse.428
In recent years, studies have been designed which have greater eco-
logical validity in that they more closely approximate aspects of chil-
dren's experiences during real-life events. For example, researchers
have studied children's memories for stressful events such as a visit to
the doctor for an injection or to have blood drawn.42 9 Researchers
have also staged live events that have some similarity to criminal situ-
ations. In one study, for example, children were taken to an unfamil-
425. Zaragoza, Memory, Suggestibility, and Eyewitness Testimony in Children and
Adults, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 53, 73 (J. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. Ross
eds. 1987) ("at this point it can be concluded with some confidence that young
children are not more suggestible than adults in all circumstances"); Cole & Lof-
tus, supra note 404; Loftus & Davies, Distortions in the Memory of Children, 40 J.
Soc. IssuEs 51 (1984).
426. Cole & Loftus, supra note 404, at 195 ("The developmental studies discussed so
far have consistently demonstrated that by the age of 10 or 11 years, children are
no more vulnerable to suggestion than adults.").
427. Goodman, Aman & Hirschman, supra note 407; King & YuiUe, Suggestibility and
the Child Witness, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 24 (J. Ceci, M. Toglia &
D. Ross eds. 1987).
428. Goodman & Hegelson, supra note 413.
429. Goodman, Aman & Hirschman, supra note 407.
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iar room, where they played games with a stranger.4 30 After playing
games, children as young as three years of age were asked questions.
Some of the questions were leading and suggestive. For example, chil-
dren were asked, "He took your clothes off, didn't he?"; "He put
something in your mouth, isn't that right?"; and "Did he kiss you?"431
Results of this study indicate that the memories of three- to six-year-
olds were not affected by the stress of the event. Moreover, four- to
seven-year-olds were not more easily misled into making false reports
of abuse than older children. Four- to seven-year-olds continued to be
resistant to misleading suggestions a year later. While three-year-olds
were more suggestible than older children, even three-year-olds were
able to resist suggestive questioning most of the time.
Thel'e is some evidence to suggest that young children are suscepti-
ble to social pressures to say what they think adults want to hear in
the context of an interview.432 In one study, when a child rather than
an adult authority figure presented misleading information, the effect
of misleading questions decreased, although it did not disappear.43 3
This study suggests that at least some of the suggestibility found in
young children is due to demand characteristics. Interestingly, some
studies suggest that although children may go along with certain sug-
gestions during an interview, their original memory for the event is
not actually changed by the suggested information. An accurate mem-
ory can be elicited at a later time.434
In summary, there is little evidence that children four years of age
and over are more suggestible than adults regarding central aspects of
events that are salient and meaningful, well understood, and directly
experienced.435 In particular, attempts to lead four- to seven-year-old
children into making false reports of abuse have been largely
unsuccessful.436
It is important to keep in mind that the studies discussed above do
not examine children's suggestibility or memory with regard to trau-
430. L. Rudy & G. Goodman, supra note 399.
431. Goodman, Aman & Hirschman, supra note 407.
432. Ceci, Ross & Toglia, Age Differences in Suggestibility: Narrowing the Uncertain-
ties, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 79 (J. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. Ross eds.
1987) [hereinafter Cecil; J. Baxter & G. Davies, Conformity and the Child Wit-
ness (paper presented at a meeting of the Society for Research on Child Develop-
ment, Baltimore, Md., April 1987); J. Baxter & G. Davies, The Suggestibility of
Child Witnesses (unpublished manuscript, 1985).
433. Ceci, supra note 432.
434. Zaragoza, supra note 425, at 52; J. Popp & M. Zaragoza, Suggestibility of Eyewit-
ness Memory in Preschoolers (paper presented at a meeting of the American Psy-
chological Association, New York, N.Y., Aug. 1987). Some researchers believe
that the original memory is replaced by misleading information. See Cole & Lof-
tus, supra note 404. More research is needed to clarify this issue.
435. Melton & Thompson, supra note 392.
436. L. Rudy & G. Goodman, supra note 399; K. Saywitz, supra, note 399.
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matic events. Children may recall traumatic events with more or less
accuracy than they recall events involving mild discomfort, such as
doctor visits. Moreover, some child abuse victims suffer from psychi-
atric disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder or depression
which may either enhance or distort memory for an event. Studies of
suggestibility in psychologically disturbed children are not yet
available.
d. Differentiating Fact from Fantasy
Are children so prone to confuse fantasy and reality that their tes-
timony is unreliable? Developmental theorists, including Freud437
and Piaget,438 have suggested that children routinely confuse reality
with fantasy. Researchers have not found evidence to support Freud's
notion of infantile hallucination, nor does experimental work bear out
Piaget's belief that children are so egocentric that they routinely fail
to distinguish reality from fantasy.439 Thus, it would be misleading to
say that children cannot distinguish what is real from what is
imagined. Modern research suggests that children are less likely than
adults to differentiate fact from fantasy in some situations, but not
others.44 0
While children use pretend in their play, they seem to know when
they are pretending. During play tea parties, for example,
preschoolers take pretend sips from empty cups, but they do not really
attempt to eat plastic cookies.441 It is obvious that children do not live
entirely in a fantasy world, yet fantasy and pretend are a part of their
world. Rather than absorbing the adult view of reality, preschoolers
spontaneously make up explanations for what they observe around
them as they construct their own view of how the world operates.
Feedback from adults serves to correct any misunderstandings chil-
dren develop.
Turning to another aspect of the distinction between fact and fan-
tasy, researchers have examined children's and adult's ability to dis-
criminate between fresh memories of an event itself, memories of
437. Freud, Two Principles of Mental Functioning, in 12 THE STANDARD EDITION OF
THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 218 (J. Strachey ed. &
trans. 1985)(original work published in 1911).
438. See J. PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND REASONING IN THE CHILD (1928); J. PIAGET, PLAY,
DREAMS, AND IMITATION IN CHILDHOOD (1951); J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT
OF THE CHILD (1932).
439. J. FLAVELL, COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT (1977); P. MILLER, THEORIES OF DEVELOP-
MENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (1983); Lindsay & Johnson, Reality Monitoring and Sug-
gestibility: Children's Ability to Discriminate Among Memories from Different
Sources, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 92 (J. Ceci. M. Toglia & D. Ross
eds. 1987).
440. Lindsay & Johnson, supra note 439.
441. See C. GARVEY, PLAY (1977), on the development of play.
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one's later thoughts about the event, and memories of what other peo-
ple have said about the event (perhaps as witnesses discuss the event
with each other or their parents). Johnson and her colleagues442 re-
port that young children (i.e., six-year-olds) show a deficit in some of
these areas, but not in others.
In Johnson's studies, children were no more confused than adults
when asked to discriminate what they saw someone else do or say
from what they themselves did or said. Children were not more likely
than adults to confuse memories of what two other people did or said.
In other words, children accurately remembered who said and did
what. Eight- through ten-year-olds made no more errors than adults
in estimating the number of times they actually saw something, as
compared to the number of times they only imagined seeing it.443
However, six-year-olds had more difficulty than adults in discriminat-
ing memories of what they themselves had said or done from what
they had only imagined themselves saying or doing. While adults also
showed confusion on this latter task, children did so to a greater
degree.444
Johnson notes that the relevance of these findings for children's
testimony may be limited by the fact that the stimuli used in the ex-
periments were artificial and were not embedded in any context that
was meaningful to children's lives. In contrast, crimes are likely to be
compelling, vivid, and important. Children in research studies, who
are instructed to imagine an event or object, may be performing dif-
ferent mental processes than children spontaneously fantasizing about
an event.
At this point, there is insufficient scientific evidence to support an
argument that children's testimony should be excluded because chil-
dren cannot differentiate fact from fantasy.
e. Understanding Time
Should a child's inability to locate an event in time render the
child's testimony suspect? The developmental answer is no. It is very
difficult, if not impossible, for young children to specify the date and
time of a past event, especially when the memory is embedded in a
series of similar ongoing acts. Time is a very complicated, abstract
concept. Infants are not born with a sense of time. They are not
aware of time as an objective concept. Children continue to learn how
442. Johnson & Foley, Differentiating Fact From Fantasy: The Reliability of Chid-
lren's Memory, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs 33 (1984); Johnson, Raye, Hasher & Chromiak,
Are There Developmental Differences in Reality Monitoring?, 27 J. EXPERIMIEN-
TA. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 120 (1979); Lindsay & Johnson, supra note 439.
443. See supra note 442.
444. Foley, Johnson & Raye, Age Related Changes in Confusions Between Memories
for Thoughts and Memories for Speech, 54 CHILD DEV. 51 (1983).
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to place events in time well into adolescence.445
Adults reason backward through time to determine approximately
when something occurred. Adult reasoning is aided by knowledge of
the daily and annual cycle of time. Young children have limited expe-
rience and knowledge on which to base their reconstructions of past
events. Children also have limited language skills for describing the
timing of events, limited number skills for estimating duration and
succession, limited ability to count, and limited knowledge of the arbi-
trary and abstract conventional systems for measuring time, such as
minutes, hours, months, and years. Until children learn the conven-
tional systems of measuring time, adult reasoning processes about
time are not available to them.
Child development researchers have been studying children's un-
derstanding of time concepts since the 1920s. The results suggest that
it is not until adolescence that children fully master the concept of
time.44 6 Preschoolers are aware of the timing of their daily routines,
but they tend to place events in time on the basis of their own personal
experiences. As a result, they may believe that time actually goes
faster when they are playing hard and slower when they are bored, or
that sand falls faster through an hourglass when they are busy. Young
children do not understand that there is a continual flow of time in-
dependent of their feelings and actions. For preschoolers, a long time
ago can be last week or last year.
Between six to eight years of age, children begin to develop a con-
cept of conventional systems for measuring time. Children can recite
the days of the week and the seasons of the year, although this does
not necessarily imply more than rote memorization.447 Usually by age
seven, children can match pictures of the holidays with the appropri-
ate month.448 However, it is not until age eight or nine that children
can order the months accurately, and can understand that there is a
constant flow of time that applies to everyone, and is independent of
their own activities." 9 Most children learn to read the hands of the
clock by second grade, but such youngsters still may not understand
the relationship between clock time, calendar time, and historical
time. It is not until eleven years of age that most children understand
the distinction between the natural cycles (seasons, months) and arbi-
trary cycles (days of the week, numbering of years) of time measure-
ment. Complete understanding of calendar and historical time is not
445. THE DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME (W. Friedman ed. 1982).
446. Id.
447. Friedman, Conventional Time Concepts and Children's Structuring of Time, in
THE DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME 171 (W. Friedman ed. 1982).
448. Friedman, The Development of Children's Understanding of Cyclic Aspects of
Time, 48 CHILD DEV. 1593 (1977).
449. Friedman, supra note 447.
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accomplished by a majority of children until approximately sixteen
years of age.450
In one study, five- and seven-year-old children were interviewed
about a physical examination that occurred a week or month
before.451 Only eighteen percent of the children could provide infor-
mation about the day on which the examination occurred (e.g., day of
the week, or month; or that the examination was a week or month
ago). Only seventeen percent of the five-year-olds, and thirty-three
percent of the seven-year-olds, could estimate the duration of the
thirty-minute examination to within fifteen minutes. Only half the
children could tell whether the examination occurred during the week
or on the weekend. Questions about the time and date of the examina-
tion were the most difficult of all for the children. By contrast, chil-
dren were much more accurate when asked to describe the doctor, the
setting, and the actions that occurred (e.g., which parts of their bodies
were checked and in what manner). The results of this study high-
light the fact that while young children cannot identify the exact date
and time of an event, this inability has little bearing on their ability to
accurately recount events they have experienced.
The fact that children have very limited ability to specify the date
and time of specific acts does not imply that what they recall is any
less accurate than if they could attach a date or time. Moreover,
adults can often reconstruct the time and date from information pro-
vided by a child. For example, although a child's inability to tell time
may preclude the child from stating what time the defendant came
into the room, the youngster may remember what program was on
television at the time. Equipped with this information, adults can re-
construct the time by consulting the television guide.
2. Behavioral Science Testimony Regarding Developmental
Differences Between Children and Adults
When the defense seeks to undermine a child's credibility by as-
serting that developmental differences between children and adults
render children less credible than adults, it is sometimes appropriate
to admit rebuttal evidence in the form of expert testimony.452 For ex-
ample, the defense might argue that inconsistencies in a young child's
description of abuse mean the child is lying. As jurors evaluate the
child's impeached credibility, they could benefit from expert testi-
mony informing them that inconsistency is developmentally normal in
450. Friedman, Development of Time Concepts in Children, in ADVANCES IN CHILD
DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 267 (H. Reese & L. Lipsitt eds. 1978).
451. K. Saywitz, supra note 399.
452. See Saywitz, The Child Witness: Experimental and Clinical Considerations, in
THROUGH THE EYES OF A CHILD: OBTAINING SELF REPORTS FROM CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS (A. LaGrecca ed. in press).
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young children. Such information is beyond the ken of the average
juror.
The defense may attempt to convince the jury that young children
are so suggestible that their testimony should be regarded with skepti-
cism. The defense may illustrate the point during cross-examination
by plying the child with suggestive questions that lead the child into
providing inaccurate information. 453 The defense may point out that
the child was interviewed numerous times, and that there was ample
opportunity to plant the idea of abuse in the child's malleable young
mind.4 54 Jurors may accept the argument that young children are
dangerously suggestible. Faced with such impeachment, the state has
a legitimate need to rehabilitate the child. The average juror is una-
ware of recent psychological research indicating that young children
are not always more suggestible than older children and adults. To
the extent the defense asserts the contrary, expert rebuttal testimony
is proper.
A final example illustrates the occasional need for expert testi-
mony to rehabilitate children's credibility. The defense may argue
that young children cannot differentiate fact from fantasy, and that
the child in the case at hand lives in a fantasy world. Counsel might
turn to the jury and say, "Ladies and gentleman, can you believe the
testimony of this young child, who admits that she has an imaginary
friend named Julius the Rabbit, and that Julius talks to her?" Fan-
tasy plays important part in children's lives, but the professional liter-
ature indicates that even young children can distinguish real from
pretend. If counsel paints an iiaccurate picture of a child's ability in
this regard, expert rebuttal testimony is warranted.
There is little case law regarding the type of rebuttal testimony
discussed in this subsection.455 However, lack of precedent should not
dissuade courts from permitting expert rebuttal testimony designed
453. For an example of this technique, employed by a skilled trial attorney, see
Yengich, C7ild Sexual Abuse Cases, 1986 UTAH L. REv. 443, 446.
454. In some cases the defense offers its own expert to provide an opinion about the
quality of the interviews to which a child was subjected. The defense expert may
opine that interviewing techniques were improperly leading or suggestive, and
that defective interviewing technique probably contaminated the child's memory.
See People v. Stricklin, 162 Mich. App. 623, 413 N.W.2d 457 (1987)(defense should
have been permitted to introduce expert testimony that children who have been
sexually abused could fantasize about sex).
455. See United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 1986)("Dr. ten Bensel might
have aided the jurors without usurping their exclusive function by generally tes-
tifying about a child's ability to separate truth from fantasy"); Tingle v. State, 535
So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1988); Head v. State, 519 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. 1988)(proper to admit
expert testimony that child was not prone to exaggeration or fantasy); State v.
Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1986)(court held that an expert opinion that a
child is not capable of fantasizing a sexual experience is an impermissible indirect
opinion regarding the child's credibility).
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to acquaint jurors with the developmental capabilities and limits of
young children.
F. Behavioral Science Testimony that a Particular Child, or Sexually
Abused Children as a Class, Generally Tell the Truth About
Sexual Abuse
As previously observed, in child sexual abuse litigation, the child is
often the state's most important witness. Thus, the child's credibility
is critical.456 Expert testimony in the first five categories often has the
indirect effect of bolstering a child's credibility. In the present cate-
gory, by contrast, the expert is asked to comment directly on the credi-
bility o a particular child, or on the credibility of sexually abused
children as a class.457
Before turning to clinical and scientific information on children's
credibility, it is useful to place the credibility issue in historical per-
spective.458 Throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, prbfessionals fueled the widely held belief that children were
unreliable witnesses.459 One early writer asked, "When are we going
to give up, in all civilized nations, listening to children in courts of
law?"460
Sigmund Freud added an additional dimension to suspicion about
children's credibility, especially in sexual abuse cases.461 In 1896
Freud presented a paper entitled "The Aetiology of Hysteria." In this
paper Freud described his seduction theory, in which he theorized that
adult hysteria was related to childhood sexual trauma.462 In reaching
this conclusion, Freud credited as true his patients' claims of child-
hood sexual experience, and broached the possibility of widespread
child sexual abuse. The seduction theory received a chilly reception
from the psychoanalytic community, which ridiculed the idea that
child sexual abuse was commonplace. Within a year, Freud withdrew
the seduction theory and replaced it with the Oedipus complex.
Under the Oedipal theory, Freud attributed his patients' recollections
456. Calloway v. State, 520 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988)("credibility becomes the
focal issue").
457. See Commonwealth v. Pearsall, 368 Pa. Super. 327,534 A.2d 106 (1987)(court drew
distinction between direct and indirect support of credibility).
458. For a more detailed historical discussion of the credibility of sex offense victims
see J. MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH: FREUD'S SUPPRESSION OF THE SEDUC-
TION THEORY (1984); Myers, Protecting Children from Sexual Abuse: What Does
the Future Hold?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LAW 31 (1989); Summit, Hidden Victims, Hid-
den Pain: Societal Avoidance of Child Sexual Abuse, in THE LASTING EFFECTS OF
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (G. Wyatt & G. Powell eds. 1988).
459. See Goodman, supra note 393.
460. Psychologist J. Varendonck, quoted in Goodman, supra note 393.
461. For detailed discussion of Freud's impact, see authorities cited supra note 458.
462. For discussion of Freud's seduction theory, see authorities cited supra note 458.
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of childhood sexual abuse to fantasy rather than reality. Due to
Freud's tremendous influence, children's allegations of sexual abuse
were viewed with new skepticism.463
Freud's impact was far-reaching. His emphasis on sexual fantasy
led many lawyers to doubt the credibility of children's allegations of
abuse. Not the least among them was the brilliant legal scholar John
H. Wigmore. Wigmore was persuaded that a female predilection for
sexual fantasy rendered accusatory testimony from women and girls
particularly suspect. In his treatise on evidence, first published in
1904, Wigmore wrote:
Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young
girls and women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic
complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by dis-
eased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environments,
partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions. One form taken by
these complexes is that of contriving false charges of sexual offenses by men.
The unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds incidental but direct expression in
the narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is the heroine
or the victim. On the surface the narration is straightforward and convincing.
The real victim, however, too often in such cases is the innocent man ....
No judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the fe-
male complainant's social history and mental makeup have been examined
and testified to by a qualified physician.
It is time that the courts awakened to the sinister possibilities of injustice
that lurk in believing such a witness without careful psychiatric scrutiny. 4 6 4
Like Freud, Wigmore was extremely influential. Many courts
adopted Wigmore's suspicions about women and girls in sex offense
cases, with the result that courts regularly subjected females to psy-
chiatric examinations regarding credibility.465 Such examinations
were not imposed on victims of other crimes. Furthermore, many
courts ruled that testimony from sex offense victims was so suspicious
that convictions could not be based on a victim's uncorroborated testi-
mony.4 6 6 Corroboration was not required of victims of other crimes.
Fortunately, during the past thirty years, mental health profes-
sionals altered their views about the propensity of women and girls to
fabricate accusations of rape and molestation. Today, Wigmore's ad-
monition that all sex offense victims should be evaluated is flatly re-
463. See Berliner, supra note 291, where Berliner writes: "Throughout history, accu-
sations of child abuse have been considered suspect. Freud's dismissal of his fe-
male patients' accounts of child sexual abuse established a climate of disbelief in
the psychiatric community. Both cnild and adult reports to counselors and ther-
apists were likely to be labeled as fantasy."
464. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 924(a), at 736-37 (emphasis in original).
465. See, e.g., Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302
(1966); 18 A.L.R.3d 1433 (1968). For criticism of psychiatric examinations in sex
offense cases, see Note, Psychiatric Examination of Sexual Assault Victims: A
Reevaluation, 15 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REv. 973 (1982).
466. See J. MYERS, supra note 2, § 4.21.
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jected as legally467 and psychologically unsound.468 Unfortunately,
however, the legacy of Freudian and Wigmorian thinking continues to
influence the views of some people, placing child victims at a disadvan-
tage from the outset.
1. Clinical and Scientific Information Regarding Credibility469
Three issues are addressed in this subsection. The first relates to
the subjective truthfulness of children. That is, do children under-
stand the difference between truth and falsehood, and are they capa-
ble of deliberate fabrication? When do children acquire the capacity
for deliberate falsehood? Are children more likely to lie than adults?
What factors influence whether children tell the truth?
Following discussion of subjective truthfulness, the focus shifts to
studies of juror's assessments of the credibility of witnesses. The sub-
section concludes with a question: Do experts on child sexual abuse
possess specialized knowledge about the credibility of sexually abused
childreii that is not available to average jurors, and that could assist
fact finders in some cases?
467. See, e.g., People v. King, 41 Colo. App. 177, 581 P.2d 739 (1978); J. MYERS, supra
note 2, § 3.27 (collecting cases). Myers writes:
While courts have properly rejected Wigmore's misguided psychologi-
cal notions about the credibility of women, the great majority of courts
continue to acknowledge that in rare cases it is appropriate to require a
witness-female or male-to undergo a psychiatric evaluation concern-
ing credibility. The decisions repose discretion in the trial judge to order
evaluations on a case-by-case basis. The authorities caution, however,
that trial courts should not order such examinations unless the party
seeking the examination comes forward with compelling reasons
therefore.
J. MYERS, supra note 2, § 3.27, at 119. Some states have gone so far as to prohibit
psychiatric evaluations of victims in sex offense cases. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1112 (West 1988).
468. See State v. Romero, 94 N.M. 22, 606 P.2d 1116 (Ct. App. 1980). While it is entirely
appropriate to reject Wigmore's unfounded suspicisions about women and girls,
some professionals went too far in the opposite direction, asserting that children
never lie, and that allegations should always be believed. Such overstatement
invites criticism of efforts to protect children, and skepticism of professional
knowledge and motives. False allegations are infrequent, but they do occur.
For discussion of assertions that children do not lie about sexual abuse see
Benedek & Schetky, Problems in Validating Allegations of Sexual Abuse. Part 1:
Factors Affecting Perception and Recall of Events, 26 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADO-
LESCENT PSYCHIATRY 912, 914 (1987) ("Unfortunatly, some clinicians still adhere
to the myth that children never lie, despite the fact they themselves may be par-
ents of normal children who 'fib.' "); Faller, Is the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse
Telling the Truth?, 8 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 473 (1984); Yates & Musty, Pre-
school Children's Erroneous Allegations of Sexual Molestation, 145 AM. J. PSYCHI-
ATRY 989, 989 (1988)("Until recently, the sine qua non of sexual abuse
investigations has been that 'children don't lie' about molestation.").




Children as young as one and one-half are capable of misstating the
truth. However, deliberate lying is rare among young children. While
preschool and elementary-school-aged children are capable of lying,
Berliner notes that "there is no evidence that honesty increases with
age .... This means that children, like adults, may lie, but that there
is no need to be more concerned about lying among children."470 Mel-
ton writes that "[t]here is in fact little correlation between age and
honesty." 471
While young children are able to lie, they are not very good at it.
Quinn observes that "[c]urrent studies indicate that children under
seven are unlikely to be successful telling a lie. By fourth and fifth
grade, however, children become more proficient at telling lies."472 A
young child is unlikely to succeed at maintaining a conscious
fabrication about sexual abuse over time.47 3
Situational factors influence the moral decisions of adults and chil-
dren.474 A child's decision to stray from the truth or engage in other
improper behavior may be influenced by peer pressure, pressure from
influential adults, the likelihood of detection, motive to fabricate, de-
sire to engage in the prohibited activity, and attempts to escape blame
or punishment. Every parent knows that many normal, happy three-
and four-year-olds deny guilt when caught red-handed in the cookie
jar.
While children are capable of deliberate falsehood, clinical experi-
ence and research disclose that children rarely fabricate false allega-
tions of sexual abuse.475 Jones and McGraw write that "from a
470. Berliner, supra note 291. See also Burton, Honesty and Dishonesty, in MORAL
DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR (T. Licona ed. 1976); G. MELTON, supra note 50,
where the authors write:
There is in fact little correlation between age and honesty.... Where
there is a developmental trend, though, is in the reasons that children
give to justify behavior. As children grow older, they become more soci-
ocentric and oriented toward respect for persons.... Where immature
moral development may be a factor is in suggestibility. Young children
tend to perceive rules as "morally absolute," unchangeable, and be-
stowed by authority. Therefore, they may confuse suggestions of an
adult authority figure with the truth.
471. Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 73, 79 (1981).
472. Quinn, The Credibility of Children's Allegations of SexualAbuse, 6 BEHAV. SC. &
L. 181 (1988).
473. See Yates & Musty, supra note 468, at 992 ("In our experience, young children
rarely or never sustain fabrications about sexual molestation.").
474. E. HALL, M. LAMB & M. PERLMUTTER, CHILD PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 505
(1986)("even when a child develops a general tendency to resist or to succumb to
temptation, the conditions surrounding each moral choice will have a strong ef-
fect on the child's final decision").
475. See Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40
J. Soc. IsSUES 125, 127 (1984), where the authors write:
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clinical perspective, false reports of sexual abuse to children are gen-
erally considered to be an unusual occurrence." 476 Benedek and
Schetky state that in their "experience in evaluating cases of alleged
sexual abuse in children and adolescents, we have found them gener-
ally to be truthful."477
A small number of systematic studies of false allegations exist.478
Jones and McGraw evaluated all cases of suspected child sexual abuse
which were reported to the Denver Social Services Department dur-
ing 1983.479 The research disclosed that eight percent of the reports
were probably fictitious. Most of the fabricated reports came from
adults. Very few were generated by children. Similar figures for
fabricated allegations are found in other research. Peters studied
sixty-four cases, and concluded that six percent of the allegations
probably were false.480 Goodwin, Sahd, and Rada evaluated forty-six
cases and concluded that three were probably fabricated (6.5 per-
cent).481 Horowitz and colleagues evaluated 181 cases and determined
that approximately five percent of the children's reports and ten per-
cent of other reports were untrue.48 2 Katz and Mazur studied adult
rape victims, and concluded that two percent of allegations were
false.483 The findings of these studies are compatible with clinical ex-
While adults are often skeptical when children report sexual abuse,
especially by those in or close to the family, there is little or no evidence
indicating that children's reports are unreliable, and none at all to sup-
port the fear that children often make false accusations of sexual assault
or misunderstand innocent behavior by adults. The general veracity of
children's reports is supported by relatively high rates of admission by
offenders. Not a single study has ever found false accusations of sexual
assault a plausible interpretation of a substantial portion of cases.
In addition to clinical experience, experimental work conducted by
Gail Goodman and her colleagues indicates that children are unlikely to
make up stories of abuse. Goodman, Aman & Hirschman report that in
their experiments, "children never made up false stories of abuse even
when asked questions that might foster such reports."
476. Jones & McGraw, Reliable and Fictitious Accounts of Sexual Abuse to Children, 2
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 27, 28 (1987). See also Goodwin, Sahd & Rada, False
Accusations and False Denials of Incest: Clinical Mfyths and Clinical Realities, in
SEXUAL ABUSE: INCEST VICTIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES 17 (Goodwin ed. 1982); Pe-
ters, Children Who are Victims of Sexual Assault and the Psychology of Offend-
ers, 30 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 598 (1976).
477. Benedek & Schetky, supra note 468. See also Faller, supra note 468.
478. For discussion of the available studies see Berliner, supra note 291, at 51-52;
Quinn, supra note 472; Sink, Studies of True and False Allegations: A Critical
Review, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 37
(B. Nicholson & J. Bulkley eds. 1988).
479. Jones & McGraw, supra note 476.
480. Peters, supra note 476.
481. Goodwin, Sahd & Rada, supra note 476.
482. J. Horowitz, P. Salt, B. Gomes-Schwartz & M. Sauzier, False Allegations of Child
Sexual Abuse (unpublished paper, 1985).
483. S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM 214 (1979).
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perience. Deliberate false allegations of sexual abuse are rare.
Among the small number of false allegations, most are made by par-
ents, not children.484
In the context of child custody and visitation disputes, several au-
thors report rates of fabricated sexual abuse that are much higher
than those discussed above.48 5 For example, Green evaluated eleven
children and concluded that four of the allegations were false (thirty-
six percent).486 Benedek and Schetky could not document abuse in
ten of eighteen cases (fifty-five percent).48 7 Commenting on these
studies, Quinn observes that "these are very small clinical samples
with a selective pattern of referrals." 48 8 Berliner adds that these and
similar articles "describe a limited number of cases referred for evalu-
ation.... In most of the cases described, there were multiple evalua-
tions and conflicting opinions among professionals. Ultimately, there
is no way of knowing that the authors' assessments are accurate." 489
Jones and Seig studied twenty cases in which sexual abuse allega-
tions arose in custody disputes.490 They found that twenty percent of
the cases probably were fictitious.4 91 Based on this finding, the au-
thors write:
This figure is higher than the 5-7% range [of fabricated allegations] reported
in other contexts .... Other authors have found a similarly elevated rate in
custody disputes .... Thus the setting of the divorce and custody dispute does
seem to raise the likelihood that clinicians will find an increased number of
fictitious allegations. However, in this study nearly 3/4 (70%) were Reliable,
arguing strongly against the practice of dismissing [child sexual abuse] allega-
tions in custody disputes contexts as most likely false.4 9 2
While there is need for concern about fabricated allegations of child
sexual abuse in the context of custody and visitation disputes, concern
should not turn to exaggeration. Unfortunately, a number of authors
appear to indulge in exaggeration. For example, Coleman writes that
"a wave of false allegations, filed by persons in the midst of custody
and visitation disputes, is flooding the police and the courts."493
484. See Jones & McGraw, supra note 476, at 30.
485. See, e.g., Green, True and False Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Child Custody
Disputes, 25 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 449, 449-50 (1986).
486. Id. at 449. For criticism of Dr. Green's article see Corwin, supra note 262.
487. Benedek & Schetky, Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Child Custody and Visita-
tion Disputes, in EMERGING ISSUES IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 145, 155
(D. Schetky & E. Benedek eds. 1985).
488. Quinn, supra note 472, at 181.
489. Berliner, supra note 291, at 52.
490. Jones & Seig, Child Sexual Abuse Allegations in Custody and Visitation Dis-
putes, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 22 (E.
Nicholson & J. Bulkley eds. 1988).
491. Id. at 29.
492. Id.
493. Coleman, False Allegations of Sexual Abuse: Have the Experts Been Caught with
their Pants Down?, FORUM 12 (Jan.-Feb. 1986). See also Gordon, False Allega-
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Concerned about fabricated allegations in custody cases, the fed-
eral government's National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect
funded research on allegations of child sexual abuse in custody litiga-
tion. The research was conducted by the Association of Family and
Conciliation Courts and the American Bar Association's National
Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection. 494 In sum-
marizing the research findings, Thoennes and Pearson write:
Some writers have suggested that the allegation of sexual abuse in divorce
constitutes a major problem....
However, respondents to a survey of courts around the country typically
describe seeing "a small but growing number" of such charges.
Interviews with court workers ... confirm these views. In addition, many
individuals believe that the major increase in such cases actually took place 3-
5 years ago, in the early 1980's. Since that time they feel the reporting inci-
dence has leveled off. The increased numbers earlier in the decade are largely
attributed to increased attention to the problem of sexual abuse. The rise of
allegations within divorces is seen as paralleling the rise in reports to protec-
tive service agencies in general. The increase in direct reports to CPS agencies
has been dramatic, with a national increase of nearly 200 percent during the
last decade. As one commissioner notes, "we've taught parents the warning
sign- of abuse, we've got to expect more reports."
The limited information available to date suggests that in most courts ap-
proximately two percent to ten percent of all family court cases involving cus-
tody and/or visitation disputes also involve a charge of sexual abuse. Since the
incidence of contested custody is estimated to be about 10 to 15 percent of
divorce filings with minor-aged children, it may be more accurate to estimate
that sex abuse allegations occur in the range of approximately 2 to 15 per 1000
filings.
The number of sexual abuse charges arising during divorces and/or cus-
tody/visitation disputes is small in absolute numbers, and as a percentage of
all contested cases.
Deliberately false allegations made to influence the custody decision or to
hurt an ex-spouse do happen, but they are viewed by knowledgeable profes-
tions of Abuse in Child Custody Disputes, 2 MINN. FAM. L.J. 225 (1985); McIver,
The Case for the Therapeutic Interview in Situations of Alleged Sexual Molesta-
tion, THE CHAMPION 11 (1986); R. Underwager, False Allegations of Child Abuse
(unpublished manuscript, 1986); R. Underwager, H. Wakefield, R. Legrand, C.S.
Bartz & J. Erickson, The Role of the Psychologist in the Assessment of Cases of
Alleged Sexual Abuse of Children (paper presented at the 94th Annual Conven-
tion of the American Psychological Association, Wash. D.C., Aug., 1986).
494. See Thoennes, Child Sexual Abuse: Whom Should a Judge Believe? What
Should a Judge Believe?, 27 JUDGE'S J. 14 (1988). The results of the research are
described in two documents: Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, The
Sexual Abuse Allegations Project, Final Report (1988), and Association of Family
and Conciliation Courts, Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Custody and Visitation
Cases: An Empirical Study of 169 Cases from 12 States (1988). For information
on the study and copies of the reports contact Nancy Thoennes, Ph.D., Associa-
tion of Family and Conciliation Courts, Research Unit, 1720 Emerson Street,
Denver, CO 80218, (303) 837-1555.
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sionals as rarities. 4
9 5
Fabricated allegations of sexual abuse occur in custody and visita-
tion litigation, and there is reason to proceed cautiously in such
cases. 496 As Jones and Seig point out above, however, the higher per-
centage of fabricated allegations occurring in custody cases should not
lead to undue skepticism about such allegations. Many are true. Fur-
thermore, it should come as no surprise that a number of children first
disclose or experience sexual abuse during the breakup of the fam-
ily.497 Corwin and his colleagues observe:
There are several reasons abused children may be more likely to disclose
abuse by a parent and to be believed by the other parent following separation
or divorce. With the breakup of the parents comes diminished opportunity for
an abusing parent to enforce secrecy as there is increased opportunity for the
child to disclose abuse separately to the other parent. Decreased dependency
and increased distrust between parents increases willingness to suspect child
abuse by the other parent.
Additionally, the losses, stresses, and overall negative impact of separation
and divorce may precipitate regressive "acting out" by parents, including child
sexual abuse. It is possible that the adult character traits and behavior
problems frequently associated with the sexual abuse of children are more
common in people whose marriages break up. Included in this list are narcis-
sistic traits, paranoid ideation, antisocial tendencies, impulsivity, sexual diffi-
culties, and substance abuse. It may well be that this constellation of factors is
more important than false allegations in explaining the current increased
numbers of such claims. Only systematic research can answer this
question.
4 9 8
In sum, clinical experience and systematic studies confirm that de-
liberately false allegations of sexual abuse are infrequent.
Because a fabricated allegation of sexual abuse can have such seri-
ous consequences, care must be taken to ferret out fabricated charges.
Experienced mental health professionals possess skills which can as-
sist in detecting fabricated and coached allegations. It must be empha-
495. Thoennes & Pearson, Summary of Findings from the Sexual Abuse Allegations
Project, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 1, 4,
16, 17 (E.B. Nicholson & J. Bulkley eds. 1988)(footnote omitted).
496. See Yates & Musty, supra note 468, at 992 ("Allegations of sexual abuse are espe-
cially likely to occur in the course of custody disputes.").
497. See Berliner, supra note 291 at 60, where the author writes:
Custody situations present one type of special case because of the con-
founding factor of the conflict between the parents. However, it must be
kept in mind that not all such accusations of abuse arise when there is an
ongoing dispute, and that simply because the parents are divorced or di-
vorcing does rot warrant an assumption that the accusation is automati-
cally less reliable. There are good reasons why a child might wait until
the parents are divorcing to disclose abuse, or, why a parent might not be
willing to entertain the possibility of abuse by a spouse until a divorce is
imminent. Further, it is conceivable that the stress of a divorce situa-
tion, coupled with unsupervised contact with a child, might precipitate
sexual abuse.
498. Corwin, supra note 262, at 102.
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sized that there is no litmus test that differentiates true from false
allegations.499 Professional judgment turns on thorough evaluation of
all relevant facts and circumstances. Medical evidence of abuse is im-
portant-sometimes dispositive-although such proof exists in only a
small percentage of cases.500 In the majority of cases, the most critical
evidence is the child's description of what occurred. 501 Thus, it is vital
to assess the validity of the child's statement.
With respect to the child's description of abuse, Jones and McQuis-
ton write:
The statement is examined for explicit detail of an alleged sexual abuse.
Younger children, particularly under the age of 5 years, are not able to relate
as much detail as are older children. However, the more detail that is recal-
led, the more likely it is that the account is truthful, especially as it is consid-
ered unlikely that an individual child can gain such detailed knowledge unless
he had personal experience of the event in question....
Unique or distinguishing detail should be sought. This may be found both
within the account of the sexual encounter and/or in unrelated recollections.
Examples include children who describe smells and tastes associated with
rectal, vaginal, or oral sex. One 4-year-old boy described a feeling of rectal
stretching when being sodomized, "I felt like I wanna' go pooh pooh". Distin-
guishing detail may also be found in the description of the room or the clothes
the child was wearing at the time. One 3-year-old girl said, "I had my panties
on backwards".5 0 2
As mentioned by Jones and McQuiston, most young children lack the
experience required to manufacture detailed and explicit descriptions
of sexual abuse. It is difficult to imagine, for example, a four-year-old
capable of inventing a detailed and anatomically accurate account of
anal intercourse or ejaculation unless the child has either experienced
such acts or been exposed to them.5 0 3 When a child describes an event
which a similarly situated child could not reasonably be expected to
fabricate, the statement gains in reliability.50 4
499. Benedek & Schetky, Problems in Validating Allegations of Sexual Abuse. Part 2:
Clinical Evaluation, 26 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 916
(1987)("no absolute formulas exist for determining a child's credibility"). See also
Corwin, supra note 262, at 91.
500. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
501. Quinn writes that "[t]he strongest validation criteria are based upon eliciting of
explicit sexual experiences with progression of acts over time described by the
child." Quinn, supra note 472, at 186.
502. D. JONES & M. McQUISTON, supra note 301, at 43.
503. See Waterman, Developmental Considerations, in SEXUAL ABUSE OF YOUNG
CHILDREN 27 (K. MacFarlane & J. Waterman eds. 1986), where Waterman writes:
[i]ssues of truth versus lying are complex in the preschool years....
However, children cannot manufacture stories based on information that
they have not learned or experienced. For example, children will not
make up a story about the comings and goings of Eskimos if they have
never been exposed to any learning about Eskimos, and will not say
someone attempted oral copulation with them if they have not had
either direct or vicarious experience with that act.
504. See Faller, supra note 468, at 475 (because young children do not have the sexual
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Courts are impressed with age-inappropriate sexual knowledge. A
New York Family Court judge wrote:
Here there is ample evidence of sexual abuse based on the explicit knowledge
of the child of the sexual matters she discussed in detail. Her knowledge in-
cludes the relative size of the male organ, the manner in which manipulation
results in ejaculation, the movements involved and the results of such
actions.5 0
5
In a different case, the New York Court of Appeals was more than
persuaded that a three-year-old had been abused. The court wrote
that "[t]here was no other basis in reality.., for Nicole's statements of
'white glue' or 'paste' coming from her father's genital area."5 06 The
Colorado Supreme Court wrote in a similar vein when it stated that
"children of tender years are generally not adept at reasoned reflec-
tion and at concoction of false stories under such circumstances.
07
The fact that young children cannot invent detailed and anatomi-
cally accurate descriptions of sexual acts does not mean children's al-
legations must be accepted at face value. In rare cases deliberately
false allegations are made, especially by adolescents. Furthermore,
even though a particular child may be incapable of inventing the sce-
nario described in an allegation, it is necessary to look behind the
statement to determine whether an adult has planted the event in the
child's mind.
The use of age-appropriate language and sentence structure in-
creases confidence in the child's statement,5 08 although use of adult
terms should not cause one to conclude a report is false. During the
course of abuse investigations, children often pick up adult terms such
as molest.5 0 9 When a child uses adult-like language to describe abuse,
it becomes important to learn how the child described the abuse at the
first disclosure. Did the child use age-appropriate language then?
It is important to note whether the child describes abuse from a
child's or an adult's perspective.5 1 0 A description which appears to be
told from an adult perspective requires further evaluation. When a
knowledge necessary to fabricate stories of sexual abuse, false allegations are
rare); Quinn, supra note 472, at 187.
505. In re Melissa M., 136 Misc. 2d 773, 777, 519 N.Y.S.2d 453, 457 (Fain. Ct. 1987).
506. In re Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112, 121, 518 N.E.2d 914, 918, 524 N.Y.S. 2d 19, 23 (1987).
507. Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 448, 453, 615 P.2d 720, 723 (1980).
508. See D. JONES & M. MCQUISTON, supra note 301, at 43, where the authors write:
The words and sentence formation should be congruent with the age and
developmental status of the child; a 5-year-old child who falsely recanted
her allegations, when asked why the sexual abuse had stopped some 18
months previously, said, "because it was inappropriate". This phrase be-
lied its adult, rather than child origins.
See also Benedek & Schetky, supra note 499, at 917 (Table 1).
509. See Corwin, supra note 262, at 100 ("We have interviewed many young children,
especially those with highly educated parents, who have been taught to use the
terms penis and vagina in describing genital anatomy.").
510. D. JONES & M. MCQUISTON, supra note 301, at 44 ("The statement may be
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child is interviewed several times, the child's account may pick up ele-
ments of adult perspective along the way. Thus, it is wise to deter-
mine how often the child has been interviewed before discounting a
story that has elements of adult perspective.
As a child describes abuse, the interviewer evaluates the child's
emotional response and affect, which are usually consistent with what
is being described.511 It is important to note, however, that some
abused children describe their abuse without apparent feeling or emo-
tion. This comes as no surprise because abused children often are
asked to tell their story over and over again to a series of interviewers.
By the time the youngster describes the abuse for the tenth time, the
feeling that accompanied the initial disclosure may be gone.512 Fur-
thermore, Quinn notes that "children who have been severely trauma-
tized and have symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder may show
an emotional numbness in all areas of life." 513
The fact that a child's description of abuse remains consistent over
time increases the likelihood the allegation is true. Consistency is an-
other tricky issue, however.514 Young children are often less consis-
tent than older children because they are not capable of monitoring
their own consistency. Older children have learned the importance of
consistency, and how to monitor their communications for consis-
tency. On the issue of consistency, Jones and McQuiston write:
The child may have made a statement to other people before this interview.
Often children talk to other children, or perhaps to neighbors, babysitters, or
teachers, and the contents of their statements to these people may usefully be
compared with the statement obtained from interview. The question of con-
sistency between different statements made by a single child is more compli-
cated than appears at first glance. There is usually, in truthful accounts, a
consistency of the core elements of the child's exploitation, but there may be
some variation in the more peripheral aspects of the child's story. Thus, the
question of consistency is not an all-or-nothing matter. It may vary with the
degree of personal poignancy of the particular experience for that child. Simi-
larly,... the more violent elements of coercion and threatening behavior by
searched for evidence of a child's perspective of the abuse incident, in contrast to
that of an adult or third-party."); Faller, supra note 468, at 476.
511. D. JONES & M. McQUISTON, supra note 301, at 44 ("The emotion expressed by the
child during the interview is usually congruent with the events being de-
scribed.... We may further ask whether the child's account is given in a re-
hearsed or packaged manner, or with appropriate emotion"); Benedek &
Schetky, supra note 499, at 917 (Table 1); Faller, supra note 468, at 476; Yates &
Musty, supra note 468, at 990 ("children who are misled are often inconsistent in
recalling the events. Their affect may not be appropriate, and they are unable to
provide details about time, place, and so forth.").
512. See Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 475, at 133; Quinn, supra note 472, at 188
("Children who have been subjected to multiple interviews may begin to report
their experience in a rote manner.").
513. Quinn, supra note 472, at 188-89.
514. For discussion of inconsistency, see supra text following note 372, and supra
notes 416-25 and accompanying text.
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the perpetrator may be very frightening for the child, and consequently these
elements may be suppressed by the child for a longer period than the sexual
aspects of the abuse. This may give an air of apparent inconsistency to a
child's account of sexual abuse over a period of weeks or months, but running
through the account will be a consistent thread. In contrast to this situation,
false statements are made with monotonous consistency, and show no sign of
variation over time.5 1 5
Some forms of psychiatric disturbance can lead to inconsistency.
For example, a child with attention deficit disorder may be inconsis-
tent in a number of respects. However, the fact that a young child is
psychiatrically disturbed seldom leads to deliberately false allegations
of abuse.516
It is important to assess whether the child or relevant adults have a
motive to fabricate allegations of abuse. 5 1 7 It is also important to de-
termine whether an adult who might influence a child is suffering
from a mental illness that could distort the adult's perception of
reality.5 i8
Research by Faller, which is discussed in an earlier subsection, 19
supports the ability of professionals to detect fabricated allegations of
abuse.5 2 0 Faller writes that criteria such as those described above are
"valid predictors of whether children have been sexually abused and
should continue to be used." 5 2 ' No foolproof technique exists to detect
fabricated charges of sexual abuse. In many cases, however, exper-
ienced professionals can uncover fabricated allegations.
b. Perceived Accuracy
A child who is consciously and accurately telling the truth may
nevertheless be disbelieved by the jury.5 22 In recent years, psycholo-
gists have begun studying factors which affect whether jurors believe
witnesses.5 23 Some studies indicate that children are viewed as less
515. D. JONES & M. McQUISTON, supra note 301, at 45.
516. See Benedek & Schetky, supra note 499.
517. Faller, supra note 468, at 474-75; Quinn, supra note 472, at 192.
518. See Yates & Musty, Preschool Children's Erroneous Allegations of Sexual Moles-
tation, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 989 (1988).
519. See supra notes 310-14 and accompanying text.
520. See Faller, Criteria for Judging the Credibility of Children's Statements About
Their Sexual Abuse, 67 CHILD WELFARE 389 (1988).
521. Id. at 396-97. Faller cautions that while the "results of this study are promising,"
replication studies should be conducted to ensure the validity of the findings. Id.
at 398.
522. Experimental work is beginning on whether mock-jurors can differentiate accu-
rate from inaccurate testimony. See Goodman, Determinants, supra note 391
(children's perceived credibility was low; mock jurors were not able to distinguish
between accurate and inaccurate testimony; guilt judgments were influenced by
witness confidence but not by witness age).
523. See, e.g., Cutler, Penrod & Stuve, Juror Decision Making in Eyewitness Identiji-
cation Cases, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 41 (1988); Duggan, Aubrey, Doherty, Isquity,
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credible than adults. 524 However, other experiments disclose no age
differences in credibility assessment.525
A number of witness characteristics may influence jurors. One im-
portant factor is the juror's perception of the witness's sincerity. Chil-
dren are likely to fare quite well in this category. Many young
children lack the cognitive skills needed for duplicitous responses to
questions. Their testimony often has a ring of veracity. Furthermore,
in sex offense litigation, jurors may believe that children cannot in-
vent such things. Most children are likable and attractive, and many
jurors are disposed toward warm feelings for children. Furthermore,
most children are perceived as vulnerable and in need of protection.
This is especially so with children who have been victimized.
While some attributes of child witnesses may increase their per-
ceived credibility, others may have the opposite effect. Jurors are im-
pressed with testimony which is consistent and certain. Testimony by
children may be riddled with inconsistencies and uncertainty. A good
memory for pertinent events is important. A child's memory may fal-
ter or fail. Jurors are favorably disposed toward witnesses who testify
confidently and without constant assistance from counsel. Many chil-
dren are hesitant on the stand. Some cannot go forward without a
stream of leading questions.
Levine & Scheiner, The Credibility of Children as Witnesses in a Simulated
Child Sexual Abuse Trial, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY (J. Ceci,
M. Toglia & D. Ross eds. 1989)(women tended to believe children more, although
this gender effect did not affect guilt judgments); Goodman, Determinants, supra
note 391 (perceived credibility of children was low; jurors could not distinguish
between accurate and inaccurate testimony; guilt judgments were influenced by
witness confidence but not by age); Goodman, Reactions, supra note 391 (children
were perceived as less credible than adults; however, age did not affect juror's
perceptions of guilt); Goodman, Golding, Helgeson, Haith & Michelli, When a
Child Takes the Stand. Jurors' Perceptions of Children's Eyewitness Testimony,
11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1987); Leippe & Romanczyk, supra note 391 (children
were seen as less credible than adults; however, age did not significantly affect
juror perceptions of guilt; children were perceived as more susceptible to sugges-
tion than adults and more likely to make errors of memory); Nigro, Buckiey, Hill
& Nelson, When Juries "Hear" Children Testify: The Effects of Eyewitness Age
and Speech Style on Juror's Perceptions of Testimony, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHIL-
DREN'S TESTIMONY (J. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. Ross eds. 1989)(children with power-
ful speech style were viewed as more credible than children with powerless
speech style); Ross, Miller & Moran, The Child in the Eyes of the Jury: Assessing
Mfock Jurors' Perceptions of the Child Witness, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEM-
ORY 142 (J. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. Ross eds. 1987); Wells, Turtle & Luus, The Per-
ceived Credibility of Child Eyewitnesses: What Happens When They Use Their
Own Words?, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY (J. Ceci, D. Ross & M.
Toglia eds. 1989).
524 See, e.g., Goodman, Reactions, supra note 391; Leippe & Romanczyk, supra note
391.
525. For discussion, see Goodman, Determinants, supra note 391.
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c. Do Experts Possess Specialized Knowledge About
Children's Credibility that Could Assist Fact Finders?
Experts on child sexual abuse are not human lie detectors. Nor are
they clairvoyant. Nothing in the literature suggests that experts can
or should replace lay jurors as the ultimate arbiters of credibility. Yet,
the literature suggests that on certain aspects of credibility, experts
possess knowledge that could assist fact finders. For example, the
clinical literature describes techniques for detecting coached state-
ments.52 6 Such detection techniques are unknown to average jurors.
Additionally, some experts possess knowledge about the developmen-
tal capabilities and limitations of children which could help jurors
evaluate the validity of attacks on children's credibility. Thus, on
some aspects of credibility, experts possess specialized knowledge that
could assist the trier of fact. Whether the expert is permitted to im-
part that knowledge is another matter.
2. Judicial Response to Expert Testimony on Credibility
Unlike some aspects of expert testimony on child sexual abuse,
courts approach unanimity when it comes to expert testimony on cred-
ibility.27 The great majority of courts reject expert testimony which
comments directly on the credibility of individual children528 or on the
526. See, e.g., MacFarlane, Child Sexual Abuse in Divorce Proceedings, in SEXUAL
ABUSE OF YOUNG CHILDREN 124-25 (K. MacFarlane & J. Waterman eds. 1986).
527. An occasional decision approves expert testimony on credibility when the defend-
ant opens the door to such evidence through a direct attack on the victim's credi-
bility. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 611-12 (Minn. 1984).
528. See, e.g., State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 385, 728 P.2d 248, 255 (1986), where the
court wrote:
Experts called to testify about behavioral characteristics that may affect
an alleged victim's credibility may not give an opinion of the credibility
of a particular witness. Psychologists and psychiatrists are not, and do
not claim to be, experts at discerning truth. Psychiatrists are trained to
accept facts provided by their patients, not to act as judges of patients'
credibility.
See also Thompson v. State, 769 P.2d 997 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); State v. Lindsey,
149 Ariz. 472, 474-75, 720 P.2d 73, 75-76 (1986); People v. Oliver, 745 P.2d 222, 225
(Colo. 1987); People v. Ross, 745 P.2d 277, 278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Tingle v.
State, 536 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1988); Head v. State, 519 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ind. 1988);
Lawrence v. State, 464 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Ind. 1984); State v. Brotherton, 384
N.W.2d 375, 378-79 (Iowa 1986)(court held that testimony that a young child could
not fantasize about a sexual act was improper indirect testimony regarding the
child's credibility); State v. Jackson, 239 Kan. 463, 470, 721 P.2d 232, 238 (1986);
People v. Reinhardt, 167 Mich. App. 584, 596, 423 N.W.2d 275, 282 (1988); State v.
Miller, 377 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App.
212, 219, 365 S.E.2d 651, 655 (1988); State v. Holloway, 82 N.C. App. 586, 587, 347
S.E.2d 72, 73 (1986); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427,437 n.11, 657 P.2d 1215,1221 n.
11 (1983); Commonwealth v. McNeely, 368 Pa. Super. 517, 520, 534 A.2d 778, 779
(1987)(an expert's "opinion on the accuracy of the victim's recitation of facts is
inadmissible."); State v. Rimmasch, - P.2d - (Utah 1989); State v. Eldredge, 773
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credibility of sexually abused children as a class.529
Courts employ several rationales to reject expert testimony on
credibility. A number of decisions hold that experts cannot discuss
credibility in terms of the statistical likelihood that children tell the
truth.530 In Powell v. State,531 for example, the Supreme Court of Del-
aware disapproved the testimony of an expert who stated that ninety-
nine percent of the children receiving treatment in programs where
the expert worked told the truth. 32 The court stated that such testi-
mony violated the rule that an "expert may not directly or indirectly
express opinions concerning a particular witness' veracity or attempt
to quantify the probability of truth or falsity of either the initial alle-
gations of abuse or subsequent statements."533 In an earlier decision,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that an expert may not evaluate a
victim'g credibility in terms of statistical probability.534 The court
wrote that to the extent expert testimony "attempts to quantify the
veracity of a particular witness or provide a statistical test for truth
telling in the courtroom, it is clearly unacceptable."5 35
Several courts rely on state equivalents of Rules 405(a) and 608(a)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence to reject expert testimony on credi-
bility.536 Rule 405(a) states that when evidence of character is admis-
sible, pkoof of character "may be made by testimony as to reputation
or by testimony in the form of an opinion."537 Rule 608(a) provides
that the credibility of a witness may be supported by testimony in the
form of reputation or opinion.538 Under these rules, testimony is lim-
P.2d 29 (Utah 1989); State v. Madison, 770 P.2d 662 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Zabel v.
State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 1988).
529. See Commonwealth v. Ianello, 401 Mass. 197, 515 N.E.2d 1181 (1987); People v.
Reinhardt, 167 Mich. App. 584, 423 N.W.2d 275 (1988); People v. Matlock, 153
Mich. App. 171, 395 N.W.2d 274 (1986); Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 734 P.2d
705 (1987); Commonwealth v. Davis, 518 Pa. 77, 541 A.2d 315 (1988)(expert testi-
mony on credibility of sexually abused children as a class is inadmissible).
530. See, e.g., State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 382, 728 P.2d 248, 252 (1986)("Nor may the
expert's opinion as to credibility be adduced indirectly by allowing the expert to
quantify the percentage of victims who are truthful in their initial reports despite
subsequent recantation"); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475, 720 P.2d 73, 76
(1986).
531. 527 A.2d 276 (Del. 1987).
532. Id. at 278-79.
533. Id. at 279 (quoting Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 275 (Del. 1987)).
534. Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 274 (Del. 1987).
535. Id. at 275.
536. See, e.g., United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 416
U.S. 959 (1974); State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 591, 350 S.E.2d 76, 81 (1986)(opinion
that child was believable inadmissible under Rules 405 and 608(a)); State v. Kim,
318 N.C. 614, 620, 350 S.E.2d 347, 351 (1986); State v. Holloway, 82 N.C. App. 586,
587, 347 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1986); State v. Rimmasch, - P.2d - (Utah 1989).
537. FED. R. EVID. 405(a).




ited to general reputation for truthfulness. The witness may not
delve into specific instances of truthfulness. 39 Thus, expert testi-
mony that a child was truthful on a particular occasion is improper.
The Colorado courts have decided a number of cases in reliance on
Rule 608(a). In Tevlin v. People,540 a physical abuse case, an expert
testified that he believed the victim when the child stated he was
beaten by his father. In disapproving of this testimony, the Colorado
Supreme Court wrote:
The opinion testimony of the expert witness in this case was brought out
on direct examination and was stated in the form of an opinion by the expert
as to a specific instance of truthfulness, rather than referring only to character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
We conclude that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the
expert witness stating the victim was telling the truth when he related his
version of the incidents of abuse. The expert's opinion failed to refer to the
witness' general character for truthfulness and instead went to the witness'
truthfulness on a specific occasion.... [T]he expert's opinion was not properly
admissible under [Rule] 608." 4 1
People v. Snook 542 is a sex abuse case involving a ten-year-old com-
plainant. The child testified at trial, and described how defendant
touched her. Following her testimony, the state offered expert testi-
mony that "children do not fabricate erotic experiences."54 3 The ex-
pert had not interviewed the complainant, and confined her testimony
to a statement that children as a group do not fabricate detailed allega-
tions of sexual abuse.54 4 The Colorado Supreme Court disapproved
this testimony, writing that Rule 608(a):
permits the credibility of a witness to be supported by opinion evidence of his
character for truthfulness only after his truthful character has been attacked.
Although the expert had no personal knowledge of the victim's credibility and
couched her testimony in general terms, the opinion testimony necessarily re-
fers to [the complainant's] character for truthfulness. The testimony is an ex-
pert opinion that [the complainant] is almost certainly telling the truth. In
539. FED. R. EVID. 608(a). On cross-examination the witness may be asked about rele-
vant specific instances of conduct. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
540. 715 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1986). See also People v. Gaffney, 769 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1989).
541. Id at 340-41 (footnote omitted).
542. 745 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1987).
543. Id. at 648.
544. The expert testified as follows:
General attitudes, accepted attitudes as far as the literature concern-
ing children is that children tend not to fabricate stories of sexual abuse
and in giving reports tend to reproduce their experiences and your state-
ment about children having had the erotic experience when young, in
order to make these things up, there has to be a basis for that experience
and unless it happened to them in this area, then in fact the description
would be what had been done to them.
Id. For another case rejecting expert testimony that children do not invent ex-




fact, the jury's only conceivable use of such testimony would be as support for
the complainant's truthful character.
Here, the victim's character was not subject to attack at the time the ex-
pert opinion was offered and the admission of the expert opinion violated
[Rule] 608(a).5 4 5
Finally, in People v. Ross546 the Colorado Court of Appeal held
that when a child's credibility is attacked, the state may offer rebuttal
evidence of truthful character. The court noted that "neither a lay
nor expert witness may give opinion testimony as to whether a witness
is telling the truth on a specific occasion."547 The Colorado decisions
send the clear message that experts may not opine that particular chil-
dren are believable or are telling the truth.548
Courts provide additional justifications for rejecting expert testi-
mony on credibility. Some hold that the testimony does not assist the
jury.54 9 Others believe the evidence will over-awe the jury and tempt
jurors to forego independent evaluation of credibility.50 Some believe
the testimony invites a battle of the experts, and a trial within a trial
on a collateral issue.551 Others worry the testimony will waste
time.552 A number of decisions raise the possibility that the probative
545. People v. Snook, 745 P.2d 647, 648-49 (Colo. 1987)(citations and footnotes
omitted).
546. 745 P.2d 277 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
547. Id. at 278 (quoting People v. Koon, 713 P.2d 410, 412 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985)). A
police officer testified that the victim was truthful on specific occasions. This was
error. Id.
548. See also People v. Jensen, 747 P.2d 1247, 1250 (Colo. 1987); People v. Oliver, 745
P.2d 222, 225 (Colo. 1987)("The defendant contends that the rebuttal testimony of
a social worker and an investigator that they personally believed each of the
three victims, based upon their experience and interviews of the victims, was re-
versible error. We agree.") (footnote omitted).
549. The Arizona Supreme Court wrote:
Opinion evidence on who is telling the truth in cases such as this is
nothing more than the expert's opinion on how the case should be de-
cided. We believe that such testimony is inadmissible, both because it
usurps the jury's traditional functions and roles and because, when given
insight into the behavioral sciences, the jury needs nothing further from
the expert.
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986). See also State v. Moran,
151 Ariz. 378, 382, 728 P.2d 248, 252 (1986); State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa
1986); State v. Holloway, 82 N.C. App. 586, 587, 347 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1986).
550. See United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974); Com-
monwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 443-44, 517 A.2d 920, 922 (1986); Dunnington v.
State, 740 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)("[The] use of expert testimony
presents a risk of overbearing the jury in its deliberative responsibility. The dis-
parate expertise of the witness and the average juror tends to produce a natural
inclination to accept the expert testimony as gospel." Court was not discussing
expert testimony on credibility.).
551. See United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 959 (1974); People v. Snook, 745 P.2d 647, 649 n.4 (Colo. 1987).
552. See People v. Snook, 745 P.2d 647, 649 n.4 (Colo. 1987).
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worth of expert testimony on credibility may be substantially out-
weighed by the potential the testimony may cause unfair prejudice.553
The Oregon Supreme Court did not mince words in its condemnation
of credibility testimony. The court wrote: "We have said before, and
we will say it again, but this time with emphasis-we really mean it-
no psychotherapist may render an opinion on whether a witness is
credible in any trial conducted in this state. The assessment of credi-
bility is for the trier of fact and not for psychotherapists."54
At bottom, the rationale underlying rejection of expert testimony
on credibility is a well-settled belief that assessment of credibility is,
and must remain, the exclusive province of the jury.555 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals quipped that "the jury is the lie detector in
the courtroom."55 6 In Commonwealth v. Seese,557 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court articulated the prevalent judicial attitude:
The question of whether a particular witness is testifying in a truthful
manner is one that must be answered in reliance upon inferences drawn from
the ordinary experiences of life and common knowledge as to the natural ten-
dencies of human nature, as well as upon observations of the demeanor and
character of the witness. The phenomenon of lying, and situations in which
prevarications might be expected to occur, have traditionally been regarded as
within the ordinary facility of jurors to assess. For this reason, the question of
a witness' credibility has routinely been regarded as a decision reserved exclu-
sively for the jury.
It is an encroachment upon the province of the jury to permit admission of
expert testimony on the issue of a witness' credibility.
5 5 8
Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court believes so strongly that
credibility is for the jury alone that in Commonwealth v.Davis559 it
held that a defense attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel
when he failed to object to expert testimony on credibility.
Perhaps the most notable exception to the nearly unanimous view
553. See, e.g., State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 382, 728 P.2d 248, 252 (1986); State v. Pe-
trich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 575, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (Ct. App. 1984).
554. State v. Milbradt, 305 Or. 621, 629, 756 P.2d 620, 624 (1988)(emphasis in original,
footnote omitted). The Arizona Supreme Court was just about as clear when it
wrote, "[We explicitly state at this time that trial courts should not admit direct
expert testimony that quantifies the probabilities of the credibility of another
witness." State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986).
555. See State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986); Townsend v. State,
103 Nev. 113, 734 P.2d 705 (1987); State v. Holloway, 82 N.C. App. 586, 587, 347
S.E.2d 72, 73-74 (1986); State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 398 N.W.2d 763, 770
(1987)("The credibility of witnesses and the weight given to their testimony are
matters left to the jury's judgment. The credibility of a witness is ordinarily
something a lay juror can knowledgeably determine without the help of expert
opinion." (citations omitted))..
556. United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 416 U.S.
959 (1974).
557. 512 Pa. 439, 517 A.2d 920 (1986).
558. Id. at 443, 517 A.2d at 922.
559. 518 Pa. 77, 541 A.2d 315 (1988).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
that experts may not testify directly on credibility is the Hawaii
Supreme Court's 1982 decision in State v. Kim.560 In Kim the credibil-
ity of the thirteen-year-old incest victim was impeached during cross-
examination. Following impeachment, the trial court approved testi-
mony from a child psychiatrist that the doctor found the victim's ac-
count believable. The Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that
such testimony could assist the jury in an area where it might be diffi-
cult for jurors to evaluate credibility. The court was persuaded that
the average juror does not possess an adequate foundation for assess-
ing the credibility of young sex offense victims, and that properly
qualified experts possess special knowledge on assessment of credibil-
ity that can assist the jury.
In 1988 the Hawaii Supreme Court revisited Kim and declined to
overrule it. In State v. Castro,561 the court held that expert testimony
560. 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982). See also State v. Busch, 515 So. 2d 605 (La. Ct.
App. 1988); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 611-12 (Minn. 1984)(permitting expert
te.timony on credibility where defendant opened the door to such testimony by
ditectly attacking child's credibility); State v. J.C.F., 767 P.2d 309 (Mont. 1988);
Sthte v. French, 760 P.2d 86 (Mont. 1988); State v. Geyman, 729 P.2d 475, 479-80
(lont. 1986)(expert testimony on credibility is admissible to help the jury under-
stand credibility); State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, 10-11, 354 S.E.2d 527, 533
(lA87)(not error to permit expert to testify that children as a class do not lie about
sexual abuse); Dunham v. State, 762 P.2d 969, 973 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
The Indiana Supreme Court has addressed the admissibility of testimony re-
lating to credibility. See Stout v. State, 528 N.E.2d 476 (Ind. 1988); Settle v. State,
526 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 1988); Head v. State, 519 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. 1988); Lawrence v.
State, 464 N.E.2d 923 (Ind. 1984). The court held that an expert may not "review
each item of the child's testimony and... specifically vouch for the truthfulness
of such testimony." Head v. State, 519 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ind. 1988). It may be
proper, however, for an expert to state an opinion "as to the general competence
of the child witness and the child witness's ability to understand the subject ..
Head v. State, 519 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ind. 1988).
In Lawrence v. State, 464 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Ind. 1984), the Indiana court wrote:
Whenever an alleged child victim takes the witness stand in such cases,
the child's capacity to accurately describe a meeting with an adult which
may involve touching, sexual stimulation, displays of affection and the
like, is automatically in issue, whether or not there is an effort by the
opponent of such witness to impeach on the basis of a lack of such capac-
ity. The presence of that issue justifies the court in permitting some ac-
crediting of the child witness in the form of opinions from parents,
teachers, and others having adequate experience with the child, that the
child is not prone to exaggerate or fantasize about sexual matters. Such
opinions will facilitate an original credibility assessment of the child by
the trier of fact, so long as they do not take the direct form of "I believe
the child's story", or "In my opinion the child is telling the truth."
In Stout v. State, 528 N.E.2d 476 (Ind. 1988), the court permitted a child wit-
ness's psychiatric social worker to describe the victim's trial testimony, and to
state that "there was nothing unusual in the victim's rather factual and unemo-
tional rendition and that the victim just wanted to hurry up, tell her story, and
not have to deal with it anymore." Stout v. State, 528 N.E.2d 476, 479 (Ind. 1988).
561. 756 P.2d 1033 (Haw. 1988). See also In re Doe, 761 P.2d 299 (Haw. 1988)(testimony
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regarding the credibility of an; adult was inadmissible. In some child
sexual abuse cases, however, the court remains convinced that expert
testimony assists jurors. The court limited such testimony to the "rare
case where the common experience of the jury [is] not likely to suffice
as a basis for assessment of credibility." 62
3. A Limited Role for Expert Testimony on Credibility?
It is appropriate to prohibit expert testimony that a child told the
truth on a particular occasion. There is considerable intuitive appeal
to the notion that jurors defer too quickly to expert assessment of
credibility. Furthermore, while qualified experts possess specialized
knowledge regarding certain aspects of credibility, expert capacity to
detect lying and coaching is too limited to justify admission of genera-
lized credibility testimony.
While generalized credibility testimony is properly excluded, cir-
cumstances exist where narrowly tailored expert testimony may be
proper to rebut certain attacks on credibility. For example, if the de-
fense asserts or intimates strongly that children as a group lie about
sexual abuse, it seems fair to permit rebuttal expert testimony. Such
testimony could draw from the clinical and scientific literature for the
conclusion that fabricated allegations of sexual abuse are rare. Such
testimony should be limited to an opinion that deliberately false alle-
gations are rare. The opinion should not be couched in terms of the
percentage of children who tell the truth. Such quantification of cred-
ibility runs too high a risk of misleading or confusing the jury.
The expert testimony discussed above does not run afoul of Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 405(a) or 608(a). The contemplated testimony
is not character evidence as contemplated by those rules. Thus, the
testimony need not be confined to generalized reputation or opinion
testimony.
It may occasionally be proper to admit narrowly tailored expert
testimony regarding credibility in juvenile court protective proceed-
ings and in child custody and visitation cases. There is no jury in such
litigation. Thus, the concern about jury confusion is eliminated.
G. Expert Testimony Identifying the Perpetrator
This subsection is short, and for good reason. Nothing in the pro-
fessional literature suggests that experts on child sexual abuse possess
special knowledge or expertise that allows them to identify the perpe-
trator of sexual abuse. In the few cases that discuss such expert testi-
relating to credibility is not permissible until there has been an attack on the
child's credibility).
562. State v. Castro, 756 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Haw. 1988).
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
mony, courts quite properly reject it.563
H. Behavioral Science Testimony Describing the Profile of Persons who
Abuse Children
The first seven subsections focused on the child. This subsection
shifts the focus to the alleged perpetrator. The clinical and scientific
material discusses current knowledge about perpetrators of sex of-
fenses. The legal analysis concentrates on cases where prosecutors
and defendants sought to establish whether or not defendants
matched a profile of the type of person who sexually abuses children.
1. Cinical and Scientific Information
Sex crimes are a major social problem. The emotional costs of
such crimes are great. The short- and long-term psychological impact
on the victim has been documented earlier in this Article.64 The
emotional impact on the perpetrator's family has received little study,
although it seems clear that the impact is significant. Financial costs
for victims and their families are also substantial. Victims may need
medical care and long-term psychological services, both of which are
expensive. Society bears the cost of the criminal justice system, in-
cluding investigation, trial, and incarceration of perpetrators.
Until two decades ago, sex offenders were under the exclusive do-
main ot the criminal justice system. Behavioral and social scientists
rarely involved themselves in study of offenders. The reason for this
lack of interest in offenders may be related to several factors, such as
disdain for offenders, discomfort in studying sexual behavior, and the
then existing lack of specific treatment strategies for offenders. Early
information on sex offenders resulted from anecdotal data.5 65 Studies
based on anecdotal data were problematic, however, because they re-
lied on the self-reports of incarcerated offenders. Such reports could
be seen as self-serving and unreliable.566
563. See, e.g., Seering v. Department of Social Servs., 196 Cal. App. 3d 298, 306, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 422, 427 (1987)("a psychiatrist's opinion that a specific third person or per-
sons had committed a molestation is inadmissible"); In re Christine C., 191 Cal.
App. 3d 676, 680, 236 Cal. Rptr. 630, 632 (1987); State v. J.C.F., 767 P.2d 309 (Mont.
1988); Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 723 P.2d 705 (1987); Stephens v. State, -
P.2d - (Wyo. 1989).
564. See supra subsection IV(B)(1).
565. See P. GEBHARD, J. GAGNON, W. POMEROY & C. CHRISTENSON, SEX OFFENDERS
(1965); Baxter, Marshall, Barbaree, Davidson & Malcolm, Deviate Sexual Behav-
ior: Differentiating Sex Offenders by Criminal and Personal History, Psycho-
metric Measures, and Sexual Response, 11 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 477 (1984);
Panton, MMPI Profile Configurations Associated with Incestuous and Non-Inces-
tuous Child Molesting, 45 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 335 (1979).
566. Abel, Barlow, Blanchard & Mavissakalian, Measurement of Sexual Arousal in
Male Homosexuals: The Effects of Instructions and Stimulus Modality, 4
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a. Defining and Describing Paraphilia
The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders5 67 is recognized as the authoritative
guide to psychiatric diagnosis. The Manual defines paraphilia as char-
acterized by repetitive or preferred sexual fantasies or acts involving
non-human objects, non-consenting partners, or the suffering or hu-
miliation of one's partner or oneself.568 The paraphilia include: exhi-
bitionism (arousal to the exposure of one's genitals to unsuspecting
strangers); fetishism (arousal to inanimate or "part" objects, such as
stockings, shoes, or boots); frotteurism (arousal to the touching and
rubbing of a non-consenting person); pedophilia (arousal to sexual ac-
tivity with a prepubescent child); voyeurism; sexual sadism; sexual
masochism; and transvestism.56 9 With the exception of sexual mas-
ochism, the majority of individuals with paraphilia are male. For ex-
ample, among reported cases of sexual abuse, ninety percent of the
offenders are men.57 0
The majority of individuals who seek treatment for paraphilia are
pressured to do so by the criminal justice system. Because only a per-
centage of paraphiliacs encounter the justice system, there is little
data on the actual prevalence of these disorders. Furthermore, the
fact that most paraphiliacs are ordered into treatment compounds re-
search problems. Individuals involved with the criminal justice sys-
tem may have reason to be less than forthcoming about their sexual
history.
In a study designed to overcome the research barriers described
above, Abel and his colleagues 57 ' conducted structured clinical inter-
views with 561 paraphiliacs regarding demographic characteristics,
frequency and variety of deviant sexual acts, and number and charac-
teristics of victims. This study is unique in that all the subjects were
voluntary. That is, subjects were not under court order to receive an
evaluation or treatment. All subjects were instructed to withhold the
specific details of any sex crimes (i.e., victim name, date, and place of
the crime). Each subject was assigned an identification number and
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 623 (1975); Kaplan, A Description of Sef-Reports of
Convicted Child Molesters Following Incarceration, INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY
& COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY (in press).
567. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. rev. 1987).
568. Id. at 279-90.
569. For a complete listing of paraphilias see J. MONEY, LOVEMAPS: CLINICAL CON-
CEPTS OF SEXUAL/EROTICE HEALTH AND PATHOLOGY, PARAPHILIA, AND GENDER
TRANSPOSITION IN CHILDHOOD, ADOLESCENCE, AND MATURITY (1986).
570. See D. FINKELHOR, A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1986).
571. Abel, Becker, Mittelman, Cunningham-Rathner, Rouleau & Murphy, SeUf-Re-




all information was kept in charts coded by the identification number.
No names were placed on any files. Finally, to further insure confi-
dentiality of data, the investigators obtained a certificate of confidenti-
ality from the Secretary of Health and Human Services which
provided that no federal, state, or local authorities could compel the
investigators to reveal the identity of the subjects.5 72 These steps were
taken to assist in obtaining accurate information.
Subject characteristics were as follows: The age range was from
thirteen to seventy-six, with the mean age at 31.5 years. Nearly half
the subjects were single (47.6 percent). Approximately thirty percent
were married (29.2 percent). Of the remainder, 7.5 percent were di-
vorced, 9.5 percent were separated, 1.4 percent were remarried, and
0.4 percent were widowed.
Many of the subjects were well educated, with forty percent finish-
ing at lbast one year of college. This finding is contrary to the stereo-
type thht paraphiliacs lack education. Contrary to another stereotype,
64.6 percent of the subjects were employed. The subjects came from a
broad Apectrum of socioeconomic levels, with 22.5 percent earning
over $25,000 per year. Religious orientations varied. In sum, the
paraphiliacs in this study were a very heterogenous group.
The study evaluated how often subjects engaged in specific
paraphiliac acts. The acts occurring at the highest frequencies were:
masochism (mean number of acts per subject 1,139.2); frottage (mean
number of acts 849.5); exhibitionism (mean number of acts 504.9); and
voyeurism (mean number of acts 469.2).
Pedophilia (child molestation) occurred from the rate of 23.2 mean
number of acts for men involved with female children unrelated to
them to 281.7 mean number of acts per offender for men who were
involved with male children unrelated to them. For pedophilic incest,
mean number of acts involving female children were 81.3 compared to
62.3 for male children. The mean number of rapes per rapist was 7.2.
Previous psychiatric literature suggested that paraphiliacs partici-
pated in only one type of deviant sexual behavior. Research by Abel
and his colleagues 73 casts doubt on this conclusion. The researchers
found that the average number of paraphilia per subject was in the
range of three to five. Of the 159 men referred because of pedophilic
incest with a female victim, forty-nine percent also had the paraphilia
of non-incestuous pedophilia (female victim). That is, forty-nine per-
cent of the incest offenders against females were also aroused by fe-
male children unrelated to them. Of the 142 exhibitionists seen in the
572. Fed. Reg. (1975).
573. Abel, Mittelman, Becker, Rathner & Rouleau, Predicting Child Molesters Re-
sponse to Treatment, in 528 HUMAN SEXUAL AGGRESSION: CURRENT PERSPEC-
TIVES 223 (N.Y. Academy of Sciences 1988) [hereinafter Abel, Predicting].
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study, forty-six percent also had the diagnosis of female non-incestu-
ous pedophilia.
These findings are of significance in forming clinical judgments re-
garding paraphiliacs. First, sex offenders find it difficult to disclose
the extent of their deviant sexual behavior. Consequently, when man-
dated to receive an evaluation, it is highly likely that offenders at-
tempt to conceal the true nature and extent of their deviant sexual
interests. When sex offenders are guaranteed confidentiality regard-
ing past offenses, the likelihood of disclosure is increased. Second,
some individuals appearing before the court with "minor" sexual of-
fenses such as voyeurism or frottage may also have, or be developing,
other, more serious, paraphilia.
A further issue warranting attention and concern is sexual crimes
committed by juveniles. Abel, Mittelman, and Becker studied 411
adult sexual offenders and found that fifty-eight percent of the sub-
jects had onset of deviant sexual behavior during adolescence.574 Re-
search indicates that twenty percent of rapes and forty percent of
child sexual abuse are perpetrated by adolescents.575
Two recent studies describe populations of adolescent sexual of-
fenders. Fehrenbach and colleagues, reporting on a sample of 305 ado-
lescent sexual offenders, found that more than sixty percent of the
adolescents had sexually victimized a child younger than twelve.576
Becker and her colleagues reported that sixty-one percent of a sample
of eighty adolescent sexual offenders had engaged in sexual behavior
with children, the majority of whom were less than eight years of
age. 77 Twenty-one of the subjects were rapists, having committed a
total of forty-two rapes.
Unfortunately, sexual crimes committed by juveniles are often de-
scribed as innocent sex play and experimentation, or as normal ag-
gressiveness in sexually maturing adolescents. Recent research
suggests that sex offenses by adolescents are anything but innocent,
non-coercive sex play. Any juvenile who engages in age-inappropriate
or coercive sexual acts should receive a thorough assessment to deter-
mine whether treatment is indicated and what form of treatment is
warranted.
574. Abel, Mittelman & Becker, Sexual Offenders: Results Assessment and Recom-
mendations for Treatment, in CLINICAL CRIMINOLOGY: CURRENT CONCEPTS 191
(H. Ben-Aron, S. Huckers & C. Webster eds. 1985) [hereinafter Abel, Results].
575. Nationwide Crime Survey Report (U.S. Govt. Printing Office 1981).
576. Febrenbach, Smith, Monastersky & Deisher, Adolescent Sexual Offenders: Of-
fenders and Offense Characteristics, 56 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 225 (1986).
577. Becker, Cunningham-Rathner & Kaplan, The Adolescent Sexual Perpetrator
Demographics, Criminal History, Victims, Sexual Behaviors and Recommenda-
tions for Reducing Future Offenses, 1 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 421 (1986).
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b. Etiological Theories of Paraphilia
Why do people become paraphiliacs? On this question Berlin
writes:
Perhaps the first point that ought to be made in discussing why persons
experience particular types of sexual desires should be to emphasize that they
do not do so as a consequence of a voluntary decision .... Men who are sexu-
ally attracted to children are not this way because they wanted to be so.
Rather, in growing up they discovered that this was the nature of their sexual
orientation. Making such a discovery about oneself in our society can lead to
conflict, anguish, and difficulty. Stating that such persons are this way be-
cause they are bad and that we know they are bad because they are this way
simply attaches a label, which then masquerades as an explanation.
5 78
Numerous theories have been proposed to explain development of
paraphilia. Biological theories focus on the role of androgens, princi-
pally testosterone in male sexual behavior. 5 7 9 Other biologic abnor-
malitie which have been reported in a sex offender population
include chromosomal disorder and cortical atrophy.58 0 Studies inves-
tigating the role of biological factors have yielded equivocal results.
Further research is needed in this area.
Psychoanalytic theory views paraphilia as expressions of un-
resolved problems in childhood development. 58 1 Some psychoanalytic
theories suggest that a paraphilia represents an attempt by an individ-
ual to recreate and master early childhood punishment or
humilidtion.582
A number of researchers employ social learning theory to explain
paraphilia.58 3 Under this approach, the development and mainte-
nance of paraphilia is attributed to the influence of a particular social
learning context.5 8 4
Laws and Marshall propose a conditioning theory of the etiology
578. Berlin, Issues in the Exploration of Biological Factors Contributing to the Etiol-
ogy of the "Sex Offender," Plus Some Ethical Considerations, in 528 HUMAN SEX-
UAL AGGRESSION: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 183 (New York Academy of Sciences
1988).
579. See Bancroft, The Hormonal and Biochemical Basis of Human Sexuality, in
HUMAN SEXUALITY AND ITS PROBLEMS 64 (1983); Berlin, Sex Offenders: A Bi-
omedical Perspective and a Status Report on Biomedical Treatment, in THE SEX-
UAL AGGRESSOR: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON TREATMENT 83 (J. Greer & J. Stuart
eds. 1983); Bradford & McClean, Sexual Offenders, Violence and Testosterone: A
Clinical Study, 29 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 335 (1984).
580. See Berlin, supra note 579.
581. ADULT SEXUAL INTEREST IN CHILDREN (M. Cook & K. Howells eds. 1981); A.
STORR, SEXUAL DEVIATION (1964).
582. R. STOLLER, PERVERSION, THE EROTIC FORM OF HATRED (1975).
583. Abel, Results, supra note 574; Barlow & Abel, Sexual Deviation, in BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION 337 (W. Graigshead, A. Kazdin & M. Mahoney eds. 1976).
584. A. BANDURA, AGGRESSION: A SOCIAL LEARNING ANALYSIS (1973); McGuire, Car-
lisle & Young, Sexual Deviations as Conditioned Behaviour: A Hypothesis, 2
BEHAV. RE. & THERAPY 185 (1965).
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and maintenance of deviant sexual preference and behavior.58 5 Under
this model, "deviant sexual preferences and cognitions are acquired by
the same mechanisms by which other persons learn more convention-
ally accepted modes of sexual expression."58 6
c. Psychological Evaluation of Sexual Offenders
Numerous methods of psychological assessment are used to evalu-
ate sex offenders.58 7 It is important to emphasize, however, that there
is no psychological test or combination of tests that can determine
whether a person has engaged or will engage in deviant sexual activ-
ity. Psychological tests and instruments are useful aids to diagnosis
and treatment, but they cannot be used to determine whether an act
occurred.
Assessment batteries given to sex offenders often include: (1) a
clinical interview; (2) offense-specific tests (i.e., Sexual Interest Card-
sort and/or Cognitions Scale); (3) personality tests (i.e., Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MIMPI)); (4) projective tests (Ror-
schach, Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)). Assessment may also
include a penile plethysmograph evaluation, during which the of-
fender is presented deviant and non-deviant sexual stimuli while his
erection response is monitored using a penile transducer.5 8 8 Assess-
ment of the individual's sex knowledge and social-interpersonal skills
may also be conducted.
The clinical interview is one of the more popular methods for ar-
riving at a diagnosis. A major problem in relying solely on the clinical
interview is that the offender may minimize or deny the deviant
behavior.
The MMPI has been utilized extensively as an assessment instru-
ment. Levin and Stava reviewed thirty-six studies that used the
585. Laws & Marshall, A Conditioning Theory of the Etiology and Maintenance of
Deviant Sexual Preference and Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT. IS-
SUES, THEORIES, AND TREATMENT OF THE OFFENDER (W. Marshall, D. Laws & H.
Barbaree eds.) (in press).
586. Id. at - (in press).
587. For assistance in evaluating the efficacy of specific psychological tests and instru-
ments, see AMERICAN EDUCATION RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ASSOCIATION & NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MEASUREMENT IN EDUCATION,
STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (1985).
588. See People v. John IV., 185 Cal. App. 3d 801,229 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1986). In John W.,
the defense offered expert testimony that defendant was not a sexual deviant.
The expert had administered a clinical interview, an MMPI, and a penile plethys-
mograph examination. The expert's opinion that defendant was not a sexual de-
viant was predicated largely on defendant's response to theplethysmograph. The
trial judge rejected the expert testimony, and the court of appeal affirmed. The
court held that the penile plethysmograph was a novel scientific technique, and




MMPI with sex offenders.5 8 9 They found methodological problems in
most of the studies, and concluded that "in general, negative or incon-
sistent findings outweigh- those of a positive nature."59  Given that sex
offenders are a heterogenous group, it is understandable that research
findings have been equivocal.
Studies evaluating the social skills of child molesters and rapists in
comparison to non-sex offenders have, on the whole, found sex offend-
ers to be deficient in social skills.591
Abel and his colleagues found that a Cognition Scale was successful
in distinguishing a group of child molesters who voluntarily presented
for treatment. 92 Child molesters who admitted their acts and sought
treatment differed from non-sex offenders in their beliefs about the
approptiateness of sexual contact with children.
Direct assessment of sexual arousal in the male via erection mea-
surement appears to be the most reliable index of sexual arousal.
However, this form of assessment is not without problems.5 93 Penile
589. Lein & Stava, Personality Characteristics of Sex Offenders: A Review, 16
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 57 (1987).
590. Id.
591. Overholser & Beck, Multimethod Assessment of Rapists, Child Molesters, and
Three Control Groups on Behavioral and Psychological Measures, 54 J. CONSULT-
ING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 682 (1986); Segal & Marshall, Heterosexual Social
Skills in a Population of Rapists and Child Molesters, 53 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 55 (1985).
592. G. Abel, D. Gore, C. Holland, N. Camp, J. Becker & J. Rathner, The Measure-
ment of the Cognitive Distortion of Child Molesters (unpublished manuscript,
under review for publication).
593. Abel & Blanchard, The Measurement and Generation of Sexual Arousal in Male
Sexual Deviants, in PROGRESS IN BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: VOLUME 2 (M. Her-
sen, R. Eisler & P. Miller eds. 1976); Barlow, Assessment of Sexual Behavior, in
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT 461 (A. Cirminero, K. Calhourn & H.
Adams eds. 1977); Zuckerman, Psychological Measures of Sexual Arousal in the
Human, 75 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 297 (1971). See also American Prof. Society on
the Abuse of Children, Task Force on Assessment and Treatment of Perpetrators
of Child Sexual Abuse, Proposed Guidelines for Penile Plethysmography, 1 THE
ADVISOR 7 (Am. Prof. Soc. on the Abuse of Children Newsletter, Aug., 1988),
where Judith Becker writes:
Historically, the penile plethysmograph has been used in research set-
tings and with individuals who admitted paraphilic behavior. Murphy
and Barbaree (1988) note in their current extensive review on the use of
the plethysmograph, "The currently available evidence on validity and
reliability does not provide strong support for the use of this procedure
with populations where there are questions regarding whether the indi-
vidual has engaged in deviant behavior." That is, there is no evidence to
support the use of erection measures as a means of determining guilt or
innocence in an alleged sex crime. Therefore, since reliability and valid-
ity have not been established to date with non-admitters, there is no em-
pirical data to justify its use in diagnosis, or prediction of treatment
outcome or recidivism. Furthermore, norms for the various populations
are lacking in adolescents and a variety of ethnic groups.
In clinical settings penile plethysmography has proven exceedingly
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response is subject to voluntary control. Obviously, the possibility of
"faking" must be taken into account during assessment. Murphy and
Barbaree provide an extensive review and critique of studies employ-
ing erection measures with offender groups and normals.94 They
write that "[t]he currently available evidence on validity and reliabil-
ity does not provide strong support for the use of this procedure with
populations where there are questions regarding whether the individ-
ual has engaged in deviant behavior."595
In summary, psychological tests are useful tools in the clinical as-
sessment of individuals who acknowledge their behavior and seek
treatment. When working with individuals who deny deviant behav-
ior, however, all available psychological tests are subject to "faking"
and concealment. There is no psychological litmus test to detect sex-
ual deviancy.
d. Treatment'
Historically, individuals who engaged in sexual relations with mi-
nors were incarcerated. Incarceration serves the dual purposes of
preventing sex crimes outside the prison as long as the individual re-
mains incarcerated, and punishing the abuser. No studies indicate
that incarceration is effective in preventing sex crimes when the per-
petrator is released from prison.
During the past two decades, numerous attempts have been made
to provide treatment for individuals with unconventional sexual inter-
est patterns. The therapy modalities that have been employed can be
categorized as: (a) organic; (b) psychodynamic; (c) family therapy; and
(d) behavioral.
Early treatment literature consisted of case reports and uncon-
trolled studies.596 The studies were methodologically unsophisticated,
helpful. Using penile responses to deviant stimuli a therapist is fre-
quently able to confront clients with their laboratory arousal and get
them to self-disclose deviant sexual interest they had previously denied.
This clinical tool is one of a variety of other evaluative methods that a
therapist may use to form an opinion.
Especially problematic has been the appearance of penile plethys-
mography results in the courtroom setting. The use of penile plethys-
mography results in the courtroom is strongly discouraged until the
validity and reliability of its use in that setting have been established.
Research is in progress to establish psychometric properties of this form
of assessment.
594. W. Murphy & H. Barbaree, Assessments of Sexual Offenders by Measures of
Erectile Response: Psychometric Properties and Decision Making (manuscript
prepared under contract with NIMH, Order No. 86M0506500501D).
595. Id.
596. Quinsey, The Assessment and Treatment of Child Molesters: A Review, 18 CAN.
PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 204 (1977).
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and results were often difficult to interpret. Some recent treatment
research is methodologically rigorous, and lends itself to replication.
Organic treatments have focused on the reduction of sexual drive
by using antiandrogens to block or decrease the level of circulatory
androgens. The antiandrogenic medications which have been used
most extensively include medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA)597 and
cyproterone acetate (CPA).598 MPA appears to block testosterone
synthesis, whereas CPA blocks central and peripheral androgen re-
ceptors. These medications act to decrease libido as opposed to di-
recting sex drive toward appropriate adult partners. These
medications have the best outcome when used by individuals who ac-
knowledge their deviant sexual behavior and who also voluntarily par-
ticipate in individual or group therapy.
Another organic method, surgical castration, which involves surgi-
cal removal of the testicles, has been used extensively as a treatment
for sex offenders in Europe.5 99 However, studies suggest that this is
not an effective means of eliminating deviant behavior because almost
one-third of castrated men are still able to engage in intercourse.600
Psychoanalysis has been employed in the treatment of paraphilia.
Measuring the effectiveness of this form of treatment is complicated
since there are no common standards of measurement. Psychoanaly-
sis has been reported to have disappointing results.601
Family therapy has been utilized with mixed results in treatment
of incest offenders. 60 2 When the incest offender has a pedophilic
arousal pattern, the major goal should be to teach arousal control. If
the offender does not receive such specific treatment it would not be
unusual for family therapy to fail. Family therapy is an appropriate
adjunct to either specific individual or group therapy for sex
offenders.
A variety of behavior therapies have been utilized extensively in
the treatment of sex offenders. 603 These therapies focus on: (1) teach-
597. See Bradford, Organic Treatment for the Male Sexual Offender, 528 HUMAN SEX-
UAL AGGRESSION 193 (New York Academy of Sciences 1988); Davies, Cyproterone
Acetate for Male Hypersexuality, 2 J. INT'L MED. RESEARCH 159 (1974).
598. Id.
599. Heim, Sexual Behavior of Castrated Sex Offenders, 10 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV-
IOR 11 (1981).
600. Id.
601. ADULT SEXUAL INTEREST IN CHILDREN (M. Cook & K. Howells eds. 1981).
602. Eist & Mandel, Family Treatment of Ongoing Incest Behavior, 7 FAMILY PROCESS
216 (1968); Gutheil & Avery, Multiple Overt Incest as Family Defense Against
Loss, 16 FAM. PROCESS 105 (1977); Molnar & Cameron, Incest Syndromes: Obser-
vations in a General Hospital Psychiatric Unit, 20 CAN. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N J. 373
(1975).
603. For detailed reviews of behavioral treatment of pedophiles see Kelly, Behavioral
Reorientation of Pedophiles: Can It Be Done?, 2 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY REV. 387
(1982); Quinsey, supra note 596.
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ing the individual. control over inappropriate arousal; (2) confronting
values and beliefs which support deviant sexual behavior; (3) identify-
ing stimuli which serve to disinhibit control, such as alcohol abuse and
stressful life events; (4) providing sex education; (5) teaching social
competence; and (6) facilitating arousal to consensual peer partners.60 4
Abel, Mittelman, Becker, Rathner, and Rouleau report on the ef-
fectiveness of a multi-component cognitive-behavioral treatment pro-
gram for pedophiles seen as outpatients.60 5 One hundred and ninety-
two adult pedophiles entered a treatment program which consisted of
thirty ninety-minute sessions, held weekly in a group format. Ther-
apy consisted of six major components: (1) satiation; (2) covert sensi-
tization to deckease deviant arousal; (3) cognitive restructring;606 (4)
social skills training;, (5) assertive skills training; and (6) sex education
and sexual values clarification.
The study identified factors associated with successful treatment,
treatment drop-outs, and recidivism. Of the 192 pedophiles that en-
tered treatment, 65.1 percent completed the program. Factors predic-
tive of treatment dropout included: (1) a diagnosis of antisocial
-personality disorder; (2) amount of pressure to participate (the more
pressure the offender was under, the greater the likelihood that he
would drop out); and (3) the lack of discrimination in the choice of
sexual victim or paraphiliac act (offenders who had committed sexual
acts against both males and females and children and/or adolescents
were more likely to drop out).
Of the ninety-eight offenders who presented for a one-year follow-
up, twelve had re-offended. Factors associated with recidivism in-
cluded: (1) marital status (those offenders who were single or di-
vorced were more likely to re-offend); (2) those who re-offended were
less likely to endorse the goals of the treatment program (which in-
cluded decreasing pedophilic behavior); and (3) re-offenders were
more likely to have committed sexual crimes against both males and
females, and against both children and adolescents.
The findings of.this study aid clinicians in identifying sex offenders
who are likely to drop out of treatment. Efforts can be made to help
such clients remain in therapy. In addition, knowing which clients are
604. Becker, Kaplan & Kavoussi, Measuring the Effectiveness of Treatment for the
Aggressive Adolescent Sexual Offender, 528 HUMAN SEXUAL AGGRESSION: CUR-
RENT PERSPECTIVES 215 (New York Academy of Sciences 1988); Marshall &
Barbaree, An Outpatient Treatment Program for Child Molesters, 528 HumAN
SEXUAL AGGRESSION: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 295 (New York Academy of Sci-
ences 1988); G. Abel, J. Becker, J. Cunningham-Rather, J. Rouleau, M. Kaplan &
J. Reich, The Treatment of Child Molesters: A Manual (unpublished manuscript,
1984).
605. Abel, Predicting, supra note 573.
606. Alteration of the pedophile's maladaptive beliefs about his behavior.
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more likely to re-offend alerts clinicians to clients in need of more
extensive supervision.
Quinsey comments on studies of behavioral treatment. "Taken as
a whole, these treatment studies provide grounds for cautious opti-
mism. Practically, they suggest that brief focused treatments can be
effective, particularly when combined with continuing community in-
terventions. Thus for child molesters who have high densities of of-
fending, such interventions appear cost effective and socially
beneficial."07
While specific treatment for sex offenders, which addresses their
inappropriate sexual arousal, has been demonstrated to be effective,
further research is needed. Furthermore, treatment outcome studies
must include long-term follow-up to evaluate whether treatment goals
are maintained, and what factors contribute to relapse prevention in
different categories of offenders.
Regardless of the theory of treatment, success is unlikely when the
therapist or treatment program lacks specialized skill and experience.
The following factors can be employed as guidelines in selecting a
treatment agent:
1. Is the treatment agent a recognized specialist in treatment of sex
offenders?
2. Does the treatment agent have extensive experience in treating
sexual offenders?
3. Does the treatment agent have specialized experience in treating
an offender with the type of paraphilia with which the client
presents?
4. How many clients has the treatment agent treated who present
with the type of paraphilia(s) the client has?
5. What form of assessment has the treatment agent utilized to ar-
rive at the need for treatment?
6. What does the treatment agent feel are the specific treatment
needs and issues? The treatment agent should be able to explain
precisely what will be addressed in treatment.
7. How will the treatment agent assess treatment progress? What
are the pre-treatment and post-treatment assessment measures
to be utilized? Are the measures empirically grounded?
8. How many clients has the agent successfully treated and what
factors are associated with relapse?
9. What is the procedure utilized for follow-up?
10. Is the treatment cost effective?
While significant advances have been made in the assessment and
607. Quinsey, Men Who Have Sex with Children, in LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH: IN-
TERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (D. Weisstub ed., in press).
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treatment of sex offenders, much remains to be done. The field lacks
an empirically tested model to explain why some people develop
paraphilia and commit sexual crimes. Also lacking is a reliable and
valid typology of subtypes of offenders.
In conclusion, sex offender specialists can be of assistance to the
legal system in a number of ways: (1) to evaluate whether the of-
fender understands the seriousness and inappropriateness of the be-
havior; (2) to evaluate the treatment needs of offenders; and (3) to
recommend and implement specific treatment procedures.
2. Behavioral Science Testimony Regarding Offender
Characteristics or Profiles
In a small number of reported decisions dealing with physical and
sexual abuse, the prosecution offered to prove that defendant matched
a psychological profile of persons who abuse children. In another
group of decisions, the defense sought to establish innocence through
evidence that defendant was not similar to the "typical" child abuser.
These decisions are discussed below.
a. Physical Abuse Cases
While the focus of this Article is on sexual abuse, it is instructive to
review cases in which psychological profile evidence is offered to
prove or disprove guilt of physical abuse. Psychological research dis-
closes that a number of parents who physically abuse their children
share certain character traits. In State v. Loebach,6o8 a child abuse ex-
pert testified that "[a]busing parents frequently experience role rever-
sal and often expect their children to care for them .... [They] often
exhibit... characteristics such as low empathy, a short fuse, ... strict
authoritarianism, uncommunicativeness, low self-esteem, isolation
and lack of trust." 09
In addition to the traits described above, many physically abusive
parents were physically or sexually abused by their own parents. 10
Adults possessing the foregoing traits may be at increased risk of abus-
ing their children. The phrase "battering parent syndrome" was
coined to describe the constellation of characteristics observed in some
abusive parents.
In the legal context, when an individual charged with physical
abuse demonstrates character traits found in the battering parent syn-
drome, arguably there is an increased likelihood that the person com-
608. 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981).
609. Id. at 62-63.
610. See Berger, The Child Abusing Family, 8 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 53, 55 (1980);




mitted the alleged abuse.611
Prosecutors have occasionally sought admission of testimony
designed to establish that a defendant's personality fit the battering
parent syndrome.612 The purpose of such evidence is to convince the
trier of fact that because the defendant fits the profile of a battering
parent, the defendant is probably guilty.
Courts have refused to admit evidence of battering parent syn-
drome because such proof contravenes the rule against character evi-
dence, is highly prejudicial, and is of marginal relevance.613 An
occasional decision suggests that if further research establishes the va-
lidity of the battering parent syndrome, such evidence may become
admissible.6 4
Decisions rejecting the battering parent syndrome are correct. A
cardinal principle of American law holds that evidence of a person's
character generally is not admissible to prove that the person acted in
conforihity therewith on a particular occasion.615 Teitlbaum and
Hertz say it well when they remark:
[Thd law] makes inadmissible, with certain exceptions, evidence relevant on
the following theory: Defendant committed a wrong in the past; defendant
therefore has a propensity or a character trait for committing wrongful acts;
therefore defendant is more likely to have engaged in the act for which he is
on trial than is someone not known to have this character trait.6 1 6
This maxim finds expression in Rule 404(a) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which states that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion." 61 7
611. Such proof is relevant within the meaning of Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which cefines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
See State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350, 353 (Utah 1985)(court rejected testimony offered
by defendant that he did not fit the profile of a child sexual abuser even though
the testimony was found to be relevant).
612. See Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983); Sloan v. State, 70 Md. App.
630, 522 A.2d 1364 (1987), cert. denied, 310 Md. 276, 528 A.2d 1287 (1987)(revers-
ible error to admit testimony concerning "classic indicators" of a child abuser);
State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981); State v. Goblirsch, 309 Minn. 401,
246 N.W.2d 12 (1976); State v. Loss, 295 Minn. 271, 204 N.W.2d 404 (1973).
613. See cases collected supra note 612. See also Note, The Battering Parent Syn-
drome: Inexpert Testimony as Character Evidence, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 653
(1984).
614. Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 76 n.7, 303 S.E.2d 13, 18 n.7 (1983); State v. Loebach,
310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981).
615. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); Ali v. United States,
520 A.2d 306, 309 (D.C. 1987); Myers, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child
Abuse Litigation, 1988 UTAH L. REv. 479.
616. Teitelbaum & Hertz, Evidence II: Evidence of Other Crimes as Proof of Intent, 13
N.M. L. REV. 423, 423-24 (1983).
617. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs charac-
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Proof of battering parent syndrome violates Rule 404(a) because
the syndrome draws its evidentiary force from the chain of inferences
forbidden by the Rule. The syndrome rests on the following logic: (1)
People who physically abuse children possess certain character traits;
(2) Defendant possesses such traits, and consequently defendant has a
propensity or a character trait for child abuse; (3) Therefore, defend-
ant probably acted in conformity with character on the occasion in
question, and committed the charged abuse. This is character evi-
dence, and it is properly excluded when offered by the state to prove
guilt.
McCord employs the term "'group' character evidence" to describe
this type of evidence.618 He writes:
[Tihis type of testimony is not immediately recognizable as character
testimony.
Traditionally character testimony attempts to prove that because the de-
fendant acted in a particular way in the past, he is likely to have acted the
same way with respect to the crime charged. "Group" character evidence, by
contrast, attempts to prove that because other persons have acted in certain
ways in the past, a defendant who shares common characteristics with those
persons is likely to have acted in the same way with respect to the crime
charged. A moment's reflection on these categories of evidence reveals that
"group" character evidence is objectionable for the same reason as is tradi-
tional character evidence: probative value depends upon the jury drawing the
forbidden inference that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime
with which he is charged.6 1 9
When battering parent syndrome is offered by the state to prove
guilt, it is properly excluded as inadmissible character evidence. Un-
like the prosecution, however, the defendant is permitted to offer
character evidence to establish innocence. 620 Rule 404(a)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence permits "[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of
character offered by an accused ... ." Theoretically, a defendant
charged with physical abuse could offer proof that he or she does not
fit the battering parent profile. If the defense offers such evidence,
however, the door opens for the prosecution to offer rebutting charac-
ter evidence.62l
In State v. Conlogue,622 the defendant was charged with physical
abuse. He sought to exculpate himself by proving that the victim's
mother, with whom defendant lived, committed the assault. Defend-
ant sought to support this defense with proof that the mother had the
ter evidence used to prove conduct in conformity with character. The Rule does
not govern character evidence offered to impeach credibility, nor does it regulate
cases in which character is in issue.
618. McCord, Syndromes, supra note 73, at 51.
619. Id. at 52 (emphasis in original)(footnote omitted).
620. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
621. Id.
622. 474 A.2d 167 (Me. 1984).
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characteristics of a battering parent. The trial court excluded the evi-
dence on the ground that it was inadmissible character evidence. The
Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the lower court's decision, rul-
ing that defendant had a right to offer evidence casting blame else-
where, and that the proffered evidence had that effect. In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Scolnik agreed with the trial judge that defendant's
evidence was inadmissible character evidence.623
Regardless of which party offers battering parent syndrome evi-
dence, serious questions persist about the syndrome's reliability.
Before hdmitting such evidence, courts should evaluate the syndrome
under the applicable test for determining admissibility of novel scien-
tific evidence.
b. Sexual Abuse Cases
In the realm of sexual abuse, the discussion in the clinical and sci-
entific section discloses that sex offenders are a heterogeneous group
with few shared characteristics apart from a predilection for deviant
sexual behavior. Furthermore, there is no psychological test or device
that reliably detects persons who have or will sexually abuse children.
Thus, it is appropriate to conclude that under the current state of sci-
entific knowledge, there is no profile of a "typical" child molester.
Despite the lack of a reliable profile, an occasional prosecutor has
offered expert testimony describing the character traits of a "typical"
child molester. In United States v. Gillespie,624 for example, defendant
was charged with sexual abuse of his three-year-old goddaughter. De-
fendant acknowledged that the child had been abused, but denied re-
sponsibility. The government offered the testimony of an expert to
rebut what it termed defendant's assertion that he could not have
abused the child. The court summarized the expert's testimony as fol-
lows: "Dr. Maloney testified that the characteristics of a molester in-
clude an early disruption in the family environment, often with one
parent missing: a relationship with the parent of the opposite sex
who is dominant; unsuccessful relationships with women; a poor self-
concept; and general instability in the background." 625
The trial judge admitted the expert's testimony. In reversing the
ensuing conviction, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that such
testimony constituted character evidence designed to establish that
defendant had a propensity for child sexual abuse. Defendant had not
placed his character in issue; therefore, the expert testimony was
inadmissible.
623. Id. at 173 (Scolnik, J., dissenting in part).
624. 852 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1988). See also State v. Clements, 770 P.2d 447 (Kan.
1989) (collecting cases); 42 A.L.R. 4th 937 (1985).
625. 852 F.2d at 480.
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There are other reasons to reject such testimony. First, the clinical
and scientific literature does not support the existence of a profile of a
"typical" child sexual abuser. Second, the testimony offered in Gilles-
pie was so general and ambiguous that it lacked probative value.
Thousands of men who would never think of abusing a child possess
the personality traits described by Dr. Maloney. The risk is very high
that the jury will be confused or misled by such testimony.
In several cases, prosecutors offered a variant of profile evidence to
prove sexual abuse. Such evidence may take the form of testimony
describing the "typical" techniques employed by child molesters to
get close to their victims.6 26 In Haakanson v. State,627 for example,
the defendant was charged with sexual abuse-of three adolescent girls.
The state's first witness was a police officer who described techniques
employed by child abusers to ingratiate themselves to children. De-
fendant objected unsuccessfully that such testimony was inadmissible
because it described a sex offender profile. On appeal, the state con-
ceded that the trial court erred in admitting the officer's testimony.
The government attempted to persuade the court of appeal that the
error was harmless. The attempt failed. The court held that "the
prosecution may not introduce a profile to show that the defendant is
more likely to have committed an offense because the defendant fits
within that profile."628 Such evidence violates the rule against charac-
ter evidence.6 29 The court concluded that admission of the evidence
denied defendant a fair trial.
As was the case in Gillespie and Haakanson, prosecution attempts
to prove guilt through profile evidence should be rejected. Should a
different result follow when the defense offers profile evidence? In a
number of reported decisions the defendant offered expert testimony
that he did not fit within a profile of a "typical" child sexual abuser.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a defendant is permitted to of-
fer evidence of a pertinent trait of character to prove innocence.630 In
a child sexual abuse case the theory of such evidence is that because
defendant lacks the personality traits found in persons who sexually
626. See State v. Hansen, 304 Or. 169, 743 P.2d 157 (1987). In this case the state offered
the testimony of a police officer describing the techniques used by child molesters
to get close to their victims. The court ruled that such evidence "has no bearing
on whether a person who does these things is a child abuser." Id. at 176, 743 P.2d
at 161. Thus, the evidence was irrelevant. See also Dunnington v. State, 740
S.W.2d 899, 902 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)(testimony on grooming practices not beyond
ken of average juror, therefore, expert testimony not needed).
627. 760 P.2d 1030 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). But see Rodriquez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200
(Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
628. Haakanson v. State, 760 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
629. The court wrote: 'The weight of authority clearly suggests that Rule 404(a) pro-
hibits the profile testimony introduced at trial, unless the defense has raised the
issue first." Id.
630. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
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abuse children, the defendant probably did not commit the charged
offense.
This theory of proof is defective. The relevant scientific literature
does not support the conclusion that there is a reliable profile of a
"typical" sex offender. Despite this fact, however, some mental health
professionals are willing to testify that a profile exists. Faced with
such testimony, a number of courts have determined that sex offender
profiles are a form of novel scientific evidence. Courts adopting this
approach correctly conclude that profile evidence has not found gen-
eral acceptance in the relevant scientific community.6 31
The decision to exclude profile evidence' offered by either the de-
fense or the prosecution is buttressed by the fact that such evidence
may be unfairly prejudicial and confusing.632 The evidence invites un-
warranted consumption of trial time.633
I. A New Concept: Court Appointed Experts on Child Development
Children take the witness stand with increasing frequency. It is
not uncommon for children as young as three and four to testify.
When the individual on the witness stand is a child whose head is
barely visible above the rail of the witness box, and whose feet dangle
a foot or more from the floor, the judge and the attorneys face unique
challenges.
Young witnesses have special needs which must be understood if
children are to testify effectively. In some cases, it may be appropriate
for the judge to appoint a neutral expert on child development to as-
sist the court in understanding the developmental and psychological
needs of particular child witnesses. A developmental expert could as-
sist court and counsel in numerous ways. For example, the expert
could advise the court on steps that could be taken to render testifying
631. See United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1987)(trial court prop-
erly refused to appoint expert to examine defendant to determine whether he fit
a sex offender profile which was not generally accepted by scientific community);
People v. John W., 185 Cal. App. 3d 803, 804-06, 229 Cal. Rptr. 783, 785 (1986)(de-
fense expert would have testified that he could find no evidence of deviant sexual
interest in defendant based upon clinical interview, MMPI, and penile plethysmo-
graph, where expert relied heavily on results of plethysmograph; court held that
plethysmograph was novel scientific evidence, and there was no showing of ac-
ceptance in the relevant scientific community); State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 520-
23, 443 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1982)(testimony that defendant did not have character
traits of a rapist not generally accepted in scientific community). See also Dun-
nington v. State, 740 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)(subject of grooming
potential victims not beyond ken of jury).
632. See State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350, 353 (Utah 1985)(profile evidence offered by de-
fendant is relevant as evidence of a pertinent trait of defendant's character; trial
court properly rejected the evidence under Rule of Evidence 403 because it could
confuse and mislead the jury).
633. See State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 518-20, 443 A.2d 1020, 1025 (1982).
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less traumatic for a child. The expert might inform the court of a
child's cognitive and communicative abilities so that the court can con-
trol the proceedings to enable the child to communicate effectively.
A court appointed expert on child development should not offer
testimony on the substance of allegations of child sexual abuse. The
expert should remain strictly nonpartisan. The expert's role is not to
prove or disprove abuse, but to assist the court in executing the diffi-
cult responsibilities of ensuring a fair trial, protecting vulnerable child
witnesses, and fostering complete and accurate testimony.
V. CONCLUSION
Expert testimony plays an important role in child sexual abuse liti-
gation. Such testimony can assist the jury in many ways. Yet, the
issues raised by expert testimony are exceedingly complex, and
clinical and scientific understanding of child sexual abuse is still devel-
oping. Courts should proceed cautiously when considering the admis-
sibility of expert testimony on child sexual abuse. It is vitally
important that professionals offering such testimony be highly quali-
fied. Courts should insist on a thorough showing of expertise before
permitting individuals to testify as experts. Furthermore, courts
should require the proponent of expert testimony to lay a complete
foundation so that the court understands precisely how the evidence is
relevant. When appropriate caution is exercised, qualified experts can
assist in attaining justice.
19891
